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SADOLETO
ON EDUCATION

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SADOLETO ON EDUCATION

A TRANSLATION OF THE DE PUERIS RECTE INSTITUENDIS

WITH NOTES AND INTRODUCTION BY

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In a chapel along the north wall of the Cathedral at Carpentras there is a cenotaph with the following inscription: over the top are the words

QVASI MORIENTES ET ECCE VIVIMVS.

Upon the tablet in the centre:

D. O. M. S.

IACOBO SADOLETO EPISCOPO CARPENTORACTIS S.R.E. PRESB. CARDINALI VIRO MORVM GRAVITATE PRVDENTIA ET VITAE INTEGRITATE PRAESTANTISSIMO DOCTRINA ET ELOQVENTIA CVM IIS QVOS MIRATA EST ANTIQVITAS CONFERENDO PAVLVS SADOLETVS EPISCOPVS CARPENT. CVM NE SEPVLCHRO QVIDEM AB EO VELLET ESSE SEIVNCTVS CVM QVO EIVSDEM REGĒDAE ECCLESIAE OFFICIO DEO AVCTORE CONIVNCTVS FVISSET PATRVO DE SE OPTIME MERITO FECIT ET SIBI. ANNO AB ORTV SALVATORIS M.D.LVII.

INTRODUCTION

I

THE Empire and the Papacy had been conceived and established to preserve against alien and destructive forces two ideas, diverse in origin and in character, and yet destined to a strange union. Roman civilization and Christianity, a kingdom of this world and a kingdom not of this world, the one fastening its domination on subject peoples more firmly by the spell of its name than by the force of its armies, the other (to balance paradox with paradox) not loth to support a spiritual claim by material power,—these two were both threatened; and a common danger cemented an alliance fruitful in whatever has been most noble and most astonishing in the history of the Western World. While men were making ramparts and building walls they had neither time nor strength for anything but these absorbing tasks, but once safe they were at leisure to think. Wrought hitherto into solidarity by united efforts for self-protection and by acts beaten by repetition into the habit of a common routine, they now became individuals again, and took account both of themselves and of the world in which they lived. Security prompted reflection, and they were driven upon a problem the solution of which, never reached, is yet the distant and disappointing goal

to which human thought is by relentless necessity urged.

The structure of Society governs the ideas of its members, and is fashioned to express and to preserve them; but ideas new born demand for their existence, their growth and their fruitful operation a re-shaping and an enlargement of the boundaries of Society. How to keep without petrifying what has been good, how to welcome what is new without treachery to the old—this is a question which recurs, though men may forget it when for a moment they are lulled to somnolent content with the smooth organization of Society as they know it, or when fascinated by new ideas they forget that these must be adapted to the general life and the common purposes of the social organism which can claim their parentage by a right as good as that of the bright particular minds from which they seemed to trace their descent.

Wisdom often counsels men to take things as they are, and humour sometimes bids them accept inconsistencies, not with the tough determined hands of those who grasp nettles, but with the smiling acquiescence of critics, sensitive indeed to the oddness of the world, but not responsible for it—sometimes and often, but not always, or wisdom would become a cowardly prudence, and humour a very bitter cynicism.

It was not possible in the time of Sadoleto for honest men, who permitted themselves to reflect, to be content with the position and the pretensions of the Church either as a temporal power

or as a Christian community. The spectacle of authority threatened from without, and distrustful of itself,—of avarice, corruption or pride patent and unashamed in those whose office it was to teach and to practise renunciation, purity and meekness,—of worldly splendour eclipsing the gentler light of modesty, and of cruelty trampling upon weakness, made them think either of reform by rearrangement, or else of a reform which differed little from a fresh beginning after revolution and destruction. To minds already engaged with these great questions the new learning came as treasure-trove, as a gift from heaven. For some the new studies, providing as yet no system or coherent scheme of thought or of life, but commanding their interest and energy, seemed to sanction indifference or to warrant scorn of the forms of belief and conduct established by use and guarded by authority. Scholarship needs ample leisure; pretence of scholarship needs more; the genuine student and the precious or pretty dilettante gave the leisure which they claimed and won to whatever most strongly attracted them, and, with either a pardonable preoccupation or a culpable negligence, set aside the duties which they owed to the general community. Others found irresistible the temptation to live, if they could, in two worlds, and adapted the language of the Classics to the sentiments and doctrines of the Church, or employed the forms of Christian expression for Hellenic ideas, doing violence at once to scholarship and to orthodoxy. There were others yet who hoped to find in the new learning a cure

for the troubles of their time; to reconcile Christian ideals with Hellenic culture, and direct the lives of individuals by a scheme of education in which physical and intellectual training should balance and enhance the value of moral and religious discipline, and with a wide and generous range include the task of shaping the character of nations and moulding their destinies. Not less than this was their ambition.

How ardently and yet with what reserve Sadoleto made this ambition his own, the treatise which is here presented to the student affords evidence.

He had two signal qualifications for the task to which inclination and duty directed him: he had sincerity and kindness. There is high authority, to which Sadoleto paid reverence, for dividing intellectual from moral virtues. Sincerity may be placed equally well in either category. Honesty, simplicity, clearness, moderation, severity, restraint, dignity,—all these are qualities which sincerity gathers up into itself; and they are the qualities of the good man and of the good scholar. And kindness, too, belongs to the mind as well as to the heart. The vivid and genial enjoyment of the world, the disposition to spread happiness, and, under the impulse of a catholic sympathy controlled by a rigorous taste, to discover and acclaim kindred with all men, a sensitive discrimination lifted above all risk of meanness by an exuberant generosity,—these are proofs and fruits of humane learning and of natural but disciplined piety.

It would be idle to maintain that Sadoleto made the reconciliation complete between rival and conflicting forces and tendencies, or that he reached a goal which ever baffles and attracts human effort; that he contributed much to achieve it, that he went far upon the road, cannot be denied. The praise bestowed by St. Jerome [1] on Christian writers of his time who united classical learning with Christian feeling, was equally deserved by Sadoleto.

Where strong and impetuous streams meet, only a fool would look for smooth water; later, indeed, they may be tamed, and drawn into the dull and useful lines of a canal; or they may defy subjection and urge their way, first in turbulent rivalry of sparkling and foaming commotion, presently in full and swift but tranquil course, to a distant engulfing sea. Sadoleto stood on the narrowing strip of land at which the rivers converged; he had tracked them, this way and that, high upward towards their sources, and descending to the point of tumultuous junction surveyed the conflict with serenity and tempered hope. He had no desire to rob them of their vehement life, or to enslave them to the sordid uses of pedants or bigots; he had some prophetic vision of their late but certain union, their force augmented by fusion and attested by quietness, their waters lit by a far-shining peace.

[1] 'Qui omnes in tantum philosophorum doctrinis atque sententiis suos referciunt libros, ut nescias quid in illis primum admirari debeas, eruditionem saeculi an scientiam Scripturarum' (Jerome, *Ep.* 10, *Ad Magnum Oratorem*).

II

Jacopo Sadoleto was born in 1477 at Modena, the son of Giovanni Sadoleto,[1] a man of high reputation as well for his goodness as for his skill and learning in law. His early education was entrusted to Niccolò Leoniceno,[2] a student and teacher of medicine and of philosophy at Ferrara. He learned Latin and Greek quickly, and, at an age when most boys are engaged upon the acquisition of words and the forms of grammar, could make his way to the meaning of authors. His father, delighted with his ability thus proved, hoped that his son would enter his own profession; but Jacopo's inclination was to philosophy and to

[1] Professor of Law at Pisa and Ferrara.

[2] Niccolò Leoniceno (1428–1524). Born at Lonigo (Leonicum), near Vicenza. Studied medicine at Padua: taught at Ferrara, where he was a colleague of Giovanni Sadoleto at the Academy. Gave much of his time to letters and the study of the classics, as witness the following works:

1. *De Plinii et plurium aliorum in medicina erroribus.* Ferrara, 1492, 4°.
2. *Liber de epidemia quam vulgo morbum gallicum vocant.* Venice, 1497, 4°.
3. *De dipsade et pluribus aliis serpentibus.* Venice, *c.* 1498, 4°.
4. *In libros Galeni a se translatos ad artem medicinalem praefatio. De tribus doctrinis ordinatis secundum Galeni sententiam praefatio et opus ipsum. Galeni in Hippocratis aphorismos commentarius.* Ferrara, 1509, 4°.
5. *Libri duo Galeni de curandi ratione ad Glauconem latine versi.* Pavia, 1514, 4°.

Published after his death:

6. *Opuscula medica.* Basel, 1552.
7. *Conversio in latinum atque explanatio primi libri Aristotelis de partibus animalium.* Venice, 1540, 8°.

letters. He attempted poetry, with some success. His hexameters on M. Curtius are not without dignity; his poem on the Laocoon (discovered in 1506) drew from Bembo warm praise—to have read the poem, he said, was to have seen the statue—and from the Pope a present of a manuscript of Plato. His model in prose was Cicero; with Aristotle he began philosophy, though to Plato he soon betook himself.

At the age of 22 he went to Rome and placed himself in the protection of Oliviero Caraffa,[1] under whose roof he lived for several years, winning the admiration of many persons of distinction and power. His modesty of demeanour, his practised but spontaneous reserve, his courage and his austere self-control commended his brilliant parts to shrewd judges. Among these was Fregoso,[2] Bishop of

[1] Oliviero Caraffa (1430–1511). Archbishop of Naples 1458. Cardinal 1467. 'Nullus fuit non Romae tantum, et in Italia, sed in universo fere Christiano orbe literarum scientia, ac doctrina, insignis, aut discendi studio illectus adolescens, qui Oliverii beneficium ac liberalitatem non sit expertus.' Ciaconius, *Vitae Pont. Rom. et Card.*, Rome, 1677. Vol. ii, pp. 1097–1105.

[2] Federico Fregoso (*c.* 1480–1541). Born at Genoa. Appointed Archbishop of Salerno by Julius II in 1507. The King of Spain refused to confirm the appointment, because Fregoso had supported the claims of France in the late wars. The Pope accordingly gave him the bishopric of Gubbio. At the court of his uncle, the Duke of Urbino, he met Bembo and Castiglione, with whom he kept a lifelong friendship. From 1510 to 1513 he lived in Rome, where he became intimate with Sadoleto. He took a leading part in defending his native city against the troops of Charles V, and when, in 1522, he had to flee he was cordially received by Francis I, who

Salerno, into whose household he was after the death of Caraffa taken. Here he had for companion Pietro Bembo,[1] to whom he was already allied by common interests and tastes, and with whom he was to be associated throughout his life.

His scholarship, his industry and his piety were valued and rewarded by Fregoso, who gave him a small ecclesiastical charge in Rome; his generosity was recognized and praised by those who surrounded him, for he used his rapidly increasing influence to secure promotion not for himself, but for others.

gave him a benefice at Dijon, where he lived for seven years during which he devoted himself to the study of Hebrew and the reform of the rule of his Abbey. In 1529 he returned to Italy; but deposed from the archbishopric of Salerno, he administered the see of Gubbio till his death. In 1539 he had been created Cardinal by Paul III. A funeral oration upon him was delivered by Sadoleto at Carpentras.

Works:

1. *Parafrasi sopra il Pater noster in terza rima.*
2. *Trattato dell' orazione.* Venice, 1542, 8°.
3. *Meditazioni sopra Salmi 130 e 145.*
4. *Orazione a' Genovesi.*
5. *Letters to Bembo, Sadoleto,* &c.

[1] Pietro Bembo (1470–1547). Born at Venice. Went to Florence at the age of 8 with his father, who was appointed Ambassador of Venice to that city. Returning to Venice after two years, he studied there till 1492, when he went to Messina to work under Constantine Lascaris. He afterwards studied at Padua, and Ferrara, where his friendship with Sadoleto was formed. From Ferrara he returned to Venice, where he became a prominent member of the Academy of Aldus Manutius. He subsequently became joint secretary to Giovanni de' Medici (Leo X) along with Sadoleto. He passed most of his later life at Padua. He was made a Cardinal in 1539 by Paul III.

Occupied in the duty which Fregoso had assigned him and with the quiet tasks of a student, he spent in Rome the years covered by the later portion of Alexander VI's Pontificate, and the period in which, following him, Pius III and then Julius II sat in the chair of St. Peter. Alert and observant, protected by the purity of his nature from influences which demoralized or hardened other men, but sharing eagerly, yet with finely tempered discretion, in all the elements of the brilliant and varied culture of that time, he was learning to form shrewd estimates of character, and while he sought no prominence for himself was not unnoticed.

In 1513 Giovanni de' Medici, second son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, was elected Pope, as Leo X. One of his first acts was to appoint Sadoleto and Bembo to be his secretaries. The two friends were thus again united in fortune. The office was one for which Sadoleto, not less than his friend, was eminently well qualified; it was an office which gave him great power; we learn from Florebelli [1] that he never asked a favour for himself. As in the bestowal of patronage he was scrupulous, so he would accept no reward from those whose advancement he secured.

A few years later, in 1517, the bishopric of

[1] Antonio Florebelli (Fiordibello) (*c.* 1510–74). Born at Modena. Studied law, literature, and philosophy. Was successively secretary to Sadoleto and Cardinal Crescenzi (whom he accompanied to the Council of Trent). In 1557 became Bishop of Avella. He was intimate with Bembo and other notable scholars of his day. Among his works is a treatise entitled *De auctoritate Ecclesiae*. Lyon, 1546.

Carpentras, near Avignon, fell vacant. Sadoleto was at the time visiting Notre-Dame de Lorette, and during his absence he was elected to the see by the Pope. He tried at once to put the office and the honour from him, but when he returned to Rome yielded to the command of the Pope, and accepted with submission what other men had clamoured to get. While Leo X lived Sadoleto was, however, unable to enter his diocese, detained by his duties in Rome. The care of the see he placed for the time in the hands of men judiciously selected for the task; but as soon as Adrian VI became Pope (in 1522) he hastened to Carpentras, where he was eagerly welcomed, and where he remained during the short reign of that Pontiff, happily engaged in the service of his Church and supported by the affection of his people.

But his interests went beyond the routine work of a bishop. About the time of Adrian's accession, or perhaps a little earlier, a society known as the Oratory of Divine Love had been established. Sadoleto and Caraffa[1] both belonged to this organization, which numbered fifty or sixty members. They were bound to work and to pray for the purification of the Church. Their aims and their methods have been succinctly described. They combined 'a stern and almost Puritan moral ideal . . . with a belief that there was no essential antagonism between faith and culture, between profane learning and Christian knowledge.

[1] Giovanni Pietro Caraffa (1476–1559). Succeeded to the Papacy in 1555, at the age of 79. One of the most resolute reformers of the Church from within and the most determined foe of the Reformation from without.

As the great mediaeval theologians and scholastics had interpreted Christianity to their age, and had harmonized the divergent elements in the knowledge of their time, so now in the Oratory of Divine Love the feeling found expression that the work had to be done afresh, and that the new revelation given to men by the Renaissance must be incorporated into the system of Christian thought.' [1]

Sadoleto was recalled to Rome by Clement VII, but begged that he should be allowed to go back to Carpentras after at most three years. Clement used him not as a minister, but as a friend and counsellor, though he was more ready to hear than to accept advice, and disposed rather to adopt than consistently to pursue the policy which in deference to it he had initiated. With the Pope's reluctant assent Sadoleto returned to Carpentras, to him a haven of rest and refuge—'locus ab omni terrore et tumultu liber' [2] he calls it in a letter (1527) to Bembo. In another letter, written eight years later to Paullus, he describes his life there—'nos hic in suavissimo otio vivimus; copia rerum abundamus (praeterquam pecuniae) pene omnium'.[3]

Sadoleto had advised the Pope against war with Charles V: he had recommended him, after the war was begun, to accept peace on any terms. His counsels were not obeyed. It was a dramatic

[1] *Cambridge Modern History*, ii. 640.

[2] Vol. i. Epp. I. 3. *Iacobi Sadoleti opp. omn.* ed. J. A. Tumerman. Verona, 1737–8; henceforward quoted as *V.*

[3] *V.* vol. ii. Epp. ad Paullum 6.

vindication of his wisdom that not many days after he had left Rome the city was taken and sacked. The Bishop of Carpentras was full of sorrow for Rome, for his friends and, above all, for his master the Pope. Of his private losses the hardest to bear was that of his books;[1] but his spirit, the strength of which Erasmus noted—('non admittit animus tuus deficientis vocabulum'[2])—was unbroken, and his temper unruffled. 'Nudus in has oras', he writes, 'tamquam ex naufragio sum compulsus: at liber . . . utpote cui iam non in his rebus externis . . . animi sit quies et vitae beatitudo reposita.' Erasmus, condoling[3] with Sadoleto on the destruction of his library—'libros, rem sacratissimam'—relieved his own feelings, if not those of his correspondent, with characteristically vehement abuse of those by whom the outrage was done: 'worse than Scythians, Vandals, Goths or Huns . . . ruffians,' he calls them. Sadoleto sought comfort in the exercises of religion and in a study, pious but scholarly, of the Scriptures. To his friends he wrote letters of consolation, and to fortify churchmen in their faith he made a commentary on the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans. He was not unconcerned by the

[1] 'Veni in Galliam nudus rerum omnium, tanquam ex naufragio in terram eiectus . . . Iuvisti me opibus, instruxisti libris, quorum ego iactura (maximam enim feceram) non mediocriter angebar.' *V.* vol. i. Epp. III. 4. Cf. *V.* vol. i. Epp. I. 3 (to Bembo). See also *Traité d'éducation du Cardinal Sadolet*, P. Charpenne, Paris, 1855.

[2] Vol. iii. Ep. 733, *Erasmi opera omnia*, ed. Van der Aa, Leyden, 1703, henceforward quoted as *L.*

[3] *L.* Ep. 988.

temporal fortunes or misfortunes of his people; and used his influence with the Pope to mitigate the exactions which the Cardinal Clermont Lodève made as Legate upon the people of Avignon and the neighbouring towns. The friendship afterwards established between Clermont and Sadoleto does credit to the generosity of both.

The oppression of Jewish usurers was heavy upon the people over whom Sadoleto had charge. He curbed the avarice of the aliens who were draining the life of their victims; and, turning at once and by habit to writing, composed a treatise, unfortunately lost, but reported by Florebelli to have been one of his most eloquent pieces, against the Jews.

To the Pope, to the King of France and to lesser authorities Sadoleto appealed not once or twice, but frequently, to secure benefits for his diocese or to protect it from injury.

Nothing distracted him from the pursuit of letters; or rather, for him learning and piety were closely allied, and both quickened and confirmed his steady impulse to practical benevolence. In a letter (May, 1527) addressed to Lazzaro Bonamici[1] he records his 'veterem ac diuturnam sitim optimarum artium', just as later, in 1535,

[1] *V.* vol. i. Epp. I. 2. Lazzaro Bonamici (1479–1552). Of humble birth, he was sent to the University of Padua by a friend of his father. He distinguished himself in mathematics, astronomy and music, but especially in classics, and after a life of some vicissitudes (among other troubles he was in the siege of Rome in 1527) he was offered the chair of Greek and Latin Language at Padua, which he filled with distinction till his death, notwithstanding the efforts of many distinguished men

he tells his nephew Paullus 'legendi voluptate ducor, sumque reversus ad Aristotelis scripta, quae quotidie mihi maiora praeclarioraque videntur'.[1] He liked to write with care and at leisure, and was distressed if hurried in composition by pressure of affairs. He apologizes for a letter, which few Latinists would disown, as 'literas inaccuratas atque illepide scriptas'.[1] Philosophy for him might have been defined in the words of Sturm, 'sapiens atque eloquens pietas', 'pietas literata'; its aim was a reconciliation between scholarship and religion, though he was too modest to use the language which Scaliger[2] in an epitaph put into his mouth: 'Sic solus iunxi cum Cicerone Deum'.

The education of the young he deemed a specially important part of the work which fell to him as a bishop; as a scholar he was not less attracted by it. The treatise *De Pueris Recte Instituendis* gives evidence both of long meditation upon the principles, and also of first-hand acquaintance with the methods and practice of instruction. He took

to attract him to other centres of learning, among whom was Sadoleto, who vainly tried to induce him to teach at Carpentras.

Among his published works may be mentioned:

1. *Carmina.* Venice, 1552, 8°.
2. *Concetti della lingua latina.* Venice, 1562, 8°.

[1] *V.* vol. ii. Epp. ad Paullum 3.

[2] Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484–1558). Studied at Bologna, and after a brief career as a soldier he devoted the whole of his life from 1525 onwards to learning. His pursuit of classical studies is, perhaps, chiefly marked by his attacks upon the 'Ciceronianus' of Erasmus, who paid small attention to them. His chief fame rests on his work as a philosopher and man of science.

care that competent masters should be appointed to the schools over which he had control, and secured their services by augmenting out of his private purse the salaries which they received from public funds.

To the school at Carpentras itself his own fame gave him the opportunity of appointing a remarkable man, Volusenus, a young Scot, who in pursuit of learning had made his way from his own country to Paris, and planned to go forward to Rome, but turned aside to Carpentras to visit the learned bishop and to seek employment under his direction. The traveller presented himself for the first time late one night when the bishop was busy with his books and loth to be disturbed, but, having gained admission, surprised and delighted Sadoleto so much by his intelligence and courtesy that he was invited to return in the morning to meet some friends at an informal disputation in which his knowledge and ability might be tested. In a letter to his nephew Paullus, Sadoleto described his visitor as 'modestus, placidus': Volusenus spoke well, 'nihil non ad rem, nihil non accurate et sobrie': his manner and address were worthy of Italy at her best, 'certe enim eiusmodi modestiam, prudentiam, compositionem oris atque vultus, vix in Italo homine talem expectare potueramus'. The letter[1] from which these passages are taken was written on November 6, 1535: on the 21st of the same

[1] *V.* vol. ii. Epp. ad Paull. 3. Cf. *George Buchanan, Humanist and Reformer,* P. Hume Brown. Edin. 1890, pp. 71 and foll.

month Volusenus wrote an account of his interview with Sadoleto and of his appointment in a letter to his friend Dr. John Starkey in London. He announces that Sadoleto had offered him a post, which he accepted, justly appreciating the distinction which the society of his patron would give him, noting too that the salary was to be 70 crowns with the prospect of an increase. 'Accepi conditionem,' he writes, 'non tam commodi mei causa, quam honoris quem tanti viri contubernium mihi apud amicos conciliabit. Nam praeter literas et eloquentiam eximiam egregia est et prudentia et humanitate praeditus, et maiora mihi posthac operae pretia pollicetur.' He was to teach Cicero, Vergil and the elements of Greek. 'Nescio quae Ciceronis, Vergilii, Graecaeque praeterea linguae rudimenta enarraturus.'

Sadoleto was a scrupulous and fearless critic of the preachers of his diocese; he rigorously checked the utterances of men whose teaching he regarded as unsound, and secured the preferment of men of whose knowledge, orthodoxy and piety he had, by examination, assured himself. He was not insensitive to the evils of his time, or slow to mark the corruption which threatened the life of Society and of the Church; but he was more apt to build than to destroy, to make than to undo, and believed that the promotion of good men was a surer and a quicker way of reform than the discovery and denunciation of error. Shrewd to detect heresy, he was gentle in censure, and laid himself open with naïve fearlessness to the attacks of critics who were united in nothing else than opposition to him. At the bidding of Erasmus he

made himself a champion of Botzheim,[1] who had been accused of Lutheranism by the Bishop of Constance; yet the Protestants who acclaimed him a friend lamented or blamed his half-heartedness in their cause, and attributed to insincerity the moderation of the language which he was constrained to use by his large sympathy with men to whom on a matter of conduct or of opinion he was opposed. By others to whom both tradition and circumstance allied him he was suspected of approval or at least of toleration for doctrines alien and repugnant to him, on account of his tenderness for the men who professed and held them. His learning was no mere ornament to be put on or off: yet it was ridiculed as though it were an affectation; he used the language of Cicero, not as a 'man of culture . . . half absently fingering the words, like beads on a rosary', but because it had become woven into the texture of his thoughts, because it was an instrument fitted quite perfectly to his purpose, a natural organ for his self-expression. 'Savant,' M. Joly calls him, 'savant sans pédantisme, chrétien sans intolérance, philosophe sans orgueil'; and distinguishing him from most of the controversialists of his own (or, may we not think, of other?) times, he adds: 'La plupart des contemporains défendent la religion comme une institution politique: Sadolet comme une loi faite seulement pour les âmes'.

Consistency is the virtue of mean minds; they buy it with niggardly lavishness at the cost of

[1] See P. S. Allen, *Erasmi Epistolae* I. 1 and note. Oxford, 1906.

spontaneity, and are paralysed by the chill treasure which they hug to their hearts. Sadoleto was Churchman and Humanist; he could afford to smile if some critics deplored his orthodoxy, while others found in him 'the eloquent apostle of a cultured unbelief', the restorer of Paganism (he sometimes swore by 'Jupiter'), the high priest of a religion of Nature. He smiled still, when even his friends, provoked by his very temperance, hurled hot accusations against him. Sadoleto had seen and, having seen, confessed virtues in Clement VII. Sturm[1] at once accused him of lying. It is the excellent Latin of his antagonist that Sadoleto lingers on in his reply:[2] a common taste for letters is 'conciliatrix benevolentiae'. He gently reproaches Sturm for his violence, and professes himself 'plane benevolum et ex animo fautorem', not only of Sturm, but also of Melanchthon and of Bucer. If he strikes, his blow is directed with unerring precision by his

[1] Johannes Sturm (1507–89). Among his works are:

1. *De literarum ludis recte aperiendis liber.* Strasburg, 1538, 4°.
2. *De amissa dicendi ratione et quomodo ea recuperanda sit libri duo.* Ibid. 1538, 4°.
3. *In partitiones oratorias Ciceronis dialogi quatuor.* Ibid. 1549, 8°.
4. *Prolegomena h. e. praefationes in optimos quosque utriusque linguae scriptores.* Zurich, 1541, 8°.
5. *De imitatione oratoria libri tres, cum scholis.* Strasburg, 1574, 8°.
6. *De universa ratione elocutionis rhetoricae libri quatuor.* Strasburg, 1576, 8°.
7. *Anti-pappi quatuor.* Neustadt, 1580–1, 4°.

[2] *V.* vol. iv. placed after the Table of Contents and immediately before the page numbered 1.

humour; but he leaves no wound. Noisy and barbaric onslaughts may be left for Luther[1] ('hoc unius Lutheri proprium esse; irruere in omnes homines videlicet cum impetu et clamore'). The letters which passed between Sadoleto and Erasmus are happy memorials of a noble friendship. 'Quis esse possit tam moestus', writes Erasmus[2] in thanks for a letter he had received from his friend, 'quem illae literae tuae non exhilararent?'

Sadoleto mingles praise with mild but unhesitating rebuke in a letter[3] of February 12, 1530. He compliments Erasmus on his commentary on Psalm lxxxv; if he sends his own work on Psalm xciii, it is a gift χάλκεον ἀντὶ χρυσείου: but he blames Erasmus for allowing himself to be angered by reviewers, often prejudiced and ignorant, and still more for being drawn into copious and bitter reply. He begs him to be more cautious too in his utterances, to save his great powers for constructive work and for the defence of accepted truths; and not to expend them on polemics which will probably be misunderstood by the good, and give the wicked occasion to blaspheme. In a long and interesting letter a year later Erasmus returns to the subject.[4] He is grateful for his friend's commendation, and marvels at a modesty which makes him blush for himself and his own work: 'Quod tuarum virtutum tam parcus ac prope dixerim malignus aestimator, plena, ut aiunt, manu tantum laudis

[1] 'Whenever I pray, I pray for a curse on Erasmus.' *Table Talk of Luther*, § 672, p. 283, trl. Hazlitt (Bohn, 1857).

[2] *L.* Ep. 733.

[3] *V.* vol. i. Epp. IV. 1.

[4] *L.* Ep. 1094.

in meam effundis mediocritatem, ne credas te prorsus operam ludere; efficis enim ut et te magis magisque suspiciam, et ipse mihi vehementer displiceam, reputans me non minus animi modestia quam caeteris ornamentis omnibus longo abs te intervallo relinqui'. He had already half consciously offered an excuse for his irritability—he had been under the treatment of doctor after doctor, each more terrible and less competent than the last, and now he has become the victim of a surgeon 'vel apud Scythas immanis'. But the critics have been worse than the physicians; their perversity it would be wrong to overlook. If they only attacked his scholarship or complained of his manners, not a word would he say; but if he does not rebut charges of impiety, it will be supposed that he admits them—'Impiorum dogmatum auctor', 'Pontificiae dignitatis eversor', 'Scripturarum ἀκινήτων falsarius', 'Schismatis molitor'—with these titles he was assailed. 'What', he asks, 'was I to do? A horse defends himself with his heels, a dog with his teeth, a bull with his horns, a bee with her sting—a dove takes to flight. I am no dove. My weapon is my pen.' No, he will strike when he is struck, though with Sadoleto's plea for moderation in the statement of matters which may be disputed—the nature, for instance, and the occasion of veneration to be paid to Saints—he is quite ready to agree. But he loves Sadoleto, and would not have him altered. He ends with thanks renewed for the letter. 'Hanc tuam epistolam, si quid mihi credis, pluris facio, quam si misisses talentum auri magnum.'

Sadoleto's house was open to visitors and travellers, and he maintained, with discreet liberality, the indigent and the afflicted. He was thrifty, not to save, but to use his money; the spectacle of a priest saving and amassing money was horrible to him; his own expenditure exactly balanced his revenue.

Known as a man who sought no personal interest or profit, he was consulted as much about matters of government and administration as about affairs which might naturally fall within the purview of a bishop. Francis I visiting Lyon made the acquaintance of Sadoleto, and soon offered him a position of distinction and rich emolument. This the bishop declined, protesting that the reason which had drawn him from Rome to his diocese must keep him in it. His conduct won the approval both of the king himself and of his attendants, and once more the high estimation, the veneration indeed, in which Sadoleto was held served his diocese. In 1541 the army of the king was marching against the Duke of Savoy, and its route lay by Carpentras. An outrage committed by some of the king's soldiers roused the people; some of the soldiers were killed; their leader, William of Fürstenberg, prepared to avenge them. The intervention of the bishop saved Carpentras.

When Paul III, on the death of Clement VII (1534), became Pope, Sadoleto was called back to Rome to discuss with a small group of men, chosen for their eminence and the variety of their experience, the best means of restoring to the Church her ancient authority. The need of reform

was patent, but the consultations seemed likely to end in nothing better than vague resolutions, and Sadoleto was preparing to return to Carpentras, when he was elected (1536) to the Cardinalate, a dignity attained at the same time by Caraffa. His inclination was to escape from the burdens and honours of this great office, but he was persuaded that he ought to remain in Rome. The deliberations in which he had already borne a part were more formally renewed, for the Pope appointed a commission of nine men to consider and prepare a report upon the reform of the Church. Sadoleto, who was elected to take part in the counsels, was associated with Contarini,[1] Caraffa, Reginald Pole,[2]

[1] Gasparo Contarini (1483–1542). One of the pupils of Pomponazzi at Padua. Repeatedly chosen as ambassador of the Republic of Venice, his native city. He was created Cardinal in 1535. He was one of those who tried to mediate between the Church and the Protestant Reformers, being praised and blamed by both alike. He was the author of several works on theological and ecclesiastical subjects.

[2] Reginald Pole (1500–58). Cardinal and Archbishop of Canterbury. Of royal blood on his mother's side. Studied at Oxford under W. Latimer. In 1521 he was sent by Henry VIII to Italy, where he studied at Padua for a year, and later formed friendships with Leoniceno, Sadoleto, Bembo, and other scholars. He corresponded with Erasmus, and was everywhere treated with distinction as a kinsman of the King of England. He returned to England in 1527 after visiting Rome. He subsequently spent many years in Italy, becoming intimate with Lazzaro Bonamici, Gasparo Contarini, and Pietro Caraffa, and many other distinguished men. In 1536 he was summoned to Rome by Paul III, who insisted on his taking orders in order to be made a Cardinal.

The part he played in English history is sufficiently well known, but it may be mentioned that in 1539 he took refuge

Fregoso, Aleandro,[1] Ghiberti,[2] Cortese,[3] and

at Carpentras, where he was staying when Henry VIII had an Act of Attainder passed against him. On December 11, 1555, he took over the administration of the see of Canterbury. The story of his strained relations with his old friend Caraffa, now Paul IV, may be read with much else concerning him in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. He died on the same day as Mary Tudor, November 17, 1558.

[1] Girolamo Aleandro (1480–1542). Scholar and Cardinal. He learned Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Chaldean, Arabic. At the age of 24 he had made his mark as a man of learning. He was the friend of Aldus Manutius and Erasmus. He became Professor of Literature in Paris in 1508 on the invitation of Louis XII. In 1519 Leo X appointed him Librarian to the Vatican, and in 1520 sent him on a special mission to Germany to oppose the heresy of Luther. His disapproval of the supposed lenience of Erasmus to the views of Protestant reformers led to some breach in their friendship. He was made Archbishop of Brindisi by Clement VII, and Cardinal by Paul III.

Among his works are :

1. *Lexicon graeco-latinum*. Paris, 1512, fol.
2. *Tabulae sane utiles Graecarum Musarum adyta compendio ingredi volentibus*. 1513 (?), 4°.

[2] Giovanni Matteo Ghiberti (1495–1543). Born at Palermo. Secretary to Clement VII. After the sack of Rome in 1527 he was one of the hostages given for the ransom of the Pope. As Archbishop of Verona he encouraged learning and a high standard of public morals. He established a printing-press at Verona, from which, among other notable works, several editions of the Fathers were issued. His collected works were published at Verona in 1733, 4°.

[3] Gregorio Cortese (1483–1548). Born at Modena. Studied at Padua and Bologna. In 1542 Paul III made him Bishop of Urbino and Cardinal. He is said to have been a man of profound learning and of a gentle temper in controversy, though he maintained a strict rule over the religious institutions in his province.

Tommaso Badia,[1] most of them, like himself, members of the Oratory of Divine Love. Their proposals, embodied in the *Consultum delectorum Cardinalium et prelatorum de Emendanda Ecclesia,* were marked by courage and insight. Reform, it was boldly urged, must mean the re-establishment and re-enforcement of discipline within the Church herself; only for grave reason must the operation of the law be deflected or checked; dispensation must not be a thing to be bought and sold.

The recommendations of the commission announced in 1538 were as barren of definite and immediate results as those of many a less distinguished and famous committee; but they were not without influence. They served, at least, to make clear the lines of the division already widening between parties soon to be violently opposed. Caraffa indeed was early estranged from his colleagues of the Oratory of Divine Love, and the *Consultum* was placed upon the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* in 1558, when he was Pope.

As Cardinal, Sadoleto exhibited the qualities which had hitherto won for him the respect and goodwill of all who had known him—firmness with

Among his works are:

1. *Tractatus adversus negantem B. Petrum apostolum Romae fuisse.*
2. *Epistolarum familiarium liber*: of which Bembo speaks in the highest terms in writing to Fregoso.

[1] Tommaso Badia (*c.* 1483–1547). Dominican. Appointed to attend the Diet of Worms in 1540, he distinguished himself by his zealous defence of the Church, and in 1542 Paul III made him Cardinal. There is extant his letter to Contarini about the conference at Worms.

gentleness, humanity with courage ; willingness to make just and honourable concessions, reluctance to accept ignoble compromise. He delighted in conferring benefits, and especially when a kindness shown to individuals might be taken as in some sort a recognition of their loyalty to the Church. His friendly services to George, Duke of Bavaria, and to William of Saxony are instances.

When the Pope set out to attempt a reconciliation between Charles and Francis, Sadoleto went with him ; and though delayed at Plaisance by illness, joined Paul again at Nice (1538). Peace was not made, but a truce for ten years was concluded, and when the Pope returned to Rome, Sadoleto went once more to Carpentras. Yet again he imposed upon himself the double task of rebuilding the fortunes of his diocese by practical administration, and of strengthening the foundations and fabric of the Church by composing a treatise,[1] *De Aedificatione Catholicae Ecclesiae.* Reflection with him prompted action, and action stimulated him to reflect again and to write. The temper of the scholar is rarely so happily united with that of the statesman and man of affairs. His relations with his people he describes in three words—'inter amantissimos versor'. His sojourn at Carpentras was not long ; he was summoned again to Rome, and the truce between Charles and Francis having been broken, he was appointed by the Pope to go as an ambassador to the King of France, whom, it is said, he inclined towards peace. Another delegate from

[1] Cf. *V.* vol. ii. Epp. XIII. 4 and 15.

the Pope, Cardinal Contarini, was sent to Spain to offer counsels of peace to Charles ; had his representations availed as much as those of Sadoleto, peace might have been restored.

His embassy finished, Sadoleto spent the winter at Carpentras and then went to Italy. He attended Paul III at a conference with Charles, near Parma, and added his own to the entreaties of the Pope for peace. Charles would not agree ; but later, having conquered the Duke of Westphalia and taken possession of several French towns, his anger was sated, and he made peace with Francis.

Sadoleto's joy was great. He ordered special services of thanksgiving in his Church, and sent to Charles a letter in praise of his wisdom and his moderation.

Of his private life little is recorded. He is known to have cherished a very tender devotion to his mother ; he did much to advance the fortunes of his brothers ; he appointed his nephew[1] Paul, whose scholarship and piety he knew, as his assistant in the administration of his diocese, his frequent and prolonged absence from which he always lamented. While he was engaged upon the embassy to which we have referred, he wrote to his nephew, ' Ego si mihi detur optio quod expetam, domum cupio et reverti ad vos, et agere vitam cum meis amantissimis.'[2]

Sadoleto died at Rome in October 1547, nine months after his lifelong friend Bembo, and was buried, as he had wished, without any pomp, in the church of San Pietro on the Esquiline.

[1] Or, as otherwise stated, his ' cousin german '. *Biographie universelle.*

[2] *V.* vol. ii. Epp. ad Paull. 10.

III

It was our intention, when we planned this work, to give side by side with our version its original. We wished, with the Latin there in witness, to set forth the arguments by which we had been governed in our choice of words and our construction and arrangement of sentences, and thus to have provided not only a commentary, which a translation cannot but supply, but a reasoned commentary on our author's language. But we have had to abandon, at any rate for the present, our hope of producing the Latin. If we are fortunate in being prevented by these evil days from putting in his hands the materials from which a critic could fashion his best weapons against us, we are bound to regret our inability to furnish students with the Treatise as Sadoleto wrote it, for his Latin still deserves and still would win the admiration which it received when the book first appeared. Two qualities remarked and praised by Reginald Pole and Bembo, to whom the Treatise was submitted in manuscript in 1532, qualities not unnoticed by other and later readers, are conspicuous in Sadoleto's Latin: first, its dependence upon Ciceronian usage, and second, notwithstanding its adaptation to purposes and to the expression of ideas with which Cicero was not concerned, its vitality. To have combined these qualities in his writing was a notable achievement for a man whose ambition it was to use in the reconstruction of a Christian society the materials of which his classical learning had made him the

inheritor, materials in his judgement appropriate and therefore essential to the edifice which he sought to build.

In some measure, we trust, these qualities have been preserved in our translation and illustrated by the notes which we have given, drawn as they are in part from the classical writers whom Sadoleto either directly cited or calls to mind, and in part from Christian writers in whom he saw, or seemed to see, the classical tradition reshaped and illumined by ideas which were not less dear to him, and lastly from some modern writers whom Sadoleto himself has in many ways anticipated.

The text we have used is that of John Albert Tumerman, Verona, 1737–8 :

Iacobi Sadoleti Cardinalis et Episcopi Carpentoractensis . . . opera quae extant omnia. 4°.

The earliest edition of the Treatise is that of Venice, 1533, 8° ; another followed in 1534, Paris, 8° ; and a third at Lyon in 1535, 8°. It is included in the collected works by Sadoleto brought out by D. Ranstius, Frankfort, 1607. A translation into Italian appeared at Venice in 1745.

Our obligations are in part indicated in the notes ; but we ought specially to record our debts to :— Joly, *Étude sur Sadolet* (Caen, 1857) ; Charpenne, *Traité d'éducation du Cardinal Sadolet* (Paris, 1855). Mr. Woodward's *Education during the Renascence* (Cambridge, 1906) ; Dr. Sandys' *History of Classical Scholarship* (Cambridge, 1908), and his Harvard lectures ; and S. Ritter, *Un Umanista Teologo* (Rome, 1912).

We have had recourse to many chapters of the

Cambridge Modern History, and principally to Jebb's *The Classical Renaissance* (ch. xvi), and more often to J. A. Symonds' *Renaissance in Italy*.

Most of all we have resorted to Mr. P. S. Allen's *Erasmi Epistolae* (Oxford, 1906–13), and to Mr. Allen himself, whose help and advice have always been most generously placed at our disposal.

It is a great pleasure further to express here our thanks for the aid given us upon perplexing problems in the translation by Dr. Postgate : without his counsel our version would have been the poorer ; for its imperfections the responsibility is ours.

Not less sincere are the thanks which we desire to express to the Delegates of the Clarendon Press for undertaking this work at the present time, and to their readers for the patient care which they have bestowed upon it.

ANALYSIS

PAGE

The occasion of the Treatise 3
Dedication 3
A good stock: careful breeding 4
The need of training 4
Paullus Sadoletus—his ability and virtue . . . 5
The Dialogue begins 5
Paullus begs Jacopus to put together in connected form his occasional observations on Education . . 6
Jacopus agrees 6
We must begin with childhood 7
The importance of wise training in childhood . . 7
The matter curiously neglected in the laws . . . 7
or dealt with in regard only to a special class, and even so unsystematically 8
The Greeks took greater pains over this matter . . 8
The legislation of Solon 9
Our forefathers were not neglectful in regard to the upbringing of children 9
We are less careful in our time. Yet the need of exact regulation is not less than of old . . . 10
Solon compelled fathers to bestow due care upon their children, and visited neglect with definite penalties 11
The example of the wise teacher to attach supreme importance to the nurture of the young . . 11
The two main divisions of the subject of Education, as here treated—moral and literary training . . 12
The object of moral training 12
and the function of letters 12
What is the true self? 13
Inward perception, power of thought, reasoning and resolve 13
These must be kindled by the flame of knowledge and of letters 13

PAGE

Moral training divided into two parts . . . 13
A difference between the progress of moral and that of literary training 13
An illustration offered 14
Appearance and reality; form and truth . . . 14
Paullus suggests a further illustration . . . 15
Two kinds of habit contrasted 16
Conscious reason alone makes moral action truly virtuous 16
Disciplined habit and true virtue 17
What is the value of the lower type of habit? . . 17
In childhood and youth, knowledge and understanding are not to be expected, but trust and obedience . 17
The effect of imposed habit on the unformed mind which is yet incapable of reason 17
The soul divided by reason and desire . . . 19
The rule for living well—harmony between Reason and Desire to be established by habit . . . 20
By the kindness of heaven, the image of virtue, like Pygmalion's statue, takes on the spirit and life of virtue (wrought by habit) 20
Experience will change Paullus' notional assent to real assent 21
Jacopus assumes that all pupils will be like Paullus . 21
But what if they are troublesome? 21
Patience and practice are the remedies to be used . 22
But the highest success can only be won with pupils naturally good and apt for study . . . 22
Let us assume that the pupil, springing from a good stock, and by nature good, is placed in good surroundings 22
Education begins at birth 23
The child to be fed at his mother's breast, if possible . 23
If a nurse is needed, she must be chosen for her chaste character and prudent mind 23
She must be neither harsh nor lenient . . . 23
The waking and sleeping alarms of children . . 24
Rocking in the nurse's arms 24
The soothing influence of singing 25

PAGE

The child must hear no evil words, and see no ugly gestures 25
He is taken by his mother to church and to the houses of kinswomen 26
The child is taught the name of God 26
He sees his parents performing acts of worship . . 26
The fear and the love of God united in the child's heart 27
With such early training, he may make mistakes, but will not go far astray 28
The father must be a pattern to his son—at any rate in the essentials of piety and good conduct, . . 28
though he may desire in his son many gifts and graces which he does not himself possess . . . 29
The parents' example of a well-balanced mind . . 30
If the father finds himself unequal to the task, let him seek a tutor to train the boy 30
The tutor should be a man of real distinction . . 31
But if the father undertakes the duty, what must be his equipment ? 31
Affection will spur him to devotion and studious care . 31
He must keep the golden mean of self-control, even though he be not a philosopher 31
The child keenly observes what his father says and does 32
The child learns by sight earlier than by hearing . 32
The father's dress 32
The father must be guided by reason, and unmoved by sudden gusts of passion 33
The boy receives a tradition of dignity from the example of his father 33
Dignity of mind shown in dignity of gesture and carriage 33
Consistent moderation, the supreme ornament of life, is the gift of philosophy 34
Philosophy is aided by experience of the world : . . 34
and experience, even without philosophy, will achieve much in a man naturally intelligent 34
The father, reverent towards God, will among men adopt a manner appropriate to his company . 35
His conversation 35

PAGE

His treatment of servants 35
The courtesy and clemency of the father will produce these qualities in the son 36
Experience of good society will confirm, and philosophy will crown them 36
The importance of a father's example in the impressionable days of childhood 37
Example or precept—which is the stronger? . . 37
Improper regard for wealth 39
Excess of wealth more harmful to character than lack of it; and the best kind of wealth is unearned, derived from estates 40
Extravagance and profusion and over-refinement are poisons of life 40
Luxury leads not only to dissipation, but— . . 40
even to pride and cruelty 41
The world mistakes luxurious living for generous living 41
The father must be frugal and temperate, but not mean or petty 41
Mothers and women generally apt to be too indulgent . 42
The examples of Cyrus and Cambyses 43
Cyrus's character naturally great, but not fortified by philosophy. He entrusted his son to the care of women—with disastrous results 43
Darius, unspoilt by luxury, restores the Persian power, 43
but Xerxes, brought up by women, and unmanned by luxury, brought disgrace and disaster to it . . 44
A training in the arts of hospitality 44
By what standard does a youth measure the success of an entertainment? 45
Economy without meanness, freedom without extravagance 45
All this, which we may now leave, is education through sight—the spectacle of life well lived 46
Hearing is the special and proper vehicle of instruction 46
In speech character is revealed 46
Speech and hearing make possible the noble commerce of human intercourse 46

PAGE

We must go back again to early years 47
Let us begin at the age of five years, when virtue first becomes intelligible 47
At this age a boy passes from the hands of women to the care of men 48
The fear of God is the beginning of education . . 48
Reverence for God and other ' divine beings ' . . . 49
Honour due to parents 49
Gratitude shown by service 50
Respect shown to parents leads to a feeling of respect and deference for age and office 51
Young children call all men ' father '—and indeed a man may become a father to the young, if not by kindred, by kindness 51
Senators are called Fathers 52
Respect for age shown by the early Romans and by the Spartans 52
This respect for age has a moderating influence upon youth ; 53
implanting modesty with the recognition of authority . 53
' He blushed—all 's well ' 53
Shame—a divine timidity 54
Shame is the only form of fear which is not discreditable 54
The sense of shame, therefore, is to be cultivated . 55
The right relation of father to son 56
Affection controlled by dignity 57
No excessive indulgence, but no violence or harshness 57
Violence shown towards children is sacrilege . . 57
Fear is a weak guardian of virtue 58
The father must make generous allowance for his son's pleasures, ... 58
but never yield, with weak complaisance, to mere caprice 59
A proper love of approbation 59
Loving or reverencing his father, the boy will show both pride and kindliness towards his equals in age . 60
Thus he will win their goodwill and admiration . . . 60

PAGE

The father must distinguish between serious faults likely to damage the character, and those which are the result of the fermentation of youth . . . 61
How to deal with faults of each kind 61
The boy as critic of himself 62
Flogging forbidden—except for a slave, who improves with beating, and whose chastisement affords a salutary lesson to the son 63
But there is little danger for a boy brought up as we have proposed 64
The boy's companions 64
Relations with the servants of the household . . 64
Undesirable acquaintances to be warned off— . . 65
but a boy must have suitable companions of his own age 65
The aid of a diligent tutor in safeguarding a boy . 65
His home tradition will become a part of himself . 65
He will delight in the results of his good training, and try to further and multiply them by his own efforts 66
Youthful dignity combined with cheerfulness and modesty 66
The spread of a good tradition benefits the whole community 66
The force and scope of youthful example . . . 67
Still the boy has only good habits, the shadow of Virtue: Virtue herself must be added 67
Philosophy gives Virtue her final perfection . . 68
Truth—the supreme source of a well-ordered and truly blessed life 68
The province of Truth includes both knowledge and conduct 69
The relation of Truth to morality and philosophy . 69
Truth not only illuminative but creative . . . 70
The light of reason 71
The lower form of virtue, based on discipline and precept, is brightened by a borrowed gleam from the higher light 71
There are those who despise and revile Philosophy . 71

PAGE

Paullus begs Jacopus to complete the defence which he has undertaken of Philosophy 72
Perhaps the course of our inquiry has been divinely directed 73
We return to the province of Moral Discipline . . . 73
Two kinds of falseness 73
The first is self-deception 73
The results of ignorance and self-deception 74
The remedy is to be found in philosophy directed by religion 75
Paullus' ignorance is that of a man ready to learn . 76
The consciousness and the confession of ignorance constitute the first truth of Philosophy . . 76
The second kind of falseness—the deception of others— 76
which, springing from self-deception, has become a habit, a convention, and pervades society . . . 77
Ingenious fraud often commended, though secretly detested even by those who practise it 78
The tribute paid by the world to Truth and the truthful man 78
The importance of early training in sincere utterance and sincere action 79
There is nothing viler than the hypocrisy of conduct . 79
The hypocrite is easily detected 79
Even in jest there should be respect for truth, and a sense of proportion 80
Imitation and deception 80
Imitation and virtue 81
Our system does not forbid merriment, still less sport and manly exercises 81
But in festivity and amusement there must be that restraint which is the secret of propriety . . 82
The youth trained in our system will become a leader 82
The influence of Paullus himself on his contemporaries cited in evidence 83
The instruction of youth in letters and the liberal arts . 84
The shrine of Apollo and the Muses : the perfection of the Trinity 84

PAGE
'Classical' and 'Christian' phraseology . . . 84
The art of speech—necessary for human intercourse . 85
The third and last act in our argument . . . 86
Example—principle 86
The boy must learn to speak fluently and correctly, before he learns to read 87
He will imitate and emulate others who are a little in advance of himself 87
He must be allured to a love of reading . . . 87
There must be appetite for learning 87
A tutor should be appointed, even though the father be a man of liberal culture 88
Difficulty of finding a good tutor—specialists may be had, but men of real and comprehensive learning are rare 88
The tutor shall exact the 'daily tale' of reading and writing, but without harshness 89
The elements of instruction—reading and writing . 89
Reading aloud 89
Paraphrase 90
Greek as well as Latin necessary for a pupil who is to be trained to the highest form of virtue . . . 90
The elements of religion to be taught with the first lessons in Latin and Greek 90
Pregnant maxims of high authority 91
Grammar follows next—its scope—sometimes improperly extended by grammarians 92
Apollonius and Herodianus 92
Donatus and Servius 93
We must look rather to the capacity of the pupil than to the extent of the subject 93
Elaborate grammatical discussions unsuitable for a boy 93
The teaching of grammar 93
Sounds 94
Parts of speech 94
Declension and conjugation 95
Grammar best taught by the practical application of rules 95

PAGE

The reading of good authors not only in prose, but in verse. The quantity of syllables, and the laws of scansion are to be appreciated with nice sensibility 95

Grammar built upon two foundations—the common practice of speech, and the authority of learned writers in the past 96

Once well grounded in grammar, the boy can move freely and fearlessly in any field 97

The student approaches Rhetoric 97

Cicero has said all that can be said about Rhetoric . 98

Cicero is not only to be read ; he is to be absorbed . 98

But other authors, both Greek and Latin, are also to be studied 99

Wide and varied reading establishes the judgement . 99

To judge is to select, and the student's reading must be large enough to provide him with materials for selection 100

Experience of men and of the world, together with knowledge of books, needed for developing judgement 100

Pleasure as well as advantage to be got from reading . 100

Demosthenes and his style 101

Aeschines 102

Lysias 102

Isocrates 102

Historians not less than orators to be read . . . 103

Uses of historical study 103

The Poets—a sacred race 103

Their power over the mind of man 103

Plato and the Poets 103

Poetry the principal element in music, of which we must speak 104

Paullus acknowledges his debt to the poets, as teachers both of style and conduct 105

Homer and Vergil compared 105

Terence 106

The genius of good taste 106

Plautus—his ease of diction and wealth of style . 106

PAGE

Tragedy and comedy—the influence and quality of each 107
Lawless and ribald verse-writers not to be included among the poets 108
False music, not to be admitted 108
The function of true music 108
We must not forget that philosophy is our final object 109
Grammar the starting-point in early years 109
Rhetoric claims the rest of life 109
Rhetoric at last is merged in Philosophy, as a river is merged in the sea 109
Other arts are like tributaries 110
Sophists—masters of civic wisdom 110
Gymnastic and music bring the natural impulses of the body and of the mind under the sway of law—securing grace and health of the body and balance of the mind 111
Gymnastic exercises, past and present 111
Dancing, common to gymnastic and music . . . 112
The effect of Rhythm on the mind 113
Music and poetry combined 113
Tradition in music to be respected. Innovations to be closely scrutinized 113
Words, Rhythm and Tune—the pre-eminent importance of the words 114
Words and ideas—the groundwork of Music . . 114
Melody to be considered after the theme has been chosen 115
The measure must be appropriate to the subject-matter 115
The voice of the singer or reciter 116
The noble compact between virtue and pleasure . . 116
The music of our own time has scarcely any foundation in word or thought 116
Degeneracy in letters and music wrought the general ruin of Greece 117
The evil spread from Greece to Rome 117
Ancient compared with modern music 118
Dance and ballet may be allowed as recreation and relaxation for youth after toil 118

PAGE

But they must soon be given up, and so must singing, though the mature may listen to the performances of musicians 118
To hear music is a relief from the cares of public responsibility as well as from the labour of study . . 119
Arithmetic joins the other disciplines 119
The elements of Arithmetic must be acquired for practical use, and some attempt must be made to get the Theory of Number 120
Arithmetic a generous art—disengaging the mind from external things, and setting it upon the contemplation of eternal truth 120
Commercial arithmetic 121
The other 'Mathematical' Arts: Music, Geometry, Astrology 121
The praise of geometry 122
Its scope, ... 122
and its manifold uses 122
The divine art of geometry 124
Mystical absorption in geometrical truth . . . 125
Paullus is alarmed at the number of subjects which he is to learn 125
What aid to the understanding of Philosophy is to be got from all these arts? 126
All the arts are members of one body—which is Philosophy herself 126
We climb step by step through many disciplines to the highest plane of the mind's activity 127
The several arts contribute to free the mind from the dominion of sensible things, and lift it to the region of Truth 128
Some mathematics must be acquired by students of Philosophy 128
Vulgar, dull and sluggish minds are baffled by the subtlety of things of the mind 129
But an acute and well-trained mind is overcome neither by the magnitude nor by the number of the subjects with which it is confronted 129

PAGE
Learned men of old time 129
Gorgias of Leontini 130
Hippias 131
Examples of complete wisdom and knowledge — Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Polemon, Arcesilaus, Chrysippus, Carneades 132
Varro and Cicero 132
Examples from our own time—Bembo . . . 132
Aleander 133
Erasmus 133
Alciato 133
Gregorio Lilio 133
Giovanni Francesco Pico 133
Different subjects pursued by a common method of investigation 134
Some men, indeed, spend their whole life upon a single art 134
We must pursue each several art far enough for our main purpose, which lies beyond it . . . 135
Absorption in a single subject natural and delightful . 135
But we should be content with a reasonable knowledge and command of the subordinate arts, and press on towards Philosophy 135
We may return to our special subject, enriched and quickened by the resources of Philosophy . . 136
Paullus longs for Philosophy 136
He has not far to travel 136
Astronomy 137
The desire for knowledge springs from wonder, and the spectacle of the starry heavens prompts wonder . 138
The open plains of Philosophy reached at last . . 138
Aristotle's *Ethics*—an introduction 138
Philosophy breathes a soul into formal and habitual rectitude of conduct 138
Dialectic is needed too (with logic) 139
A method of Science 139
The weapons of Dialectic must be used by trained skill 139

PAGE

The best authors to be constantly read; especially Plato and Aristotle 140
Do not use Latin versions of Greek philosophers . . 140
False philosophers 140
The Art of Life, the gift of Philosophy . . . 140
Those who, after philosophic training, turn to any other pursuit, will have gained efficiency and determination 141
Those who make Philosophy their habitation are to be deemed godlike 141

SADOLETO

A TRANSLATION OF HIS *DE PUERIS RECTE INSTITUENDIS*

SADOLETO

ON EDUCATION

EURIPIDES says, I think in the *Andromache*, that a husband finds delight not so much in the physical as in the spiritual beauty of his wife. How great, then, must be your joy, William du Bellay, best of all my friends, you who have lately married a woman to whose distinguished virtues and endowments of mind is added a loveliness of face and form worthy of her faultless manners. And indeed she had those from whom to learn them, born of a very noble family and trained in those daily habits of life which breathe all the dignity and refinement of high lineage. It has surely been your fortune—to take your own expression of your feeling—to possess such a wife as you have always longed for. For you also, born of an ancient and noble house, descended from a distinguished line of ancestors, have by your own achievements won decorations ampler and more notable than those with which nature and fortune had already liberally endowed you. It was, I know, only right that you should take as your mate and companion one whose genius and goodness answer your own character and culture.

The occasion of the Treatise: Dedication.

Special praise is due to the wisdom of Francis, our king, who, with forethought worthy of so great a prince, adopts a method of dealing with

human beings which others usually reserve for the breeding of horses and dogs, and with the utmost diligence examines the stock of both the contracting parties, with intent to choose such fit persons to enter the holy bond of matrimony as that from good parents may spring children capable of doing service to their king and country.

A good stock: careful breeding.

The need of training.

But this is not enough. Some kind of training seems necessary to secure the due nurture and upbringing of boys and young people. I lately made an attempt to write something on the subject by way of providing fathers with a system and a plan for the sound and liberal instruction of their children, and I have resolved to dedicate this effort to you in the hope that it may serve as a token of my affection for you, though you yourself least of all men stand in need of any such admonition. For no one who desired to write upon the proper upbringing of children could fail to find in your household more full and forcible illustration of his subject than he could himself supply for the instruction of others. And here I often marvel at your father's good fortune or virtue, or, to put it more truly, at both of these. For he brought up and nurtured many children, and gave them all alike, by the noblest and most distinguished discipline and culture of mind and character, such a training in the highest intellectual and moral qualities, that they seem to have been refined in the same furnace, and fashioned from the same pattern of physical beauty and moral dignity. Yet I have allowed myself to think that this fruit of my

studious meditation might not be unacceptable to you. Our friendship will, I hope, give it some place, your recent marriage will make it opportune.[1] Indeed I pray God that it may be your destiny to have children, who shall repeat and maintain for generations to come the standard of excellence which they have inherited from their father and their grandfather.

But to come, at length, to my discourse on the proper training of children. As I was sitting not long ago at midday in leisurely reflection, there came to me Paullus Sadoletus—a young man, I think I may claim, devoted to the most liberal studies. My nephew, placed in my hands by his father, I brought him up as if he were my own son, and tried to train him in sound learning and good conduct.

Paullus Sadoletus—his ability and virtue.

This was an undertaking, however, which was made light and pleasant to me, both by his supreme ability, and also by his disposition, already inclined as it was by nature and habit to every kind of excellence of heart and of judgement.

He had come to me on this occasion very much earlier than was his wont—for a certain hour was fixed at which he used daily to listen to me on Aristotle's *Ethics*. So I began to question him.

Jac. How is it, Paullus, that you are here so early? Have you mistaken the hour, or have you some news?

The Dialogue begins.

Paul. Nothing much, uncle; or rather 'father',

[1] Cf. the dedication of Quintilian's Institutes of Oratory to Victorius Marcellus, *Inst. Or.*, Prooemium, § 6.

if I may find a name which better becomes not indeed our physical kinship, but our more sacred spiritual connexion and my filial regard for you. I came to you deliberately a little early, not because I was bringing any news to you, but rather looking for something from you.

Jac. What is it then that you look for from me? Come, tell me, for it will never be my wish to say no to your right desire.

Paul. I know that, even without your assurance, father. Your actions prove that. But just now when your servant told me, on my asking, that you were at leisure, I thought it was not an unsuitable moment to beg you to put together, in a single discourse, all the counsels which you have been in the habit of giving, in scattered and fragmentary form, upon the subject of the right training of youth; for I long to have, if I may so call it, a compendium of your opinions in this kind; from it I might learn to fashion myself to the pattern of goodness—to become what you would wish me to be. But only if this is not troublesome to you, and if you do not feel that something else has a first claim.

Paullus begs Jacopus to put together in connected form his occasional observations on Education.

Jac. Troublesome to me? And shall I put anything before such a task? Is there anything in all the world that I should more fervently covet than that you should be good and learned. For I think I understand your request—you want me to expound everything that concerns the training of character and the establishment of sound learning.

Jacopus agrees.

Paul. Yes, it is just that; that is my wish.

Jac. But consider, Paullus; if we are to take the matter in hand and follow it out in its proper sequence, we must make a beginning with childhood itself.[1] For no one can be properly trained as a youth, who has been badly brought up as a child; for as the character and quality of a tree come from its roots, so a well-conditioned, well-balanced youth is the fruit of childhood. It is remarkable that this early stage of life, in which a slip and a mistake are most easily made, has been less than any other handled and considered by our present laws;[2] no care is taken to ensure the cultivation of childhood as a public duty, though it is on this and no other foundation that the character of our citizens, and the soundness of our states is based.

We must begin with childhood.

The importance of wise training in childhood.

The matter curiously neglected in the laws.

For guiding our citizens in their actions and disputes among themselves, our enactments are precise and firmly established. But upon the

[1] Cf. Plato, *Laws*, 765–6: 'Of all the great offices of state that [of Minister of Education] is the greatest; for the first shoot of any plant, if it makes a good start towards the attainment of its natural excellence, has the greatest effect on its maturity; and this is not only true of plants, but of animals wild and tame, and also of men.' Cf. Locke, *Thoughts on Education*: ed. R. H. Quick, Cambridge Press, p. 20: 'The Difference to be found in the Manners and Abilities of Men is owing more to their Education than to any Thing else . . . great Care is to be had of the forming of Children's Minds, and giving them that Seasoning early, which shall influence their Lives always after.'

[2] Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics*, x. 9. 8: 'To get right guidance from youth up in the road to virtue is hard, unless we are brought up under suitable laws. . . . Our nurture, then, should be prescribed by law, and our whole way of life . . .'

questions which embrace practically all others there is a strange silence: upon the choice of a profession, upon the rearing of children, upon parental responsibilities, upon goodness and manners, what methods of conduct are to be adopted and what rejected—upon all these not a word; unless we reckon the counsels laid down in regard to the teaching of righteousness and ceremonial observance in the Pontifical Law for the benefit of youth, or rather for that of a certain class, for those, namely, who are entering upon the priesthood—and even these counsels, such as they are, are not grouped and arranged in orderly fashion, beginning with what is suitable for childhood. Indeed their authors would seem rather to have had some splendid but fitful inspiration than to have set forth a careful and systematic scheme.

or dealt with in regard only to a special class, and even so unsystematically.

The Greeks have been at greater pains—not so much in the practice and precept of virtuous actions (in this our fathers of old are second to no people under heaven, as is gloriously testified by the memorials of our past) as in the preservation and transmission to posterity of their excellent institutions. But as for us, we have allowed the law of the XII Tables—that seed-plot of all equity and right—the resolutions of our popular assembly, the decrees of the Senate, and the magisterial edicts, to be submerged and swept away beneath the flood of endless enactments with which our later jurists have overwhelmed them. The Greeks, on the other hand, have taken all possible care to preserve all they could of the

The Greeks took greater pains over this matter.

ancient codes of Draco and Solon, and even the maxims of Lycurgus as they are called. This is the more remarkable, inasmuch as for the most part his laws were not so much contained in written documents as impressed upon the minds and spirits of the people by the habit of obedience. But to return to Solon, whose legislation, wherever the education of the young is concerned, is so exquisitely, and even meticulously elaborated, that nothing at all which bears on that subject is omitted. He gives the most exact and punctilious directions with the most minute particularity, so that the question of physical exercise, the qualifications of a tutor, the hours of study, the selection of schools, the very clothing of a boy and the kind of companions he should choose—none of these things are forgotten, even to such a detail as the keeping of his hands within the folds of his cloak in public.

The legislation by Solon.

But indeed, or so I am inclined to surmise, we may take it that our forefathers were not less scrupulous in paying all possible attention to the training of youth, as is testified by their daily exercises in the field of Mars, by their regulations for the length of military service, by the directions they gave about the kind of raiment suitable for children and for those of riper years, and the time at which there should be a transition from the bordered toga of the child to the plain white toga of the man, and by a host of similar customs, a knowledge of which may be gleaned not so much from the perishable parchments upon which the laws were written as from the chronicles and

Our forefathers were not neglectful in regard to the upbringing of children.

records of events that still remain to us. Hence it is easy to see that it was owing to the seeds of learning so wisely sown, to the assiduous cultivation of the fallow land of children's fresh young minds, that there grew the harvest of high character and conduct which so richly blessed the days of old.

We are less careful in our time. Yet the need of exact regulation is not less than of old.

We think ourselves superior to these precautions nowadays, and prefer to leave the intimate charge of children's training to the individual choice of parents. But how rare it is to find a parent who is truly wise! For even when they have the will to make their children all they ought to be, they do not know the way by which their end may most fitly be attained. In general human creatures are ignorant and need the light of law, a light by which they may be guided, if they will, or even constrained, against their inclination. The troubled and disordered state of manners in which we live to-day reminds me of a famous ode often quoted by our forefathers when they desired to extol the glories of the past and the lost liberty which republican Rome had once enjoyed. It seems to me that it were not amiss to quote it now.

Paul. What ode is that, please?

Jac. 'Viler than grandsires, sires begat
Ourselves yet baser, soon to curse
The world with offspring baser yet.' [1]

Paul. Ah, yes, now I remember it is Horace.

Jac. Next we observe how stringently the code

[1] Hor. *Od.* iii. 6. 46, Conington's translation.

of Solon[1] compelled fathers to remember the duty of looking after their children in the manner prescribed by law. The dereliction of this duty or neglect of this precept, either through the greed which grudges the means or the wickedness which repudiates the obligation of educating and training their children, was visited with explicit penalties, and the delinquent had reason to dread the terrors of a court of law, before which any one who pleased might summon or report him. Such a man was held to have lost his title even to those filial attentions which our common nature and humanity demand from children to their parents: respect and reverence were forfeited, no less than any claim to support in time of want and weakness. In short, the failure of a father to fulfil his statutory duties to his children deprived him of the sanction which the law supplied to the customary obligations of filial duty and gratitude. The only exception made, and how signally humane we feel it to be, was that a son was bound to give decent burial even to such a father. For while that service did not confer upon the father any unmerited satisfaction, it discharged a debt of nature which is in accordance alike with divine and human dictates.

Solon compelled fathers to bestow due care upon their children, and visited neglect with definite penalties.

The example of the wise teacher to attach supreme importance to the nurture of the young.

But why do I say this? In order that you may understand, Paullus, that it has always been held by the wisest men that a very careful account must be taken of this first stage, as being in a sense the porch of life and prefiguring the whole form and structure of the years to come.

[1] Cf. Plutarch, *Solon*, 22 *νόμον ἔγραψεν, υἱῷ τρέφειν τὸν πατέρα μὴ διδαξάμενον τέχνην ἐπάναγκες μὴ εἶναι.*

Paul. I am sure that they were most prudent in making for our guidance ordinances so reasonable in themselves and so full of profit for mankind, and I am the more anxious for you to expound these principles and to draw together into a single view childhood and youth : it will benefit not only myself but, I am sure, many others also.

Jac. A happy conjecture, Paullus ; and I accept this task : and since God is the source and inspiration of all good things, let us both kneel in reverent entreaty that He may bestow the grace of His Presence upon us and enable us to utter such things as may be pleasing to Himself and serviceable to others.

Paul. Let us do so.

The two main divisions of the subject of Education, as here treated—moral and literary training.

Jac. Our system of education, then, falls into two divisions[1]—the first deals with moral, the second with literary training.

The object of moral training,

Moral training sets out with the object of ensuring that all our words and actions may be marked by moderation, and may keep a fit and proper rule of conduct, the correct beauty of which may delight not only the mind of the learned but even the eyes of the ignorant and constrain them to admiring imitation.

and the function of letters.

Now the power, the quality of literature and of what we call humane studies is this : We receive from Nature what is central in ourselves, what indeed makes us truly and individually what we are, but in a rough and unfinished form ; it is the function of letters to bring this to its highest perfection and to work out in it a beauty comparable to its divine original.

[1] Cf. Cic. *De Or.* i. 69.

Paul. Here surely are two glorious things, father, if the one enables us to become like to God and the other helps us to appear such.

Jac. And yet, Paullus, it is of the utmost importance for you to observe and thoroughly to grasp and understand that our true self is not this body which we perceive with our eyes, this frame, compact of bone and sinew with covering of flesh and vesture of skin, nor this countenance, the chief image of ourselves whereon we are wont to trace the marks of our inner feelings and almost recognize in it the mind itself. No: our inward perception and power of thought, our faculty of reasoning and resolve, this it is that makes us men, and this is fashioned after the image of God, its Creator. In itself it is dim and feeble, save it be kindled with the flame of knowledge and of letters.

What is the true self? Inward perception, power of thought, reasoning and resolve.

These must be kindled by the flame of knowledge and of letters.

Now as we said that in right training there are two divisions, literary and moral, so the training of character must in its turn be divided into two parts.

Moral training divided into two parts.

Literary training progresses, so to say, in one continuous and gradual process, one step leading to the next: but stages in the training of character are marked not only by reason, but also by time.

A difference between the progress of moral and that of literary training.

Paul. How so?

Jac. Character is a composite thing, and cannot be treated upon a uniform plan. One element clearly is that which is impressed upon us by the careful and systematic teaching of others: another and a different element is that which we acquire for ourselves by the purposive effort of our own minds.

Paul. Yes, but though these processes are carried out at different moments, is not the underlying principle one and the same?

Jac. When one of two things is endowed with principle and the other is devoid of principle, you cannot say that both are governed by one and the same principle.

Paul. I should like that put more plainly.

An illustration offered.

Jac. I will try, and the better to do this, I will offer you an illustration which may help you to see my argument. Tell me, then, have you seen in Rome the statue of Apollo, in the portico of the Vatican garden, that forms the chief adornment of the front colonnade and all the surrounding shrubberies? It stands next the Laocoon group in the noble beauty that we all know so well.

Paul. You mean that great tall statue, with the majestic appearance of a man who has somewhat passed the time of youth, who, as though he had shot an arrow from his bow, seems to be waiting with his arm still drawn back, to see whether it hits the mark at which it was aimed. The graceful vigour and movement of the body and the extraordinary beauty of the face reveal the supreme art of the sculptor and the glory of his work.

Jac. Yes, that is the statue I mean.

Paul. I have often seen and gazed on it.

Appearance and reality; form and truth.

Jac. Well, I ask you, if Apollo, the son of Jupiter, were exactly of that appearance, and if from him as model one traced on the marble all the characteristics of his face and form, his gait and motion, his very words and tones, so that the

outward likeness could not be more exact, but the figure remained devoid of mind and thought, should you say that the essence of Apollo was the same in the god himself and in the marble statue ?

Paul. I begin to understand the ambiguity,[1] and I am reminded of that image, that unsubstantial, strengthless phantom which was fashioned after the likeness of Aeneas in a hollow cloud, not so much by the hands of Juno as by the greatest of all poets in his poem.

Paullus suggests a further illustration.

Jac. An excellent illustration and even more apposite to our subject. And if it had occurred to me I should not have been obliged to quarrel with Polycletus and, as it were, try to supplement the beauties of his work. For Polycletus would have been far more skilled than I in fashioning the kind of effigy we desired, finished and perfected with all the resources of art, but for all that an effigy, something, that is, inspired not by its own will or volition, but merely by a kind of imitation :[2] and I do not suppose you will consider it of the same type and nature as the living Aeneas himself.

Paul. Far from it. And now I think I see the

[1] Agnosco ὁμώνυμον. Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* viii. 2. 13.

[2] Cf. Cic. *Orator*, ii. 9 : 'Itaque et Phidiae simulacris, quibus nihil in illo genere perfectius videmus, et eis picturis, quas nominavi, cogitare tamen possumus pulchriora ; nec vero ille artifex cum faceret Iovis formam aut Minervae, contemplabatur aliquem e quo similitudinem duceret, sed ipsius in mente insidebat species pulchritudinis eximia quaedam, quam intuens in eaque defixus ad illius similitudinem artem et manum dirigebat.'

Two kinds of habit contrasted.

difference between these two kinds of habit, the one imposed from without and bearing the impress of another's will, without initiative, almost lifeless, the phantom of a real habit, a mere picture pencilled on a tablet that is outside oneself: the other the true offspring and very product of reason itself, acting designedly, conscious of its own function and duty, and capable of maintaining its existence as the former type of habit never is. So while that is mere shadow of the truth, this is truth itself.

Conscious reason alone makes moral action truly virtuous.

Jac. I see you understand, and are taking a true line of distinction: for in the case of a child, or a man who is no better than a child and has no independence of mind and judgement, such a mere copy of moral action brought in from without lacks the force of a settled routine and has no proper claim to be called virtue.

Paul. I agree.

Jac. Nay, more, I find that we have even different words and expressions for describing these two things, calling the habit that is imposed from without disciplined training, but that which is our own personal choice, virtue.

Paul. How so?

Jac. [1] Discipline consists in habituation to the

[1] Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics*, vi. 13. 5: 'Virtue is not simply a formed habit in *accordance with* right reason, but a formed habit *implying* right reason' (μετὰ λόγου); 'The agent must not only be guided by reason, but by his own reason, not another's.' F. H. Peters, translation and note. Cf. also ii. 4. 3: 'A man is not said to act justly or temperately if what he does merely be of a certain sort—he must also be in a certain state of mind when he does it; i. e. first of all,

authority of another's virtue: virtue in obedience to its own authority.

Disciplined habit and true virtue.

Paul. Now I understand. But what need is there of that lower type of habit? Why not rather look in every case to a man's own reason to form him in the best conventions?

What is the value of the lower type of habit?

Jac. What you throw out, Paullus, is a difficult thing to understand—especially for the young, who have not yet been taught by time and practice and a wide experience of life, how great, and indeed almost irresistible is the force of custom. It is inappropriate, nay, impossible, for that precise and subtle idea of virtue to be instilled into the youthful mind, and when a man attains it even in advanced age we rightly call him blessed. But in your childhood, and even in your youth, you should receive in place of knowledge and understanding a certain conviction, to make you trust and obey your elders, who, as you can see, are held in high esteem; for public opinion never approves or admires for long what is at variance with goodness and truth. How much, indeed, habit [2] contributes to virtue is made evident by the fact that the department of philosophy which deals with virtue takes its name, not from know-

In childhood and youth knowledge and understanding are not to be expected, but trust and obedience.

The effect of imposed habit on the un-

he must know what he is doing; secondly, he must choose it, and choose it for itself; and thirdly, his act must be the expression of a formed and stable character.'

[1] Cf. Cic. *de Nat. Deorum*, i. 42. 118: 'ut quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret,' and Plato, *Rep.* 402 A.

[2] Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics*, ii. 1. 1: 'Moral excellence is the result of habit or custom (ἔθος), and has accordingly in our language received a name formed by a slight change from ἔθος.' Peters' trans.

formed mind which is yet incapable of reason.

ledge or wisdom, but from the word 'mos', and is called moral philosophy. We know how the body of an infant is fashioned and moulded to a certain physical habit by the nurse's hand;[1] not less certainly is the fresh and pure mind led into the moral habit in which it is trained. As with plants, so with characters; while they are soft and impressionable, any form you will may be easily put upon them; but when this form by use and time has grown hard, it becomes practically unchangeable. We may complain of the inconsiderate arrangement of nature which sets the passions in a man's heart long before reason is born, but if so, we must use every care to ensure the obedience of these passions to an external reason, until his own proper reason comes, as their natural ruler whose command they will readily fulfil.[2] For if until that time they are restrained by no careful guidance, but attempt to win for themselves an empire in the mind, and do without let or hindrance whatever they will, reason will assuredly remonstrate with them in

[1] Plato, *Rep.* ii. 377 C: 'Let [mothers and nurses] fashion the mind with [suitable] tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands.'

[2] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* iii. 401 E, 402 A: 'He who has received this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the good and becomes noble and good, he will justly blame and hate the bad, now in the days of his youth, *even before he is able to know the reason why*; and when reason comes, he will recognize and salute the friend with whom his education has made him long familiar.'

vain, and make no headway whatever against them.

And now, though you are still a mere boy, for you have just reached your eighteenth year, let me tell you something about this procedure and plan of nature—indeed, your interest and amiability encourage me. Well then, the soul of man is divided into two parts,[1] different from one another, and almost at enmity—one part belongs to reason, the other to desire; of these two parts reason is itself clear-sighted and endowed with light; it is the eye of the mind,[2] discerning all things with the utmost clearness and accuracy; but the other is blind, and has no share at all in light. Further, each of these parts has constantly at its side two counsellors,[3] one to suggest, the other to dissuade. The counsellors of Reason itself and intelligence are the Good and the Bad—of Desire, the Pleasant, and the Painful. These four, then, are fellow guests living in the same house; if they cannot agree and live peaceably together, but are violent and quarrelsome, what strivings and battles, what upheavals and riots do you suppose there will be. When Reason banishes as bad what Desire claims as pleasant; or when

The soul divided by reason and desire.

[1] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* iv. 440 for the opposition between Reason and Desire as elements in the soul. Sadoleto finds no place here for the spirited element, which Plato places between the two.

[2] Cf. J. Smith: 'True Way or Method of attaining to Divine Knowledge': *The Cambridge Platonists*, ed. Campagnac, Clarendon Press, 1901, p. 80; and Plotinus, *Enneades*, I. 6. 9.

[3] Cf. Plato, *Laws*, i. 644: 'And each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both foolish and antagonistic; of which we call the one pleasure and the other pain.'

Desire finds that painful which Reason judges to be good, commotion and struggle ensue. What, then, we may ask, is the true rule for living well? Surely it is a system upon which Desire shall harmonize and adjust itself to Reason, and adapt and unify what it regards as Pleasant and Painful with what the other regards as Good and Bad; and this result is happily effected mainly by habit and by conduct; for nothing can be so pleasant as that to which you have made yourself used. Consider your own friends and comrades, consider the place in which you have been brought up, the studies in which you are engaged; if any one were to try to draw you away from these, and turn you to other associates, to other studies, you can judge for yourself, Paullus, how hardly you would take it, for a new and unwonted mode of life you would think hateful, whereas you glide easily and pleasantly in the familiar direction. Indeed, familiarity and unfamiliarity are the causes, the one of what is pleasant and the other of what is painful. If this is so, parents must devote themselves with whole-hearted zeal to teaching their children to form the right habits. True; habit impressed by careful government from without is not real virtue, but only the semblance and image of virtue; yet, as legend and story tell of Pygmalion's statue of a woman,[1] by the kindness of heaven, it comes about in the course of time that this image takes on the spirit and life of true virtue.

The rule for living well—harmony between Reason and Desire—to be established by habit.

By the kindness of heaven, the image of virtue, like Pygmalion's statue, takes on the spirit and life of virtue (wrought by habit).

Paul. Had I not begun by asking you a different question, I should gladly let you spend the whole

[1] Ovid, *Met.* x. 243 seq.

day upon these subjects; so charming, and, indeed, to me so entrancing are the doctrines you set forth.

Jac. Yes, and they will be far more delightful to you, Paullus, when you prove them by experience, and apprehend by personal use and intelligence the facts which you can now only know by hearsay or by the exercise of your powers of reason: in mind you are nearer to them than in years, for nature disposed you to the study of virtue; and nature has been aided by your father's care and then by my own. And now that the foundations of your young manhood are well and truly laid, all that remains is for you to endeavour to respond with diligent and virtuous assiduity to our hopes and efforts and to the large expectations which others have been led to form about you.

Experience will change Paullus' notional assent to real assent.

Paul. The natural warmth of my love for such things has been in the first place, my father, encouraged by your advice and exhortations, and even more perhaps since I have been attracted by you to the study of Greek and Philosophy, to which I owe more pleasure than I can say.

Jac. Excellent youth! it is no hard task properly to train such spirits as yours. Let us assume that all others are of like disposition, and first deal with the education of childhood, and then of youth.

Jacopus assumes that all pupils will be like Paullus.

Paul. Yes, but suppose they are not similar in disposition—suppose they bring a nature a little troublesome and unapt for the study?

But what if they are troublesome?

Jac. You remember, I am sure, what your own poet has said of toil.

Paul. You mean, perhaps, when he says that persistent toil can vanquish all difficulties.[1]

Jac. Yes, exactly; and one might also quote the common proverb that use becomes second nature.

Paul. Yes, they say that, and it is most true.

Patience and practice are the remedies to be used.

Jac. Put it in this way: even if the pupil's nature be something less than apt, the result of patient work will be that, whatever his disposition, it may, if subjected to good training, turn out less intractable and be saved from conspicuous moral blemish. But fair beauty, the ornament of lofty virtue, no one can hope to attain unless he has the seeds and germs of it naturally implanted in his mind. Since this is so, and since we must wish in a child that something in which Nature's power and not our own is seen—viz. a good disposition—why should we not pray that it be not only good, but the best possible—and we must say the same thing about the stock, the fortune, the circumstances of him whom we are to train, I mean, that he should come of an honourable stock, of good parentage, of well-to-do family, and that he should be born in lawful wedlock: not because the way of virtue is closed to those who are not so fortunate as to possess these advantages, but because the way is without doubt plainer and easier for those who set out from this starting-point. For the Greek poet was wise when he said that unless the foundation of the race is fairly laid a dishonoured offspring will follow: and in truth the lofty confidence and freedom of a man's spirit must needs be narrowed and daunted when it suffers the stigma of an ignoble parentage. We

But the highest success can only be won with pupils naturally good and apt for study.

Let us assume that the pupil, springing from a good stock, and by nature good, is placed in good surroundings.

[1] Virg. *Georg.* i. 146.

will begin, then, with the birth of the child: for though it might not be profitless to offer some words of counsel to mothers in respect of the best form of bodily exercise and the ordering of their daily life during the time when the infant is yet in the womb, yet the physical conditions vary in different cases: some women are more delicate than others, and we may safely leave that period to the care of nature rather than of the father. No sooner, however, is the child born than it becomes his father's duty to see that the mother feeds him at her own breast,[1] both because of their kinship and because this practice gives no mean bond to their love: for the more the labour, the greater the affection, when its object is made perfect. But if by any chance we are obliged to employ a nurse,[2] we should be careful to choose one of chaste character and prudent mind: for as we see even our own minds, as well as our bodies, to be affected by the food we take from day to day, so an infant draws into its nature with the milk it drinks no small measure of the virtuous sobriety which belongs to the person from whose body it is fed. One ought, moreover, to see that a nurse is neither too severe in handling a child, nor, on the other hand, unduly lenient. For it is not only daily

Education begins at birth.

The child to be fed at his mother's breast, if possible.

If a nurse is needed, she must be chosen for her chaste character and prudent mind.

She must be neither harsh nor lenient.

[1] Cf. Rousseau, *Émile*, i: 'Ever since mothers, despising their first duty, have been no longer willing to nourish their own children, they must be entrusted to hireling nurses, who, thus finding themselves mothers to others' children for whom the voice of nature did not plead, have felt no anxiety but to rid themselves of their burdens.' *Rousseau's Émile*, tr. W. H. Payne, Appleton, New York.

[2] Cf. Elyot, 'The Boke of the Governour', *Everyman Library*, I. iv and v.

habit and associations that work insensibly upon a child's nature, but a single hour, nay, a single moment, leaves its mark; and while the spirit is broken by the shock of harsh treatment and becomes mean and timorous, a will spoiled by over-indulgence becomes incapable of fixity for any length of time. We are all from the beginning of life ordained to weeping and wailing, as though nature had prescience of the lot of human kind, which is full of wretchedness; and it is certain that through the eyes and ears of children—untrained and unaccustomed as they are to the world—sensations steal into their consciousness even in sleep, and shake them with alarms. For, as I said before, the unfamiliar is ever a distress to them, and is the source of frequent tears, the remedy for which is patient rocking in the nurse's arms, or her songs, and the gradual familiarizing with the faces and voices of the household. The rocking, above all, is good for them in every way; it soothes and strengthens the body and frees the mind from all its petty terrors; for as the external and physical movement subdues and assuages the vague unrest that stirs within, the sharp onset of the sensory impressions is made milder. It is for this reason that, taught in some sort by nature what was the right thing to do, we first thought of cradles and learnt to carry babies patiently in our arms. And so we must see, so far as we can, that the nurses who tend our children spend their lives in a kind of perpetual sea-roll.[1]

The waking and sleeping alarms of children.

Rocking in the nurse's arms.

[1] Plato, *Laws*, vii. 790: 'Infants should live, if that were possible, as if they were always rocking at sea.'

The power of singing, moreover, can not only allay perturbed spirits, but even calm a frenzy, as we see in the case of the Corybants. Then when we come to the age at which a child can comprehend words and begins to listen with more attention to those who talk near it, it becomes more than ever important for the father to take the utmost care about the conduct of the household; that no base or blasphemous word may reach a child's ears, no coarse gesture may meet his eye.[1] The mother also must needs take special care, since it is in her lap the little one sits, in her face that he most often looks: it is she who teaches him to walk and talk. So it is her duty to lead the child by the hand or take it in her arms to the Church [2] and her services, and also to visit

The soothing influence of singing.

The child must hear no evil words, and see no ugly gestures.

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 45: 'They are wholly, if possible, to be kept from such Conversation; for the Contagion of these ill Precedents, both in Civility and Virtue, horribly infects Children, as often as they come within reach of it. They frequently learn from unbred or debauched Servants such language, untowardly Tricks and Vices as otherwise they possibly would be ignorant of all their lives.'

[2] Plato, *Laws*, vii. 794: 'And all the children who are between the ages of three and six ought to meet at the temples of the villages, the several families of a village uniting in one spot. The nurses are to see that the children behave properly and orderly.' Cf. Locke in the scheme for poor law reform which he drew up in 1697 as a Commissioner of Trade and Plantations: 'Another advantage also of bringing children thus to a working school is that by this means they may be obliged to come constantly to church every Sunday, along with their schoolmasters or dames, whereby they may be brought into some sense of religion: whereas ordinarily now, in their idle and loose way of breeding up, they are as utter strangers both

He is taken by his mother to Church and to the houses of kinswomen.

and converse in the houses of matrons, allied to her own family, that the child may learn to take pleasure in the companionship of relatives and connexions, to recognize them, and to distinguish not only their faces but their names. Nor should she ever take him to a house where there is not a pure and decorous discipline, for as health-bringing[1] breezes blow from wholesome regions, so from places of sound and religiously guarded morals the breath of goodness should be made to flow upon the child's mind. Years pass, and the child grows daily in vigour of mind and body, so that, as though in a soil fitly prepared, some seed may now be sown: and the first and fairest seed, the most rich and fruitful in true happiness, that should be cast into the soul, is the name and thought of Almighty God; that the child may begin from the outset to love and reverence Him, whom he is daily taught to recognize as the source of all the gifts of life.[2] This now becomes the common duty of both parents. For when he sees them worshipping Him,[3] offering Him thanks for

The child is taught the name of God.

He sees his parents performing acts of worship.

to religion and morality as they are to industry.' (Quoted by R. H. Quick from Fox Bourne's *Life of Locke*, vol. ii, p. 383.)

[1] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* iii. 401: 'Then will our youth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason'; and *Laws*, vii. 792 E.

[2] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 116.

[3] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 116: 'I am apt to think, the

all His benefits, and with look and gesture of supplication invoking His help in all perplexities, he will himself conclude that the nature and the power of God far transcend the human creatures that he knows. This, indeed, the child will be the more sure to do if, when he desires something for which he eagerly begs, e. g. the bulla, the bordered toga, or something else which marks the high origin and nobility of his family, (I say, he will learn this lesson all the better) if, whenever it is granted to him, he is taught that it is the goodness and the grace of God which he has to thank. Thus from the beginning he truly learns to love Him whom he must also needs fear—not with a slavish fear: for this pleases not God nor does it make for innocence of life and true virtue, but with that fear which is so bound up with love that it cannot be divorced from it. For as we read in holy writ, 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of all wisdom'[1]: and, truly, when this love or fear of God (for we declare that each is blended and mingled with the other) has once been firmly rooted in a child we need have no serious apprehension lest he, whoever he be, ever give himself up entirely to an evil life. This, then, should be our chief endeavour with a child—that this root,

The fear and the love of God united in the child's heart.

keeping Children constantly Morning and Evening to Acts of Devotion to God, as to their Maker, Preserver and Benefactor, in some plain and short Form of Prayer, suitable to their Age and Capacity, will be of much more use to them in Religion, Knowledge, and Virtue than to distract their Thoughts with curious Enquiries into His inscrutable Essence and Being.'

[1] Psalm cxi. 10.

so fruitful in blessedness, be most firmly fixed in his heart as early as may be, while the ground is, so to say, untenanted, and the mind, thanks to its very newness in nature and origin, is not yet seized by alien and even conflicting ideas. For seeds, which at the first sowing are set well apart, are not yet crowded into a narrow space by a forest of other growths. Of course, all that is human must at times go astray and fall; but if pure love and worship of God have once grown like a tree within the heart, then, just as weeds may spring up and flourish for a while in sunless places, but assuredly cannot come to maturity nor bear fruit, so the deadly sins will be destroyed by the shadow of religion. And we ought to be careful to make a child understand that all I have here said of God and His worship concerns every aspect of his life: for indeed all virtue, all honour, all hope of joyful or happy life depends above all upon this one ambition, viz. our never ceasing to love and fear God.

With such early training, he may make mistakes, but will not go far astray.

The next main principle in a child's training, second to that of which I have just been speaking, but of far greater importance than any other, is that a father, who desires to bring his son up as a good and noble man, should himself afford a pattern to be copied.[1] No training can be better than that. In saying this I do not deny that there

The father must be a pattern to his son, at any rate in the essentials of piety and good conduct,

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 44: 'Children (nay, and Men too) do most by Example. We are all a sort of Camelions, that still take a Tincture from Things near us; nor is it to be wondered at in Children, who better understand what they see than what they hear.'

are many graces of life that ought daily to be increased in a child, though his father may not possess them: for example, letters and the pursuit and study of those Arts which are called Liberal, the knowledge of civil or ecclesiastical law, practice and understanding of war and military matters, it may be: for while a father may by the fault of his own father or of mere mischance be wholly ignorant of these matters, he should see that his son know something of them. For there is a natural desire common to all fathers, that they should leave sons better and more illustrious than themselves. And this comes from a natural love in every man, not more for his son than for himself, due to the deeply implanted, inborn craving to prolong our life, a craving by which we are swept on to the lust for immortality; and a father always feels himself to live again in his son and to pass into his own image.

though he may desire in his son many gifts and graces which he does not himself possess.

We must leave in partial neglect some matters which this is not the time for treating more fully; and declare that the foundation of everything lies in what we have named, i. e. a sound and upright character and a dignified and well-balanced order of home-life. On this topic I must now briefly and comprehensively summarize my conclusions. For in the scheme we sketched just now, we agreed to postpone for secondary consideration the question of training in literature and the liberal arts.

Paul. Very properly, for we shall find it easy to revert to the earlier period and stage of a child's education if that be found advisable. And I confess this picture of the parents' character as seen

sketched in their children's dispositions has a peculiar charm for me: not only because the subject is one of infinite interest and importance, but because I have personal experience of the truth of most of what you say in the debt I owe to you who have nurtured and brought me up.

Jac. Let this, then, be the first rule for parents in regard to their children if they desire to bring them to the best fruits of goodness—that what they long for their children to become, they must show themselves to be in their children's eyes.[1] But this first counsel of ours is far from easy to carry out; for he who wishes to obey it must discern and observe the golden mean in conduct, the practice of which has ever been most difficult though its fruits have always been most excellent. But if a father feels himself scarcely equal to the guidance of his son, and yet wishes him to grow up into a good man, let him find a tutor more suitable for the task than himself, and entrust the boy to his training;[2] for it is better for him to be trained to goodness by the influence of a stranger, than depraved by that of his own kin. That such a course has been taken by the most eminent men, we know not only from books, but from our own observation—for I suppose we are not to find

The parents' example of a well-balanced mind.

If the father finds himself unequal to the task, let him seek a tutor to train the boy.

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 45, and note: 'Children [should be] kept as much as may be in the Company of their Parents . . .' 'How much the *Romans* thought the Education of their Children a Business that properly belonged to the Parents themselves, see in Suetonius, *August.* § 64. Plutarch, *in vita Catonis Censoris*, Diodorus Siculus, *l.* 2, *cap.* 3.'

[2] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 66 and foll.

fault with the judgement of Philip of Macedon in this matter.[1] His son, Alexander, a boy with natural endowments which gave promise of the highest qualities (a promise amply fulfilled later by his achievements), he entrusted from childhood to the tuition of the greatest of philosophers, Aristotle. But let us for our purpose take the case of a father who has aptitude for the teaching and training of his son—such aptitude indeed is often created by affectionate zeal, so that though a man may not have previously considered what is essential to that serious and well-controlled mode of life, yet, aflame with love for his son, he devotes himself whole-heartedly to the study of it.

The tutor should be a man of real distinction.

But if the father undertakes the duty, what must be his equipment? Affection will spur him to devotion and studious care.

First, then, as we have said, he must keep the golden mean, for without this there can be no real distinction, no true satisfaction; and though philosophy alone can afford a complete and rounded conception of this, yet men of good character and good intelligence, who have bent themselves to acquiring a position of honour by their solid worth, have even without philosophy fashioned for themselves no mean figure of this queen of all the virtues.

He must keep the golden mean of self-control, even though he be not a philosopher.

Let the father then be a man of this sort: of well-balanced nature, his one vehement passion

[1] Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* i. 1. 23: 'An Philippus Macedonum rex Alexandro filio suo prima litterarum elementa tradi ab Aristotele, summo eius aetatis philosopho, voluisset, aut ille suscepisset hoc officium, si non studiorum initia et a perfectissimo quoque optime tractari et pertinere ad summam credidisset?' Cf. Elyot, *Gov.* I. v, p. 22: 'Hit shal be no reproche to a noble man to instruct his owne children . . .' and also I. vi. and ix–xii.

the pursuit of goodness and honour, eager to pour his whole soul through the channel of ears and eyes into the mind and spirit of his son. For the child at once begins to turn his eyes upon the father of the family as soon as he has any power of thought, and observes with a special attention all that he says and does ; and so we must be more watchful, lest we carry from ourselves any infection of evil or dishonour into the life of him whom we ourselves long to mould and shape to the fair form of a rounded and complete virtue. Now as the sense of sight is prior to the sense of hearing and is earlier to develop its natural power, the first care must be to set before the eyes of the son the pattern, in the person of his father, of a manly dignity.[1] This will express itself in dress, in every movement of body and of mind—and all the concerns of home life from day to day : in all these the father must observe the fashion of dress which is in general vogue, yet so that there shall be nothing over-exquisite in his apparel, and nothing again common or unkempt, which is sometimes attributed to carelessness, but more often to meanness.[2] As for the movements and impulses of the mind, which springing from anger, vexation, love, hate, hope, unexpected pleasure, the fear of some evil or disaster, the sudden announcement of calamity, and all the other influences, the inward passions of whatever kind that buffet or shake the mind, and strive to move

The child keenly observes what his father says and does.

The child learns by sight earlier than by hearing.

The father's dress.

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 44 (quoted above, p. 28).

[2] On dress cf. Elyot, *Gov.* II. iii : *Of apparaile belongynge to a noble man, beinge a gouernour or great counsailour.*

it from its seat, all these he must so support and govern that to a beholder he may seem to be on the lookout for these assaults, however impetuous and swift they may be, but awaiting the command of reason, not daring to make a sortie against them, until, and then only so far as, reason bids. This is a spectacle than which the world offers nothing more God-like. For what can the eye discover so rare, so noble, so splendid in its rounded and beautiful dignity as the sight of virtue controlling and ordering the impulses and affections of the mind, or fitly adjusting them to the rule of reason.

The father must be guided by reason, and unmoved by sudden gusts of passion.

If a boy from his earliest years has been steeped in this tradition in the example of his father, he will have taken into his heart the noble seed of a virtue which will come to a splendid fruition in his own character.

The boy receives a tradition of dignity from the example of his father.

But this ordered self-control of the mind is accompanied by a certain slowness shown in every movement and gesture of the body—not of course the heaviness or slackness which is generally the sign of indolence and inertness of mind, and sometimes even of a gross stupidity—I mean rather that slowness which accords with acknowledged dignity of character and is curbed by the same checks and enjoys the same freedom as the mind itself; when occasion calls for quick decision and rapid action, the quick and ready service of the body, with hand and foot, the keen glance, the sharp tone of voice, are not forbidden, yet each seems to have been held at the disposal of reason and judgement for use when use was urgent.

Dignity of mind shown in dignity of gesture and carriage.

This art of moderation, which, as I said, is the

Consistent moderation, the supreme ornament of life, is the gift of philosophy.

supreme ornament of life, decorating it and illuminating it in every part, this knowledge of what is fit in every circumstance, on every occasion, under every condition, is the gift, the work of philosophy. Philosophy alone makes this art self-consistent everywhere, and for every stage of life ;

Philosophy is aided by experience of the world :

though no doubt it gets aid from age and wide experience, and from that shrewd observation of what has commonly befallen or is at the moment taking place in the world and among men, which

and experience even without philosophy will achieve much in a man naturally intelligent.

affords to philosophy both her materials and her instruments and by itself, apart from philosophy, can achieve in one naturally intelligent and good the appearance of a wise man, though it cannot produce complete and perfect wisdom.

The father of a family must indeed always have his spirit well in control, but specially if his son is present upon any occasion which calls for signs of agitation he must remember to summon to his aid the counsel of reason, so that he may not only set about and carry through the action which is appropriate, but do this with a certain dignity, to the end that those high examples of conduct may with most potent influence make their way into the heart of his son, and settle there—examples which, if once they have established a place for themselves in him, and won the use and right of domicile in his heart, will never suffer examples of a different sort, mean and disfiguring, to approach or at any rate remain too long.

The father[1] must, then, if our principles be ac-

[1] The ideal father, clearly, has many of the characteristics

cepted, show himself devout and reverent towards Almighty God, genial with his equals, keeping equally remote from fawning deference to his superiors and from arrogant self-assertion; towards his slaves and his household gentle rather than severe,[1] yet so as to maintain an unchallenged authority,[2] and have each and all alert in ready obedience to his command. His speech at home will be concise, mild and even in tone, but expressed in words of force. He will not seek the company and conversation of his servants unduly; yet when they approach him with some petition,

The father, reverent towards God, will among men adopt a manner appropriate to his company.

His conversation.

His treatment of servants.

of Aristotle's 'high-minded man'. Cf. *Ethics*, iv. 3. 26: 'It is characteristic of the high-minded man . . . to be lofty in his behaviour to those who are high in station and favoured by fortune, but affable to those of the middle ranks. . . .' And 34: 'Further, the character of the high-minded man seems to require that his gait should be slow, his voice deep, his speech measured.'

[1] Cf. Elyot, *Gov.* II. v, *Of affabilitie and the utilitie therof in every astate.*

[2] On the authority of the parent, cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 27: 'Those therefore that intend ever to govern their Children, should begin it whilst they are *very little*, and look that they perfectly comply with the Will of their Parents. . . . For methinks they mightily misplace the Treatment due to their Children, who are indulgent and familiar when they are little, but severe to them, and keep them at a distance, when they are grown up: For Liberty and Indulgence can do no good to *Children*; their Want of Judgment makes them stand in need of Restraint and Discipline; and on the contrary Imperiousness and Severity is but an ill Way of treating Men, who have Reason of their own to guide them; unless you have a mind to make your Children, when grown up, weary of you, and secretly to say within themselves, *When will you die, Father?*'

he will always be courteous, and give them a fair and generous answer in brief judicial form. Yet that they may be in harmony and at peace among themselves, and to avoid injustice to any, and moreover that he may aid those who are straightened in means or affected by illness, he may sometimes allow himself a greater freedom in sympathetic[1] kindness of act and word; indeed the head of the household need not keep this for rare and extreme cases, if he desires to hold them devoted to himself, and afraid above all things of losing his regard, which indeed, if they are treated as I suggest, they often prize more dearly than life itself.

In conduct of this sort there is always the note, the quality of grave and assured command; it is a supreme and constant illustration of dignity, of a kind to foster a certain loftiness and magnificence of temper and spirit. For we must graft upon the mind and disposition of the boy that sense of what is noble and honourable, which will keep him from any failure in grave courtesy in his relations with the great, and yet prevent him from loss of tender clemency in governing those who are in subordinate positions—a sense, the exhibition of which is at once most charming and most difficult. And yet the first lines of such a character a father must trace upon the heart of his son with his own example for his instrument: experience and the conventions of the best society will deepen the impression; and philosophy will give it its final distinction.

The courtesy and clemency of the father will produce these qualities in the son.

Experience of good society will confirm, and philosophy will crown them.

[1] On civility and deportment towards servants cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 102–3, § 117.

If we rapidly traverse all these considerations it is not because it is our own aim to train a father, for that were a greater enterprise, and would cost more labour; but rather to sketch with a light hand upon the tender and impressionable mind of youth whatever can come to him in clearly envisaged examples of goodness and honour from the native virtue of his father. For just as letters are easily cut upon the tender bark of young trees, so it is our hope that our faint outline of virtue marked upon a boy's nature may be deepened, strengthened, and made permanent by time.

The importance of a father's example in the impressionable days of childhood.

Paul. An excellent scheme, and in my judgement where there are such parents it will not be hard to find in the children a high standard of rectitude and wisdom.

Jac. No doubt, but I would have you consider this, Paullus, if all teaching of virtue depends either upon example or upon precept—that is, if the seed of virtue is borne into the mind either by the ears or by the eyes,—those things which seem to be done as it were in passing, and not of set purpose, the mere spectacle of which seizes the eyes of youth and forms its character in the mould of virtue, have a greater influence than what is done openly with this object. For admiration of a father's virtue, as it shines out in his daily habits, moves the children's minds to a desire to imitate him, and invites them by the shining example, so that they long to be like him —especially when they see those who are about them silently and reverently obeying the com-

Example or precept—which is the stronger?

mands of the head of the household ; for this image of beauty and dignity, which is alone in its own essence and for its own sake admirable, passes not unheeded before their eyes, and the impression sinks deeply into their inmost hearts, not only in their waking hours, but often during sleep. The wondering interest which this sight arouses is immediate, and it is shared by all.

Skill in instruction is vouchsafed to few—and in this kind the silent far more than the uttered eloquence of a father serves to train the son—the eloquence, I mean, which speaks in acts. For a father who deals in words, and gives to his son with his lips counsels, which he has not adopted for his own life, were like a man who should claim to be a guide upon a road from which he himself wanders far.

But if a father has not received from nature nor been able by careful reflection to fashion for himself the capacity to play such a part, let him find, as we have said before, a man to whom he can properly entrust his boy for training. But let us assume for our argument a father who should be such as we have described, or of whom it is to be hoped that he may become such a man as can lead his son in his own footsteps into the road which makes for virtue. About him we have not yet said what is the most important of all, and what is perhaps most remote from the general trend of opinion among men.

Paul. Pray tell me what this may be ? For whatever it is, it must certainly be a great matter, which can make any sort of addition to the long

list of noble qualities which have been touched upon in your speech.

Jac. This surely is the rock upon which social life is wrecked, that men almost always think that wealth and great possessions are the chief aid and ornament of a good and a magnificent life. And indeed it may be that this belief is not wholly mistaken, for great advantages and aids not to mere living, but even to the practice and exhibition of virtue, come from the riches a man has acquired and his inherited wealth.[1] But they are carried too far by this view; they do not know how to set a limit to their desires; they do not learn restraint either in the pursuit or in the use of money. And I maintain that no more terrible curse, no more deadly bane, could have fallen upon the human race. It is through this, as is of course quite plain and clear, that loyalty and faith have long been utterly banished from life, and indeed almost destroyed. I argue, against the prevalent view, that a house in which wealth and money are over-abundant, fails necessarily in its standard of conduct, and for that very reason can have no peaceful and pleasant life. Nor do I say that, because I think that a man should, on the contrary, woo poverty and straitened means—I uphold that sentiment of the wisest

Improper regard for wealth.

[1] Cf. *Rep.* I, 331 A (Cephalus): 'The great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, but to a good man, is that he has had no occasion to deceive or defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men.'

of kings in his prayer that God should grant him neither poverty nor wealth, but only those things which are needful for life—a sentiment applauded by our beloved Plato, the father of philosophy.

But when we reflect that of the wickednesses and curses of men some are of greater and some of less magnitude, we are forced to recognize that excessive wealth is the fountain and source of the greater, and the lack of it the cause of the less. I should hope for the generous spirit whose training in boyhood and youth we are devising, that he should be of a family whose wealth and fortune were so well assured that the master should have no need to earn money but rather be satisfied with his private revenues, and these I should trust would be derived from his own estates. I should hope further that such revenues would supply not only adequately but even liberally the daily claims of convention and good taste ; yet in expenditure a certain economy should be observed ; for I think that luxury and extravagance expressing themselves in undue profusion of equipment, and an over-elaboration of ornament and a too curious refinement, are to be shunned as the most deadly poisons of life. For strength of character is sapped, and the mind is dissipated in the dalliance of empty self-admiration by the diverse refinements of sideboards and servants and jewels and pictures and tapestry. Preoccupied by these frivolous tastes people become incapable of any sustained or consistent effort after those things which are truly worthy of a man : above all, if

Excess of wealth more harmful to character than lack of it ;

and the best kind of wealth is unearned, derived from estates.

Extravagance and profusion and over-refinement are poisons of life.

Luxury leads not only to dissipation, but

they consider the whole value of life and money to consist in a daily succession of banquets, with all their accessories of sport, jest, song, festivity, and pleasant talk. A home life spent like this in constant luxury, in excess of wine and food, in daily debauchery, where every hour is devoted to some form of pleasure, makes young people not only headstrong, petulant, and proud, but violent, lawless, cruel, and wholly depraved. They become tyrannical in temper and disposition, they recognize no standard of propriety save their own caprice, and regard their fellow men as mere cattle and beasts of burden, whose duty is to pay them service. Nay, it is manifest that the household—and indeed the community—in which this type of conduct prevails, contains within it the seeds of every kind of disaster and calamity: nor can it long enjoy peace or permanence. And yet the world calls this a generous style of living—a statement with as little truth in it as many other popular judgements. For this lavish and luxurious scale of expenditure is far more likely than any other to engender the vice of frantic and grasping avarice which brings nations and cities to ruin.

even to pride and cruelty.

The world mistakes luxurious for generous living.

This is not the occasion to go into details, but let us say that the father of a family (provided, of course, he is a man who wants his children to turn out sturdy and hard-working men) ought to be frugal, temperate, and economical in all matters of dress and food, without being mean and displaying any symptoms of a petty or narrow mind. In this he will succeed if with an ordered and prescribed system of daily provision he keeps a simple, rather

The father must be frugal and temperate, but not mean or petty.

than a sumptuous table, with delicacies sparingly provided, but extravagant variety banned; for a life ordered on so temperate a system as this maintains a splendour and liberality which avoids excess as it avoids defect, and is worthy of a wise father, to whom everything that concerns the upbringing of his children is specially in this regard a personal care. For mothers and women[1] generally are apt to be over-indulgent, and spoil their children by stuffing and plying them with everything they desire; they never do or say anything to thwart their wishes, nor will they suffer any one else to say a word; nothing could do more to promote the despotic domination of the passions. You have surely noticed, Paullus, in reading your Persian History (for by my advice you have included in your Greek reading Xenophon's *Cyrus* and Herodotus's *History*) how differences in training and upbringing resulted in differences of nature and of character in those kings. This Cyrus sprang from a father noble and illustrious among the Persians; but, brought up on a system in which the food consisted of bread and water, with cress for relish, or if he desired flesh food, he had to toil and sweat for it, nay, occasionally to secure it in the woods not without risk from the wild beasts; and Cyrus proved himself a great king, born to be an administrator, whose one aim was to gain glory and renown by extending his kingdom: he was so courteous and affable to the people, so kind and just to the

Mothers and women generally apt to be too indulgent.

[1] Cf. Elyot, *Gov.* I. vi, p. 23: 'After that a childe is come to seuen yeres of age, I holde it expedient that he be taken from the company of women.'

tribes he defeated, that, dear as he always was to his fellow-countrymen, he was no less beloved by the foes he conquered, in spite of their previous hostility to him. He won a glorious name, and his reputation for valour will never cease to be extolled.

The examples of Cyrus and Cambyses.

But being, one must suppose, preoccupied with other matters, he handed over his son Cambyses, whom he was to leave as the heir of his name and empire, to be brought up by women. For he did not owe his strength of character or plan of life to the study of philosophy (the only guarantee of consistency and coherence) but to nature only. Hence he found the appropriate results of upbringing by women in the case of his own child. Cambyses, petted and coaxed by women, accustomed from childhood to meet no hindrance to his desires, after succeeding to the kingly title, came to such a pitch of intemperance and madness, that he found no joy or satisfaction in anything that was sanctioned by custom or law. He was led on by senseless fury to the murder of many persons, among them his own brother (for he set at naught the power of the immortal Gods), and finally laid hands on himself, and in his own ruin involved the whole house of Cyrus.

Cyrus's character naturally great, but not fortified by philosophy. He entrusted his son to the care of women—with disastrous results.

The kingdom of Persia then fell to Darius, a man indeed of distinguished family among the Persians, but the tradition and fortune of whose house had been remote from the luxuries of a palace. He brought to the task of government not perhaps the same greatness of soul as Cyrus, but an equal justice and clemency: and so by his efforts again the Persian

Darius, unspoilt by luxury, restored the Persian power,

but Xerxes, brought up by women and unmanned by luxury, brought disgrace and disaster to it.

kingdom was increased. His son Xerxes, neglected by his father, and trained, like Cambyses, by women, found the Persians rich in glory and renown, and brought upon them disgrace and countless disasters. I have recalled these things to you, Paullus, to prove by instances, what it has been necessary to state in many words, that there is no greater obstacle to the attainment of virtue than luxury at home and an equipment more elaborate than self-control and reason demand. If a father is the slave of such tastes, he shall strive in vain to leave a brave and strenuous son behind him fit to fill a great position. And if you ask my opinion, I want to see home-training severe and pure : not crabbed either, but seasoned with genial good fellowship, insomuch that the household servants want for nothing, and friends and guests are glad to frequent the house ; when they are invited to come, the father of the family sees that the entertainment is a little more generous, and that his countenance and conversation is expressive of a more than ordinary gaiety ; his provision, though more plenteous and tasteful, is yet not lavish (for extravagance we do not care to see in any well-ordered household). Nay, at such festivals and over the wine he finds an opportunity for quietly observing the behaviour of his son : whether he remembers his father's training and his temperate habits, and maintains a modest and discreet behaviour at a feast, and knows how to control himself in his cups.

A training in the arts of hospitality.

For this, in Plato's judgement, is a proof of the first importance for estimating the nature and

quality of a boy or a youth, and we ought not to set it aside, for the test is free from risk, and full of value, and if a youth comes through it satisfactorily, if he feels that the success of an entertainment is to be measured rather by the cheerful and generous quality of the conversation than by the gratification of the palate, we are fully entitled to hope for him that he will be just what every man should pray that his son might become.

By what standard does a youth measure the success of an entertainment.

But to bring our counsels in this kind to a conclusion, let us say that the father who desires to bring up his son in a way of life generous and liberal, of course, but also refined and temperate must arrange and order his scale of daily expenditure in such a manner as to be able to observe economy without meanness and to allow magnificence and freedom, when occasion arises, without ostentation or extravagance. He must shun a petty, narrow consideration of every trifling expense, by which all generosity is thrust out of the spirit, and nobility of temper dies away. By such a mode of life men are made surly and disagreeable and troublesome, a burden to themselves as well as to every one else—as though always in despair about everything, afraid of the light, weak, absurd in company when they enter it, crouching in corners, accepting nothing broad and generous in their minds, choked with mean cares and the pettiest interests—and what, we may ask, can be more inimical to the health and self-respect of the spirit or to an honourable elevation of mind?

Economy without meanness, freedom without extravagance.

But let us at last leave this part of our subject, for you have, Paullus, in your father a fine example,

All this, which we may now leave, is education through sight—the spectacle of life well lived.

an image of that dignity, the sight and spectacle of which I should wish for his diligent imitation to be set before every son who is to be reared to great hopes: an example set before his eyes, you will observe; for sometimes the impression made without any words through the eyes is as powerful in its advocacy of goodness as that which is made through the ears—and about that we shall have to speak later, for hearing is the sense specially appropriate for training and teaching and learning of every kind—since it alone discerns the mind, which the eyes cannot contemplate.

Hearing is the special and proper vehicle of instruction.

This is why, so the story goes, Socrates, wisest of the Greeks, as the Delphic oracle affirmed, after watching for some time a frank and generous-looking youth who was standing by in silence, cried, 'Now say something, my young friend, that I may see you.' Clearly he felt that the real man is the mind, and assigned understanding and apprehension of the mind not to the eyes but to the ears. And rightly: for the ears take in the sound which speech forms and arranges, and speech is at once an image of the speaker's thought and mind, and the expression of his inmost feelings: making a road for itself from mind to mind, it carries the thoughts and sentiments of the intelligence from which it proceeds by way of the ears to another intelligence. It thus fulfils a most apt and useful embassy: for thereby thoughts which otherwise lie hidden in the secret recesses of the mind are by the service of speech and hearing freely interchanged in the shrewd and noble commerce of human intercourse.

In speech character is revealed.

Speech and hearing make possible the noble commerce of human intercourse.

Paul. I am much charmed by what you say of the faculty of vision, as setting before the mind a noble and venerable form by the imitation of which it may be enriched. But I look for no less delight from the faculty of hearing, for indeed it is by its aid that your pleasant and delightful account of the sense of vision has been conveyed to my mind. And by the words which you have used in extolling and praising this faculty, you have roused in me the anticipation of no ordinary benefit in listening to you.

Jac. At this point then, Paullus, we shall do what you said a little earlier that we ought to do if need arose, I mean call our discussion back to those earlier years which our conversation had passed by and pressed on to what we may call a terminus, the end of that period which we propose to limit at 24 years: for we included the whole period of youth in that plan of instruction that seeks to adorn the character by the imitation of virtue exemplified in the manners of our forefathers.

We must go back again to early years.

But since our discussion is to be brought back to those matters which find a place in precepts and admonitions constantly addressed to their children by parents, that virtue may be, not only held up before their eyes, but made intelligible to them, let us make our starting-point for this purpose the age of five years. At that age, if we look to physical measurement, the body achieves about half the full height (since the ensuing twenty years give roughly an equal increase and development). Moreover, in the course of his fifth year, a boy, who has

Let us begin at the age of five years, when virtue first becomes intelligible.

At this age a boy passes from the hands of women to the care of men.

hitherto been solely in the charge of women, is handed over to his father's supervision for the most part;[1] for he now can clearly express what he thinks himself and understand the speech of others. And so let us again begin from the same foundation which we laid before in welding together the parts of our educational structure, I mean Religion and the love and worship of Eternal God. Day after day we delight to see the sun rise and set, because of the glory and brightness of that greatest of the stars, in whose splendour and light all things rejoice; and the soul ought not to receive less delight because we seek again and again from God the same blessings: nay, rather the more since all the manifold and shining beauty of the heavenly constellations is drawn, as by little channels, from the infinite beauty of God, the Highest. A father's first and foremost care, then, must be to imbue his son's mind with the fear of God, of which we have spoken before, a fear which alone can strengthen and support a man to face with undaunted courage all human misfortunes. And this will be so if he displays to his son the might of God, His presence everywhere and His infinite majesty, not so much by argument, which the child cannot follow at this tender age, as by examples and by accounts of the wonderful things which God has done:[2] if he is constant and careful in making mention of the benefits

The fear of God is the beginning of education.

[1] Cf. Elyot, *Gov.* I. vi: 'At what age a tutour shulde be prouided, and what shall appertaine to his office to do.'

[2] Cf. Book of Common Prayer: 'O God, we have heard with our ears, and our fathers have declared unto us, the noble works that thou didst in their days, and in the old time before them.'

by which not only he himself as an individual but also the whole human race in common has been enriched by God, and this includes the mysteries of our Faith, which must be subtly communicated to the heart. Nothing is to be regarded as of prior importance to this in moulding the soul to piety and religion. This will be best done, if the father makes good and applies in deeds and not words alone whatever solemn and pious lessons about divine things he has given to his son. After God and all those divine beings who were either taken at once to Heaven by the Kindness of God or after a while raised to Heaven by their own eminent merits, and lives nobly spent—whose praise should ever be fresh, and their glory immortal among men—after these a father must instruct his children above all to honour their [1] parents, seeing that in fact we owe almost everything to them: for we must reckon as due to them our birth and existence, and the whole sunlit world, which we happily perceive with lips, eyes, nostrils,

Reverence for God and other 'divine beings'.

Honour due to parents.

[1] Cf. Plato, *Laws*, iv: 'In the first place, we affirm that next after the Olympian gods and gods of the State, honour should be given to the gods below. . . . Next to these gods, a wise man will do service to the demons or spirits, and then to the heroes, and after them will follow the private and ancestral gods. . . . Next comes the honour of living parents . . .' Cf. with this *Phaedrus*, 246 E–247: ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεύς . . . πρῶτος πορεύεται . . . τῷ δ' ἕπεται στρατιὰ θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων—a passage supposed by Orelli to have been in the mind of Arnobius (*Contra Gentes*, ii. 25) when he speaks of man holding the fourth place, under God (the supreme God); and kindred spirits (i. e. the lesser gods and the daemons).

and in short through every sense and movement of the whole body. To them again we must acknowledge the careful and anxious labour which, on our behalf, they not merely refuse to shun, but actually seek and pursue, in order to rear and nurture us and give us an honourable place among our fellow citizens and our equals. Surely they deserve all the gratitude their children can show by dutiful regard and the practice of a peculiar veneration. Later on it becomes our duty to provide for their welfare, and by our diligent labours to secure them from need and discomfort. We should supply their necessity, sustain their weakness, and avert from them all kinds of vexation that may assail them from any quarter. For if Hesiod[1] is right in bidding us repay services done to us by others, in equal or if possible in greater measure, what return, we may ask, should we make to our parents, for whose benefits to us no commensurable acknowledgement can be found? For indeed parents, however weak, decrepit, or broken they may be, are never useless to their children. But even as we reverence the images and statues of divine beings as memorials, because of the kindness of those in whose likeness they are fashioned, believing that those divine beings themselves will be more disposed to be gracious to us, so there is no image of the Eternal God more beautiful than that which exists in the person of a father or a mother.

Gratitude shown by service.

And the tender spirit of the child should be trained by them in habits of respect to his parents

[1] *Works and Days*, 185 seq., 349 seq.

in such sort that the father should hold up the mother, and the mother the father, and all the members of the household and acquaintance should hold up both to the dutiful regard and veneration of the son. Nor should this tribute of honour on the part of children stop with the parents: it should extend also to his grandparents and all other ancestors, if they are still living: for in them the source of all those benefits which we have received from our parents may be seen in a yet more august and venerable form. Furthermore, from this reverence towards parents and grandparents, this due and dutiful observance, flows—as from a full source of good feeling—the general respect and common deference paid to age, to office, and to ripe years. It is a fit and appropriate tribute to pay to old age, which not improperly claims the title of father: for in their first years children, warned by the aspect of age, give the name of father to persons whom they are not yet able accurately and exactly to distinguish by their lineaments and features: and then afterwards their affectionate and almost brotherly relations with those of their own age give a common use of that name for all their own and their friends' fathers. Indeed, at that age a man, whoever he may be, may become the father of a child or youth in virtue not of kindred, but of kindly counsel.[1] Hence Romulus, or it may have been

Respect shown to parents leads to a feeling of respect and deference for age and office.

Young children call all men 'father'—and indeed a man may become a father to the young, if not by kindred, by kindness.

[1] Cf. Plato, *Laws*, vii. 808 D, on the responsibility of all mature citizens for children: 'And he (the citizen) who comes across him (a boy) and does not inflict upon him the punishment he deserves, shall incur the greatest disgrace.'

Numa—one of whom was the father of the city, and the other of the legal and religious institutions of Rome—was quite right when, influenced by this natural kinship between seniority and the name of father, he called the chief council of the state the 'Senate' (or body of elders) and called the Senators themselves 'Fathers'.

Senators are called Fathers.

Moreover, he ordained that younger men should give way to their elders in the street, should bare their heads and rise from their seats at their approach. History tells us also that the Spartans fully and loyally observed this rule; for in that city it is remarkable with what honour seniority was always treated.[1] Hence the well-known story of the lesson cleverly and wisely given to the Athenians by a Spartan. At the games in Athens some Spartan envoys had been placed in a seat of honour on the steps of the orchestra: presently, when the theatre was full, an old man, a person indeed of no great importance, came in leaning on a staff, and went round looking for a seat, but no one made room for him: when he came to the Spartan envoys they rose at once in respect for his age, and gave place to him in the better position. For this they were loudly cheered and applauded by the audience, whereupon one of the Spartans remarked, not unhappily, 'So the Athenians know what is right to do, but fail to do it themselves!'

Respect for age shown by the early Romans, and by the Spartans.

A boy, then, should be so trained by the careful precepts of his parents as to learn to respect the old and indeed his elders generally and treat them

[1] For politeness generally, cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 124, ll. 27 seq.

almost as parents : for such deferential observance of his seniors is of the utmost value as a moderating influence in a young man's life : for it implants in him a sense of shame,[1] and provides him with many witnesses of his words and actions, so that he will not venture to stray at all beyond the path of honour and rectitude. For when they shrink from the censorship—if I may use the expression—and the bad opinion of those whom they fear and worship, they find the way of the transgressor more difficult to tread, and they blush when caught in it. And so *verecundia* (the word for modesty) is derived from the verb *vereri* (to fear), for it is the act of feeling shame and blushing, painting the faults upon the face and paying a generous fine for the wrong done. And yet the blush is the pledge of a good disposition and of the virtue we look for in a boy, so that there seems much fitness in the saying 'He blushed—all's well'. For shame itself is a habit of taking precaution against the occurrence of anything which may cause a blush : and while it is appropriate to any time of life, it is the chief grace

The respect for age has a moderating influence upon youth :

implanting modesty with the recognition of authority.

'He blushed—all's well.'

[1] Cf. with the whole of this section, Aristotle, *Ethics*, iv. 9 : 'Shame cannot properly be spoken of as a virtue ; for it is more like a feeling or emotion than a habit or trained faculty. At least, it is defined as a kind of fear of disgrace, and its effects are analogous to those of the fear that is excited by danger ; for men blush when they are ashamed, while the fear of death makes them pale. . . . It is a feeling which is not becoming at all times of life, but only in youth . . . and so we praise young men when they are ready to feel shame, but no one would praise a man of more advanced years for being apt to be ashamed.'

of youth: nor should we be wrong in describing it as the averter of crime and the bulwark of temperance and virtue. And I would urge upon any parents, with whom my influence is likely to have weight, that they delay not to cherish and increase in their children this root of shame which nature has planted in their fresh minds. They can rely upon reaping a rich harvest for their pains. For though a sense of shame may not actually be virtue itself, it is the chief support to virtue: since it is the dread of an evil name and of disgrace: and this is a stern and vigilant guardian of virtue. So those who call shame a kind of divine timidity seem to me to get nearer the right definition of this emotion. It alone dreads the loss of that one wellnigh divine possession, which we win from high honour and office—to wit, our credit and good repute.

Shame—a divine timidity.

All other terrors,[1] fears, and apprehensions, of death or of dangers, which cast down and all but destroy the spirit, we rightly deem in general empty and profitless and always disgraceful, for the very aspect they induce is unseemly and

Shame is the only form of fear which is not discreditable.

[1] Cf. Plato, *Laws*, i. 646–7: 'Do we not distinguish two kinds of fear, which are very different?' 'What are they?' 'There is the fear of expected evil.' 'Yes, and there is the fear of an evil reputation; we are afraid of being thought evil, because we do or say some dishonourable thing, which fear we and all men term shame.' . . . 'And does not the legislator and every one, who is good for anything, hold this fear in the greatest honour? This is what he terms reverence, and the confidence which is the reverse of this he terms insolence; and the latter he always deems to be a very great evil both to individuals and to states.'

ignoble—the ghastly pallors of the cheek, the trembling and shrinking limbs. The soul retreats to the citadel of life, the heart, and calls in thither all its forces: it seems to desert the outer circuit of the city and to retreat before the foe. Now shame,[1] on the other hand, boldly sallies forth (for the danger is without, springing from the estimation and regard of others); and by setting a blush in the face, like a mask against its fault, seeks cover in the very act by which it reveals itself; and yet it proves less that it has been guilty of a fault than that it is aflame with vexation at having committed it.[2] And it does this withal in so charming a fashion that the very confession confers a kind of grace upon the fault confessed. But enough of this: let us return to what we were saying, let us repeat again and again that the force and quality of this emotion which fosters and promotes in the mind a dread of disgrace, ought to be studiously implanted, cultivated and increased in their sons by all parents who have the proper training of children at heart, as being a thing which preserves for them a healthy mind and a good reputation until the time when true reason and philosophy herself shall come to their aid. No little thought and care should be devoted by parents to this.

The sense of shame, therefore, is to be cultivated.

Paul. Explain, father; for you would hardly believe how eager I am to hear. I had learnt from you who nurtured and trained me that parents and elders

[1] On the Sense of Shame, cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 36, § 60.

[2] Cf. the account *Rep.* iv. 440 of the 'spirited principle in the soul'.

should be treated with honour and respect, and I used diligently to try to do that and obey your precept; but now that I realize the value of your advice, and see what I did not notice before, how rich is the fruit of that reverence, I shall henceforth be even more steadfast and persevering in my obedience: indeed this is eminently fitting for me, above all others: for I have not one father only but two, to teach me the lesson of veneration and respect for my elders.

Jac. I am glad, Paullus, that it is not in vain that I endeavoured to make you apply yourself to the study of philosophy, for I now perceive that you apprehend how strong a support true principle and knowledge give to good character. But when I speak, as I did, about the fostering in young people of a sense of reverence, you must understand me to mean that if parents are possessed of that desire to train their children with a view to distinction and high position, a desire worthy of a father's love and tenderness,—they ought to undertake the task in a mild and gentle spirit, adopting no harsh and frightful method (as the old poet says [1]) of teaching and instructing, but rely rather upon a winning kindness. Dignity, of course, must always be kept; a father should never let himself sink to the level of familiarity or become the boon companion of his son,—that merely breeds contempt and self-confidence in the youth, who, feeling himself curbed by no law, comes to pursue with headstrong passion whatever takes his fancy. On the other hand he should

The right relation of father to son.

[1] Quoted in Cic. *Orat.* 49. 164.

be no formal or rigid moralist, afraid of giving his son ample proof of courteous and warm-hearted consideration, or shy of taking affectionately[1] and even with a certain rapture to his heart the child, who is a living image of himself, than which nothing in life is sweeter to a parent. But if he must control his affection, lest the child spoiled by excessive indulgence cast away all respect and reverence for his father, he must take even more strenuous pains to avoid violent and rough severity;[2] that crushes out love from the child's heart and brings him to the purpose and passion of hating whatever in himself he knows to be pleasing to his father. A boy thus will either fall into meanness and timidity, or if he is more stubborn in disposition will resist, and believe that by rejecting his father's authority and behaving worse from day to day, he is avenging himself for his father's ill-treatment. What wisdom and what practical judgement is shown by the elder Cato who, reflecting on this, used often to remark with emphasis that the father of a family who laid violent hands on his wife or children was not less sacrilegious, and deserved no less detestation than those who outraged the shrines of the immortal Gods. And in truth, if we will but think, as it is improper for any one to be kept to his duty by fear, it is most of all unsuitable for a child, whose mind we desire to mould to honour and integrity: for fear[3] is a weak and tottering guardian

Affection, controlled by dignity.

No excessive indulgence, but no violence or harshness.

Violence shown towards children is sacrilege.

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 78, &c., §§ 95, &c.
[2] Cf. ibid., p. 30, §§ 46–9.
[3] Cf. ibid., p. 28, § 42.

Fear is a weak guardian of virtue.

of virtue; and those who wish to use it should hear the rebuke which Terence (in graceful verse enough) draws from everyday experience against fathers of this sort:[1] 'In my opinion a man greatly mistakes if he thinks that authority over children has more weight and security when won by force than when cemented by affection.' Let it then be a father's first consideration to be loved and honoured by his son; and this he will attain if he is not captious nor harsh, nor ready to follow up every fault too shrewdly; if he is in no way inexorable and cruel, but shows himself kind and tender to his child, yet always maintaining his dignity.[2] And this will be so if a father combines and uses word and act in right proportion, and in all that comes within the scope of his son's permitted and natural desires and tastes, he grants (with few words or none) all his wishes—whether the boy delights in horses, or wants dogs for hunting,—and indulges him even with rich and magnificent, yet not extravagant dress; and with every equipment, moreover, with which he may invite and entertain friends of his own age at his home,

The father must make generous allowance for his son's pleasures,

[1] Sadoleto apparently quotes from memory. The reference is to Terence, *Adelphi*, i. 1. 40 seq.:

> Et errat longe mea quidem sententia
> Qui imperium credat grauius esse aut stabilius,
> Vi quod fit, quam illud quod amicitia adiungitur.

[2] Cf. Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, Book IV, ch. 3 (*Ante-Nicene Christian Library*, vol. xxi): 'If a man is named father of a household, that it may appear that he is possessed of a double power, because as a father he ought to indulge, and as a lord to restrain, it follows that he who is a son is also a slave, and that he who is a father is also a lord.'

and even make an occasional present to one of his companions. For if a father, without any preface of idle words or attempt at jest and pleasantry in pointless talk with his son, but with dignified munificence and as of set purpose, permit his son a full use, enjoyment, and control of these things, it is wonderful how large a place he will hold in his heart, so that for love and reverence to his father the young man will not dare to entertain even a thought that may displease his father. On the other hand, if in all matters of character and duty, of moderation and self-control, courtesy towards equals, kindness to inferiors, deference and attention to superiors, a father be unsparing and assiduous in advice and exhortation ;—if, once more, in actual conduct and those actions in which sound training is revealed, he makes no concession for the sake of pleasantness, never permitting his son to act and behave at his own caprice, instead of obeying his father's orders and the dictates of virtue : (if, I say, the father makes this his practice) by this method most certainly the fertile and fruitful root of honour and all the virtues, being duly tended, will develop into a noble dignity in the minds of the young.

but never yield, with weak complaisance, to mere caprice.

This training will put into them not only the fear of disgrace, but a love, a marvellous passion, for approbation, and adorn them with loftiness of spirit and uprightness of purpose, so that they will shrink from anything mean and unworthy. For the father who is most skilful, and who makes merit his standard in all things,

A proper love of approbation.

securing by his kindness the love, and by his dignity the fear, of the child, will easily direct the young mind into any channel he pleases, and will never implant in it the seed of virtue in vain. And so a boy will in the first place desire to be praised and honoured by his father, who is himself (as Hector says in Naevius) a man held in honour; and then in all his intimate intercourse with his own companions, though he may surpass them in lustre of character and nobility of conduct, he will be content to be brought to an equality with them by his kindliness.

Loving or reverencing his father, the boy will show both pride and kindliness towards his equals in age.

So in life, as Terence says, it will be easy to him to put up with and endure all whom he meets, joining with them in devotion to the pursuits they care for, never thwarting them, never putting himself first, in such sort that he will easily win their praise without their envy and make his equals his friends. But Terence adds something more: for besides gaining fresh approbation and attention he will also secure the admiration due to his high virtue. There are, of course, many tendencies at this time of life which make rather for vice than for virtue; this is inevitable, because of the vehemence of the passions, particularly at that age, for in boys and youths a firm footing has not yet been won by reason, which even in its mature development seems scarcely able to keep men of advanced years from every kind of error and misdeed. So a father should carefully see that he bring much fairness and patience to the task of guiding and directing the slippery steps of youth and should sharply note any violation of

Thus he will win their good-will and admiration.

the law of virtue or duty, and consider whether the fault be of a kind to corrupt good character, or whether it is the result of a kind of fermentation of youth. I do not draw any such distinctions at the moment—since this is not the fitting time to do so. But there are certain delinquencies which a father should be prepared to ignore and tolerate, and he will be able to make some allowance to the young, provided they keep some restraint, nor need he always insist on exercising his full parental rights. But in regard to some matters he must be more vigilant and alert, nor allow any opportunity for the stealthy inroad of such faults as only increase with years and, while they have an immediately bad effect upon the disposition, eventually—if they are not checked—prove the ruin of fortune and good name. Of this nature are gambling, debauchery, and those unruly lusts which Plato well calls the tyrants of the soul. And in regard to the class of faults first considered,[1] which is less heinous and less dangerous, if a father

The father must distinguish between serious faults likely to damage the character, and those which are the result of the fermentation of youth.

How to deal with faults of each kind.

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 59, § 79: 'Where a *wrong Bent of the Will* wants not Amendment, there can be no need of Blows. All other Faults, where the Mind is rightly dispos'd, and refuses not the Government and Authority of the Father or Tutor, are but Mistakes, and may often be overlook'd; or when they are taken Notice of, need no other but the gentle Remedies of Advice, Direction, and Reproof, till the repeated and wilful Neglect of those shows the Fault to be in the Mind, and that a manifest *Perverseness* of the Will lies at the Root of their Disobedience. But whenever *Obstinacy*, which is an open Defiance, appears, *that* cannot be wink'd at or neglected, but must, in the first Instance, be subdu'd and master'd; only Care must be had, that we mistake not, and we must be sure it is Obstinacy and nothing else.'

feels that he cannot, or ought not to ignore them, let him take his son alone and gently reproach him, revealing his care and anxiety, disclosing to him his fault, and earnestly beseech him not to seek to ruin the hopes of his father and his family, nor to sacrifice the reputation and the position which he himself desires and hopes to win. And he need say but little—unless I am mistaken—for the early training and discipline will gold good.

The boy as critic of himself.

The boy himself will be a sterner critic of his own action than his father, will have less mercy on himself, and will feel much pain at the prayers and admonitions of the parent whom he dearly loves. If, however (though I should be reluctant to say a word of ill augury, since in such a family with such a character it is incredible that anything should befall contrary to our desires)—if, I say, there be any grave misconduct, a father must take stringent measures and use more serious language ; not to the extent of breaking out into the violent anger which disorders voice and feature, and hampers all the gestures of a speaker, impairs his dignity, and is always unseemly in a man of his position ; but he will copy the old man of Terence,[1] who apparently rebuked his son with sufficient sternness : 'Now do you really suppose' (said he) 'that you can be allowed while I your father am alive to do this sort of thing any longer? to have a mistress almost in the position of a wife ? You are mistaken if you think that, Cleinias, and do not know me. I like you to be called my son so long as you behave in a manner worthy of yourself : otherwise

[1] Terence, *Heaut. Timor.* 102–8.

I shall find a way of dealing with you worthy of myself.' That kind of language seems likely to move any erring son, and so much the more if it has been preceded by the training and issues from the lips of a father such as I have described above —a man who has never set his son a bad example to follow. But if the matter be so serious as to require it, there will be a remedy, not, however, to be adopted save in an extreme case. The father will show himself estranged[1] from his son and refuse to deal with him in the old way ; he will little by little curtail his former generosity and indulgence to him ; for either that will have the desired effect or he will have to take other measures. But whereas in dealing with a son we forbid a father[2] to flog him or reduce a generous nature to the condition of a slave, we readily admit such an expedient in the case of a slave or servant, for such a person—like the Phrygian in the old proverb —improves with beating. And this he should be the more careful to do if the same fault, which as a father he deprecates in his son, is found to call for correction in a slave : that by all means the son may be taught that so long as he continues in such a disposition his father's approval is withdrawn from him and from his acts. But we are conjuring unreal visions ; in truth we feel no apprehension, as though that could happen against

Flogging forbidden—except for a slave, who improves with beating and whose chastisement affords a salutary lesson to the son.

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 36, § 60 ; p. 65, § 87.

[2] Cf. Quintilian, i. 3. § 14 seq. : 'Caedi vero discipulos, quamlibet et receptum sit et Chrysippus non improbet, minime velim' ; and Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 30–1, §§ 48–51 ; pp. 62–6, §§ 83–8 ; pp. 102–3, § 117.

which nature herself protests. For there is no reason to anticipate that when a youth has been brought up by such a father and on such a system, and has been trained to walk in the right path of virtue, his nature and tastes can turn to depravity.

But there is little danger for a boy brought up as we have proposed.

One thing, however, a father will observe and notice with scrupulous attention, and that is the kind of companions,[1] either in the household, or among his young acquaintances, who are particularly intimate with his son: 'Watch ever;' says Ennius, 'many are the snares set for our good things;' and indeed a careful father has scarcely time for repose. And yet, if they are well bestowed, there can be nothing sweeter than these cares and solicitudes. And in regard to the household, the injunction may be briefly laid down (though every man ought to have personal knowledge of his domestic staff[2]) that all should pay equal respect and observance to the son of the house and obey his orders: but those who are to be specially concerned with daily attendance upon him should be individually chosen by his father. Should any one else, however, going beyond his duty be too eager to make his way into intimate relations and association with the young man, he ought to be driven back as having no good purpose. In the case of young men, the risk is greater, for in a large circle of acquaintance,[3] there is often a greater

The boy's companionships.

Relations with the servants of the household.

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 128, § 146: 'The tincture of Company sinks deeper than the outside.'

[2] Cf. ibid., pp. 102–3, § 117: Manners to servants.

[3] On the influence of Companionship generally, cf. Elyot,

difference in character—and there are some, older, perhaps even quite advanced in age, who seek to satisfy their own desires at the cost of that tender and pliable age: association with them is peculiarly damaging to good character. They should be warned off, just as birds of prey are frightened away from a poultry-yard by cries and shouts. But it is not right to cut a youth off from the companionship of those of his own age. And so all such dangers as I have indicated have been met since the earliest times by the employment of diligent and careful tutors. These are in constant contact with their young charges keeping them within the bounds of duty, and opposing any tendency to vice: such men should be chosen by a father for their high character and trustworthiness. But though the industry and care of these men sometimes counts for much, young men have no surer bulwarks of virtue than the sense of shame, of which I have already spoken; regular consistent discipline at home, and above all the grave wisdom of a father. When a son has drunk deep of this influence in daily intercourse, and become thoroughly tinctured by the example and training received from his father at home; when he has carried with him into public life the noble patterns of honour and integrity which have settled deep in his mind and compared the manners and tastes of others with his own, then he will begin to mark and note how vast is the difference between himself and those who have not come out

Undesirable acquaintances to be warned off—

but a boy must have suitable companions of his own age.

The aid of a diligent tutor in safe-guarding a boy.

His home tradition will become a part of himself.

Gov. II. xiv: 'The election of frendes and the diuersitie of flaterers.'

of a similar training, nor enjoyed so great a blessing of heaven. Then he will congratulate himself on his good fortune, and will rejoice to make daily test and trial of the high character and habits so formed, tasting the fruit of them not only in the internal joy and satisfaction that he feels, but in the honour paid him by his contemporaries, the admiration bestowed on him by his elders, and the signal evidences of goodwill which greet him on all sides. Stimulated by this love and approbation, he will ever be encouraged to further efforts, will daily become more firmly grounded by habit in all well-doing, will show marked kindness to others, will help those whom he can, will be courteous to all, offensive to none, and while he will knit the upright and good to him with closer bonds of intimacy, he will not contemn others. In all his words and actions he will study to exhibit a dignity of demeanour, not of the grave and reverend kind that befits those of riper years, but such as allied with cheerfulness and modesty excellently becomes youth. In short he will carry with him from his home-life into the circle of his young companions a virtue, dignity and loftiness of character like his father's, not of course in vigorous maturity, but ripening with his youth; so that many of those in his own station and of his own age, who observe and are influenced by the bright and gracious beauty of this good example, will be seen resolving to try to copy it. We may judge from this how greatly the community will benefit if ever this plan of sound training of the young should

He will delight in the results of his good training, and

try to further and multiply them by his own efforts.

Youthful dignity combined with cheerfulness and modesty.

The spread of a good tradition benefits the whole community.

have a wide vogue when we see how, from time to time, a single virtuous youth can easily fire almost all his fellows [1] to emulate his example.

The force and scope of youthful example.

Paul. When I hear you speak like this, father, I can scarcely conceal my delight; for by the bounty of Almighty God, I have had the advantage of being trained in pursuit of virtue, by discipline from which I now begin to reap some of the fruits which you have enumerated. But when a youth has once been led into this condition of life and this practice of virtue, what, I beg you, does he still need to make him successful and happy?

Jac. He needs that, Paullus, which is most of all needful, Virtue herself: good habits we have often declared are the shadow of Virtue. But we must track down and hold the substance, that we be not, as it were, tricked in our sleep by empty visions, but be wide awake and possess ourselves completely and in all reality, of the highest good.

Still the boy has only good habits, the shadow of Virtue: Virtue herself must be added.

Paul. Now I see you mean philosophy.

Jac. Yes, I do. For philosophy [2] is the one thing

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 45, &c., §§ 69–71: The influence of Example and Company.

[2] On the Study of Philosophy, cf. Elyot, *Gov.* I. xi, p. 47; xiii, p. 60; and xiv, p. 69: 'And they whom nature therto nothinge meueth, haue nat only saued all that time, which many now a dayes do consume in idlenesse, but also have wonne suche a treasure, whereby they shall alway be able to serue honourably theyr prince, and the publike weale of theyr countray, principally if they conferre al their doctrines to the moste noble studie of morall philosophie, whiche teacheth both vertues, maners, and ciuile policie: wherby at the laste we shoulde haue in this realme sufficiencie of worshypfull lawyars, and also a publike weale equiualent to the grekes or Romanes.'

without which (except for the special favour of heaven) no man can, at all events by his own counsel, become wise or blessed.

Paul. Why not, then, at once, turn to this third division of our theme? For here, I imagine, we find philosophy, which as you say gives virtue her complete and final perfection. For much as I am charmed by what you have already said and are now saying, still I fain would reach the source and fountain-head of all the virtues.

Philosophy gives virtue her final perfection.

Jac. There still remains one subject more, Paullus, on which I must say a word: and this, though of first rank in dignity and profit, I have for the convenience of our discussion placed last. I have so far said not a word about Truth. Now Truth is the supreme source not merely of a well-ordered but of a truly wise and blessed life. Without it nothing honourable or wise or generous or great can be produced. For what man—I will not say habituated to lying and deceit (for he is rather a monster than a man), but a little inclining his mind to the belief that it is permissible to think one thing and say another, and to have a tongue that is at variance with his heart—is fit to be placed among those in whom we hope to form the image and model of high worth for the days to come?

Truth—the supreme source of a well-ordered and truly blessed life.

Paul. Indeed, I think we must reject him, whoever he is. But all this had not occurred to me, even though I can now begin to appreciate, from you mainly but also from Aristotle himself (whom by your advice and example I hold in my hands), this great, this excellent blessing of truth. But

I would like to hear from you why you have reserved all mention of this, as you yourself say, till the last stage of the discussion.

Jac. The fact is that it extends over both provinces, every kind of learning and knowledge falls within its scope, and it covers also good conduct; but I have reserved the consideration of it to this place, because I have said what I had to say (not, of course, all that might be said, but I hope enough) with regard to the conduct and domestic training by which a youth must be habituated to all that is correct and seemly in behaviour. But now we turn to what are not so much matters of habit as of fixed principle, or of will directed by its proper knowledge and reason: and we place truth (which as we have said holds a pre-eminent and dominant position in both provinces of Education) in this place as by special right, so that being as she is supreme in each of these two provinces, she may yet, with the selfsame undivided authority, enforce discipline upon the moral elements in human character, elements which yield a laborious and yet a willing obedience to a good counsellor, and also be the leader of the elements which depend on wisdom and learning.

The province of Truth includes both knowledge and conduct.

Paul. As if you were to call truth the bond by which these two kinds of elements were held together.

Jac. More than that; for truth is the luminary by which both are created and illumined; it is more powerful than the sun which rises on us day by day, for the sun brings the light of day to our eyes, but truth brings it to our minds; the

The relation of Truth to morality and philosophy.

Truth not only illuminative, but creative.

sun makes things appear to be what they are, truth[1] causes them to be what they are. But this inner illumination is properly and closely pursued by philosophy herself, for philosophy spends all her energy and care upon the effort to attain this light by the perception of truth—and when she has won it and made it really her own, she dwells in the light of truth, and raises its beams far and wide upon those who are wandering in the world, so that they, guided by the communication of this light, may the less fall and be confounded in the darkness of that region in which the greatest throng and the utmost variety of men pass their fleeting and fitful life. For these, though not wholly bereft of light, are yet oppressed and enwrapped by many shadows, which move in vaster masses the further they are removed from the higher light; and so very often are deceived in the objects of their desire, and seize and embrace evil things as if they were good, and when they believe that they are planting their feet upon sure ground, slip and fall headlong. This light, which is the

[1] Compare (and contrast) with this Plato, *Rep.* vi. 509–10: 'The good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence.' Cic. *Acad.* ii. 10. 30: 'Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur. itaque alia visa sic arripit, ut iis statim utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. . . . quocirca et sensibus utitur et artes efficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam ipsam corroborat, ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta est. ergo ii, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae . . .'

reason implanted in every man, kindled and fed by the most trustworthy forms of knowledge and learning, which points out the path for itself in every plan and every action, standing in no need of guidance from any other source—this light, I say, philosophy keeps in her breast. The road which leads to philosophy will soon be indicated in the third part of our treatise on Education. But if the truth dwells most perfectly and completely in this light, so also there is a ray of light and therefore of truth in that other and lower [1] form of virtue, which as we said is based on discipline and precept. It is a ray which casts not an original beam but a borrowed gleam into this region. And in regard to this there remained something still to be said before our observations upon conduct and discipline could be regarded as complete—and we have kept what we had to say till this point, in order that the passage might be made easy from the ray to the fount of light, from the image of truth to truth itself.

The light of reason.

The lower form of virtue, based on discipline and precept, is brightened by a borrowed gleam from the higher light.

Paul. It was a convenient and proper arrangement. But is there a man who, reflecting on what you say, could fail to be enamoured by the study of philosophy?

Jac. It should be as you suppose; and yet, Paullus, there are men who despise philosophy, and even revile her, and bring her into disfavour with the multitude.

There are those who despise and revile Philosophy.

Paul. These are ill-natured men of whom you tell me; but you have long since undertaken a defence

[1] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* x. 619 D: 'His virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy.'

of philosophy against detractors of this sort, and many of your friends constantly and urgently press upon you the duty of completing and some day producing it—among these are two men of the highest culture, and most warmly attached to yourself, I mean, Paolo Giovio and Lazzaro Bonamici—indeed what your own estimate is both of their goodness and their learning, I often hear from your lips.

Paullus begs Jacopus to complete the defence which he has undertaken of Philosophy.

Jac. Of course, you hear me speak of men who are very dear friends of my own, and have the highest title to the affection of all men—in each of them our age possesses a brilliant ornament. Giovio is equipped not only with the physician's lore, in which he is distinguished both for his knowledge and his art and for the service and benefit which he brings from it to his friends, but also with every liberal and generous accomplishment. Specially is he remarkable for his eloquence, and for a certain magnificence of style in the exhibition of which as a writer of history he brings to his own age the credit and glory of the best writers of the past. As for Lazzaro, his learning in Latin and Greek Literature, and specially in philosophy of which we are speaking, is so vast, and the vigour of his fine intellect such, that when we listen to him we find that there is not one of the older or of contemporary scholars from whom we can expect a richer store of knowledge, nor an ampler rhetoric—and this combination of gifts is all the more admirable because he has so fashioned his life and his character that in every office of goodness and benevolence he seems to have taken philosophy as a guide not

for learned disquisition but for practical service. For me to refuse them what you say they ask of me, I should regard as not less than sinful. And perhaps—who knows?—it may turn out that it was by some divine direction that our present inquiry has been placed before that towards which they press me.

Perhaps the course of our inquiry has been divinely directed.

Paul. How so?

Jac. Why, in order that we may climb step by step, and as it were by a smoother course from these rules and discipline for fashioning right conduct, to those higher counsels of philosophy and at last to the very summit of virtue.

Paul. Very likely indeed; God always aids those whose thoughts and purposes are good.

Jac. Let us return, Paullus, to that part of truth which we said belonged to moral discipline; or rather, let us try to render that province of truth more intelligible.

We return to the province of moral discipline.

Paul. What method do you mean?

Jac. The false, I suppose, is an essence or quality in the highest degree opposed and hostile to the truth.

Paul. Certainly.

Jac. And there are two kinds of falseness?

Two kinds of falseness.

Paul. What are they?

Jac. One kind is manifested, when we deceive ourselves and, led on by some base idea or fettered by some specious and alluring arguments (which are of the greater potency to move and persuade us if they have fastened upon an ally in the form of some passion strong in us), we imagine that we have knowledge which we do not really

The first is self-deception.

possess, and root ourselves firmly and confidently in our error. This happens when we suppose that what is, is not, or that that which is not, is, or that anything does not belong to the kind, the class, the quality or essence to which it really belongs, but to some other.

Paul. I understand.

Jac. This falseness, Paullus, which is the fountain-head of error, deceit, and every kind of ignorance, is most antagonistic both to the Gods and men: although of course falseness and error cannot overtake the divine nature itself; nevertheless, as though diametrically opposed to the eternal principle of truth, it has availed to mislead not only the hearts of men day after day, but even upon occasion those celestial and incorporeal beings also. And indeed our life is afflicted and tormented by no evil more dangerous, by no plague more shrewd and destructive, than by this scourge of ignorance which takes itself for knowledge. From it spring pride and arrogance, from it unbridled and unrestrained desires, from it exaggerated self-love and the inability to distinguish between right and wrong; from this source, moreover, there flows into our lives that countless host of misfortunes, anger, enmities, wars, slaughters, the utter overthrow of states and peoples, the almost uninterrupted feud which man wages not only against others, but against himself and within his own breast, and the often terrible disputes with his countrymen and fellow citizens, and connexions and kindred; finally, by the baneful influence of this immeasurable evil every kind of

The results of ignorance and self-deception.

human society, which by the obligation of nature itself is harmoniously established and ratified, comes sooner or later to be outraged, violated, and torn to shreds.

Paul. Great indeed, my father, are the evils which you attribute to ignorance.

Jac. You cannot marvel at that since ignorance quenches that light which is the intelligence of our soul, and robs it of sight by deceitful enticements, as though by a brand thrust into the eye; if (as we must believe) all these evils are full of error and recklessness and divers causes of offence. But all this vast mischief philosophy alone holds out the promise of being able to remove; nay, she makes her promise good if she is fitly treated and directed by faith and religion to God and the supreme good of the universe. And the power to direct her so has been granted by the favour of heaven to us and to us alone who worship God and the Son of God.

The remedy is to be found in philosophy directed by religion.

Paul. I agree, this is the splendid gift of philosophy and the Christian Religion.

Jac. Yes, experience has proved that it is as you say, Paullus; but as this is not the time to dwell on these matters longer, let us turn to the other kind (or part) of the false with which we are now dealing.

Paul. Indeed I could wish you to pause long over these topics; for there is nothing that I would more gladly hear, and I am once more inflamed with love of philosophy. But I fear that my own ignorance may stand in the way of my attaining it.

Paullus' ignorance is that of a man ready to learn.

Jac. Not at all, Paullus, you must have no fear in regard to your own ignorance, which is of the kind that is ready for learning and receiving like a house which is indeed bare and empty, but waiting to be filled with good furniture. It is against another kind of ignorance that you must promise me to be on your guard, ignorance which is packed with false opinions and holds stubbornly to them, hugging gilded brass, as if it were pure gold, and setting no higher store upon true riches; the time will come, or let me say, is come, when you shall satisfy your desire, and become master of the noblest objects of love of which you are already able to get some taste from your study of Aristotle's ethics, lately begun.

Paul. May God, the creator of our race, who, when it became defiled and lost, became its Saviour through His only-begotten Son—may God to whom I devote myself with my whole mind and heart, grant that it may be so.

The consciousness and the confession of ignorance constitute the first truth of philosophy.

Jac. Nay, to feel and to act in this way is in itself the first and the supreme truth of philosophy. But now, pray, consider what this second kind of falseness is.

Paul. Please tell me.

The second kind of falseness—the deception of others—

Jac. This kind of falseness, springing like a branch or shoot from a root of that first kind of which we have spoken is seen in such an instance as this: Suppose a man does not deceive himself, but with callous cunning seeks to hoodwink and deceive another with regard to the facts, in order to lead him into error, and offering him something quite different from what he expects, to seduce him

and carry him far from the truth—I say that this second kind of falseness springs from the first because no man would seek to hoodwink and entangle another in a network of deceit unless he had himself first become the prey and victim of the corrupt belief, that it is right to seek, by any means whatever, the food to glut his greed, and his desires of every kind. But this bad habit and practice of deceiving and lying has through the conventions and modes of our daily life so spread and flowed through almost every channel and function of it, that it seems to have left very small space indeed for the truth in our intercourse with our fellows.

which, springing from self-deception, has become a habit, a convention, and pervades society.

Paul. Every one confesses it.

Jac. What is to prevent us from confessing what is obvious ? For where is there a man, who has made but the slightest initial study of our social life, or considered with what sort of honour the dealings of men with one another are conducted, but recognizes that just as soldiers in battle use their swords for cutting down or seizing their enemies, so in their daily relationship men use treachery and deceit, for these are weapons which knavery puts into a man's hand for holding his neighbour, whom he tries to trip up, and thus make his way the more easily towards the objects of his desire.

Yet though out of vogue in contemporary manners and conduct, though neglected and set at naught, the rarer it is, the brighter and the more precious a possession is honour. I know that shrewd, sharp, subtle fellows are held to be men

of the greatest account, and sometimes win popular applause; I know that men who have learned to carry off a clever deceit or practise an ingenious fraud, and to use every circumstance to contribute to their own success and pleasure, are considered great men even in the palaces of princes; yet I know too that this way of life and the conduct of such men is never safe, but always vile in their own eyes, and full of evil results for others. For there can be no real dignity, nor beauty, nor confidence, nor security against misfortune or accident, if truth is lacking; but when truth establishes itself in a man's breast, making a union with it, ratified by a sacred pledge, and sharing in all his words and all his acts, it gives him among men a certain position and reputation of a wonderful sort, as if he were a God in human form. A father ought, therefore, to keep his son free from the disgrace and defilement of this second type of falseness (for of course a youth is not susceptible to that first kind of falseness, against the attack of which philosophy herself must be the defender), and he ought carefully to warn him against the habit of thinking one thing and saying another. With a boy, such warning is easy, for the sins of boyhood rarely spring from real wickedness. But when the boy has reached early manhood, he must be more strictly and definitely taught to believe and hold as a fixed principle that no man can attain strength of character, nor the form of good conduct, nor the good esteem which he desires from his comrades, nor the honourable position which is the goal of all his

Ingenious fraud often commended though secretly detested even by those who practise it.

The tribute paid by the world to truth and the truthful man.

ambition, if he is without honour and probity ; so that he may learn to recoil from a lie, and keep his tongue always as it were in harmony with his thought—not only in speech, in conversation with his fellows, is he to say what is straightforward, true and transparent ; he must not admit into his plans or his deeds anything counterfeit or unreal ; for as deeds count for more than words, it is more disgraceful to lie and deceive by conduct than by speech. Now we may say that men lie by what our friend calls the mischief of a cunning tongue, when they spread a veil of seeming honesty over some none-too-honest desire ; they do not consult the truth, nor guide themselves by consideration of what is fit and right, but direct their course to some quite different object—than this lying virtue no vice is more horrible. Indeed this pretence of goodness which they put up does not last long, and is at once detected by those who are at all clear-sighted ; in a handshake, a turn of an eye, an expression of the face, they quickly give away their secret. Truth can never be completely hidden and obscured or prevented from escaping at some point from her prison into the light of day ; and when these simulators of virtue are overtaken, and their masks torn off, revealed to men's eyes for what they are, they find themselves caught by a more violent storm of indignant reproach than if from the first they had made an open boast of their wickedness.

The importance of early training in sincere utterance and sincere action.

There is nothing viler than the hypocrisy of conduct.

The hypocrite is easily detected.

Now if a youth genuinely devotes himself to virtue and draws from truth the decoration and distinction of his life, he will allow no place for

Even in jest there should be respect for truth, and a sense of proportion.

pretence or deception in his conduct; except indeed sometimes by way of jest,[1] when his aim will not be deceit, but amusement; and even then he will show restraint, and a gentle consideration, lest he should really injure a man of whom he only wishes to make sport. And to make sport cleverly and suitably is often of course to give a sauce to friendly intercourse—it must not be understood that we wish to make a young man rigid or morose or stiff; but, on the contrary, gay and affable, going forward to receive all the gifts which youth has to offer him, but taking with him as he goes his own sense of proportion and fitness. Imitation is closely allied with and easily passes into deception, for what is imitation but to assume the semblance of that which you are not? If by your imitation[2]

Imitation and deception.

[1] Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics*, iv. 8 (Peters' translation): 'Since relaxation is an element in our life, and one mode of relaxation is amusing conversation, it seems that in this respect also there is a proper wa of mixing with others, i. e. that there are things that it is right to say, and a right way of saying them: and the same with hearing; though here also it will make a difference what kind of people they are in whose presence you are speaking, or to whom you are listening. And it is plain that it is possible in these matters also to go beyond, or to fall short of, the mean. Now those who go to excess in ridicule seem to be buffoons and vulgar fellows, striving at all costs for a ridiculous effect, and bent rather on raising a laugh than on making their witticisms elegant and inoffensive to the subject of them. While those who will never say anything laughable themselves, and frown on those who do, are considered boorish and morose. But those who jest gracefully are called witty, or men of ready wit, as it were ready or versatile men.'

[2] Cf. *Rep.* iii. 395: 'If they imitate at all, they should imitate from youth upward only those characters which are

you render and fashion forth acts which are good and honourable; if you imitate the carriage and the look of one who has borne bodily pain with courage, or shown temperance in enjoyment, or retrieved a lost battle—if you call up such a man to our imagination by voice, movement, pose, the imitation deserves praise; it is no foe, but rather an advocate of truth. Indeed we may say that the discipline and training in domestic morals, about which we have been speaking, is an imitation of the true virtue. But if you bend imitation to baser purposes and consent to imitate the action of certain players, or the look of some stage-gallants, and their deeds and sayings, for the sake of raising a laugh, then we must declare that nothing can be less dignified than such play-acting, nothing more opposed to self-respect and self-control; for it is a sign of the utmost insensibility, nay, of stupidity, and want of judgement, to be ready to make oneself a laughing-stock; and there can be no elements of fine feeling left in a man whose conduct is intended to provoke ridicule.

Imitation and virtue.

But if we banish this base and discreditable form of amusement, we yet leave many modes of happiness and merriment to youth. For if it is to be the ambition of the youth whom our system of training is moulding to excel his fellows in every adornment and distinction of virtue, yet it becomes him to enter eagerly and upon equal

Our system does not forbid merriment, still less sport and manly exercises.

suitable to their profession—the courageous, temperate, holy, free and the like; but they should not depict or be skilful at imitating any kind of illiberality or baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be what they imitate.'

terms with his age-fellows into those occupations which are the common delight of the young—running, leaping, playing—and into those games by which the body is exercised—sometimes he must lead a dance, or give a banquet, laugh gaily, cause amusement by witty speeches, yet so as in all this to preserve, what we have spoken of somewhat too often, that restraint which is in fact the secret of propriety: and it will not be difficult for him to observe this, formed as he is by paternal counsel and home training, through which by imperceptible degrees the fair fashion of seemly conduct has been woven into the very texture of his behaviour. And the result is that while his comrades love him for his friendliness, the warmth and geniality of his nature, they also feel for him a certain wondering reverence on account of his sterling goodness, and the exquisite perfection of his manners; they have complete confidence in him in every relationship, and seek to place themselves, as willing vassals, under his guidance and rule; and while many will consciously strive to copy him, all who know him, and daily enjoy his familiar society, will acquire in their own manners some traces of his excellence; but there will be some who will come nearer still, and will try to become really like him—and thus as I have said elsewhere, and must say again and again, it is easy to estimate how great is the benefit which must accrue to a state, pre-eminently of course, from the national establishment and maintenance of a sound system of education for boys, and, in a measure only second to that,

But in festivity and amusement there must be that restraint which is the secret of propriety.

The youth trained in our system will become a leader.

from the influence or the example of a single youth who has been well trained.

You, Paullus, have been able to judge of this very well lately from your own experience. You know how the young men of our own city fix their regard upon you more than on any other, how they turn to you, and take a peculiar delight in your acquaintanceship; and so you have lately been able to check their habit of speaking evil of their neighbours, a habit which had grown in them of eagerly, and as it were with relish, disparaging others: shrinking as you naturally did from such a practice yourself, you were able in a friendly way to beg them to abandon it; and thus, thanks to you, they have all become more restrained in their speech.

The influence of Paullus himself on his contemporaries cited in evidence.

Paul. Indeed, I do not see what good I can have done; and moreover if I ever do any good the credit must be given, not to me, but to you. But of course I both recognize and confess that it will be a great distinction, and a great advantage to a State, to have her young men properly educated: and for that end I could pray that all should adopt and follow the rules of life which you laid down for me. A youth who has had the benefit of this training and discipline may certainly claim that he has enjoyed a supreme evidence of the kindness of heaven towards him.

Jac. Indeed it is so, Paullus; and it must be our prayer to God that He will grant a share in this kindness to as many as possible. But now that we have gone through our scheme for the training of character and conduct, let us make a

fresh beginning, and return (like runners on a last lap) once more, and for the third time, to our starting-point—the beginnings of a boy's education.

The instruction of youth in letters and the liberal arts.

Paul. You mean, I understand, to draw out a scheme for the instruction and equipment of youth in letters and what we call the liberal arts.

Jac. I do. We must lead our pupils to the dwelling-place where true virtue resides, not to the stage where counterfeit virtue is displayed.

The shrine of Apollo and the Muses: the perfection of the Trinity.

Paul. We must lead them from their household gods to the shrine of Apollo and the Muses.[1]

Jac. Shall we not rather lead them to that Wisdom, which, springing from the heart of the Father with whom it is linked in indissoluble union and harmony by the spirit of love, manifested itself long ago to illumine the life of men; and though it remained none the less unmoved in the Father's being, yet bestowed itself upon us, so as to arouse in us who were cast down in the dust, and had no upward glancing thoughts, the sure hope of heavenly blessings and immortal life? For to that is due all perfection, which is to be contemplated best in the Trinity.

'Classical' and 'Christian' phraseology.

Paul. That[2] would certainly have been a better expression, but I was speaking in the Latin manner.

Jac. I should be very far from blaming you for

[1] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 427 B.

[2] Cf. Sir Richard Jebb in the *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. i: 'The Classical Renaissance', pp. 564–5: 'Another trait of the time, justly ridiculed by Erasmus, was the fashion of using pagan paraphrases for Christian ideas or for things wholly modern.' Perhaps we have here a '*Christian*' paraphrase for a '*pagan*' idea.

that, Paullus; for you are surely at liberty to make some concession to the genius and bent of the language which you elect to use. I, too, speaking without careful precision about divine things, gladly avail myself of the familiar images, and turn to the Latin language to illustrate my meaning. To be sure, if we sometimes speak of the 'Immortal Gods', using the plural number, it is the sound, not the exact sense of those words that we covet, so that our speech may flow more brilliantly and boldly on, not shrinking from the form which tradition has made venerable; nay, if our language is embellished and equipped with the wealth which it inherits from antiquity, it brings greater weight, and a certain increase of power to the task of revealing what is true, and holy, and right, and of giving stimulus and impulse to proper conduct.

Paul. The utmost care must be bestowed on language and style—that is how I understand you.

Jac. Yes, and especially if you wish to attempt or achieve anything distinguished. For, if it was your lot to live alone, by yourself, philosophy, or that which is the object of our quest—virtue or wisdom, would suffice for itself and ask for nothing more; but you have to live in a large society, and have to enter into and maintain a traffic with men in regard to every interest, concern, and common duty which bind you and them together, and if so, if this human society is to be maintained in easy effectiveness, there is no instrument of more signal use than the art of speech. And that is why I often make it my business (and indeed I shall often make

The art of speech—necessary for human intercourse.

it) to commend you before all else to these studies from which a distinguished and lofty mode or style of speech can be acquired—and I do this all the more earnestly because I am far from discontented with the progress you are making, and the excellent promise you give.

Paul. I will do what I can to please you by my care and labour; but what may be achieved by me, I shall leave to your guidance entirely.

Jac. We will both devote ourselves to this, Paullus, so that the issue may not disappoint us. But let us choose another starting-point for our discussion, and return to the subject of childhood, on which we have now so often begun to speak; let us try to lead boys by some new way, some new track to the pursuit of virtue; for though all the excellent things said to boys now about virtue are perfectly true, they win credence, but not intelligent apprehension from them.

The third and last act in our argument.

This is, as it were, the third and last act in our argument: it must be better than those which have preceded it, and must lead our youths to a position from which, not content with following the footsteps of others, they will learn to look, as if from a watch-tower, with their own eyes, choosing their goal and electing the path towards it under the command of their own judgement and will. Therefore,[1] as soon as a boy has learnt to speak correctly, to bring out his words clearly and with precision, and to throw out some little sparks of boyish wit, his father should most carefully

Example—principle.

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 129, &c., §§ 148, &c. The order of Studies.

lead him to the notion and the desire of learning to read. This can be very effectively done, if he invites some small boys, a little in advance of his own age, who have made some progress in reading; he will listen to them, and in the hearing of his own boy, praise their performance, and caress them, and perhaps give them some little present or prize[1] —for the ambition of a child will be kindled for those studies in which he sees another winning such approbation; and he himself will ask, nay, he will beg for those same writing tablets, and those very exercises to be given to him. And those which are to be given to him must be themselves beautiful and pleasant and written in clear letters, so that by every attraction which can move children of that age, the boy may be allured to a passionate love for reading. For we must always carefully make sure that appetite for reading is present and so keen that a feeling of surfeit may never follow.

The boy must learn to speak fluently and correctly, before he learns to read.

He will imitate and emulate others who are a little in advance of himself.

He must be allured to a love of reading.

There must be appetite for learning.

Yet though the father[2] may himself be a man of wide and liberal culture in arts and letters, able to teach his son, and eminently fitted to give him instruction in every sort of learning, I should still

[1] Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* i. 1. 20: 'Lusus hic sit: et rogetur et laudetur et nunquam non fecisse se gaudeat, aliquando ipso nolente doceatur alius, cui invideat; contendat interim et saepius vincere se putet: praemiis etiam, quae capit illa aetas, evocetur.' And i. 3. 6: 'Mihi ille detur puer, quem laus excitet, quem gloria iuvet, qui victus fleat.' Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 33–4, §§ 54–5.

[2] Cf. Quintilian, i. 1. 6: 'In parentibus vero quam plurimum esse eruditionis optaverim. Nec de patribus tantum loquor.' Quintilian expects more from women than Sadoleto.

A tutor should be appointed, even though the father be a man of liberal culture.

advise the appointment of a suitable tutor,[1] whose time is set apart entirely for his work, and who is free from every other engagement or business, and can devote himself absolutely to the charge of instructing the boy. The father is bound often to be called away by various claims, sometimes out of doors and sometimes within his own household. This counsel of ours of electing a tutor is supported by Cicero. Though such was the brilliance of his genius and such the lustre of his attainments in letters and every sort of knowledge, that he seems rather to have enriched and adorned eloquence, than to have borrowed any decoration from her, he yet employed the service of other men in educating his own son. But though this counsel is easy to prescribe, in fact, as experience shows, it is most difficult to carry out. For there are but few men—did I say few? No, let us rather pray that there might be any, who had grasped the meaning of true wisdom, and firmly held that secret which like a bond keeps together in a system all the elements of that liberal culture, that wisdom on which alone our hope is fixed in our training and education of a boy—and did not devote themselves for ostentation, or money-making, or popular favour, to learning the several arts in isolation, as if learning meant being ignorant of the very object for the sake of which learning is undertaken at all.

Difficulty of finding a good tutor—specialists may be had, but men of real and comprehensive learning are rare.

But I have spoken about this common and

[1] For this whole passage cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 75–77. Cf. Elyot, *Gov.* I. vi: 'At what age a tutour shulde be prouided, and what shall appertaine to his office to do.' I. ix: 'What exacte diligence shulde be in chosinge maisters.'

almost universal mistake in my Praise of Philosophy, and shall have occasion to speak of it often elsewhere. Let us now turn once more to the boy, whom we have in our charge, and set over him, from some school of letters, a master in whose character we have confidence, and whose diligence in his task is well known; a man who shall exact the daily tale of reading and writing from the boy strictly, yet without harshness, without threats or violence; for we must be on our guard lest the boy begin to hate learning, at a time when he cannot love it for its own sake. The boy must rather be encouraged by hope and praise, and sometimes a bargain may be made, that when he has given himself several hours for boyish games, he shall devote one to his master.

The tutor shall exact the 'daily tale' of reading and writing, but without harshness.

Reading and writing are the first lessons, the very elements of instruction for a boy. He must learn to read[1] and write[2] readily and rapidly, to recognize the letters without the least hesitation or uncertainty, whether they occur simply or connected in syllables or words; not only must he recognize them but pronounce them properly with a clear correct tone[3] of voice, neither slurring nor

The elements of instruction—reading and writing.

Reading aloud.

[1] Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* i. 1. 24–5: 'Neque enim mihi illud saltem placet, quod fieri in plurimis video, ut litterarum nomina et contextum prius quam formas parvuli discant. Obstat hoc agnitioni earum non intendentibus mox animum ad ipsos ductus, dum antecedentem memoriam sequuntur. . . . Quapropter optime sicut hominum pariter et habitus et nomina edocebuntur.'

[2] Quintilian, i. 1. 28: 'Non est aliena res, quae fere ab honestis negligi solet, cura bene ac velociter scribendi.'

[3] Quintilian, i. 8. 1–3: for general instructions on reading aloud. Quintilian sums up his counsels thus: 'Unum est

Paraphrase.

over-emphasizing each sound. Similarly he must read fluently any writing which is put before him, and be able to turn it backwards and forwards, this way and that. No doubt these may seem to be trifles [1]; but they are the foundation of all that is to follow, and must therefore be laid down the more firmly, and some time must be spent over these exercises until they settle and take hold. And whatever we have said about letters, or rather about the elements and characters of letters, we wish to be understood in regard not only to Latin,[2] but also to Greek.[3]

Greek as well as Latin necessary for a pupil who is to be trained to the highest form of virtue.

Both of these languages we would have learnt by a pupil of whom we cherish the hope that he will be trained to the highest form of virtue. In each language we have authors of the greatest power and erudition, in each of them we inherit every kind of learning in supreme examples; in each the noblest skill of the lawyer, the philosopher, the orator, is to be enjoyed; and each is so clearly allied and bound up with the other, that a student who acquires one of them without the other seems to have got something damaged and incomplete. Into both of these, Greek and Latin, then, the boy at the outset is to be plunged both by writing and reading. And here at once we note a most

The elements of religion to be taught with the first lessons in Latin and Greek.

igitur, quod in hac parte praecipiam: Ut omnia ista facere possit, *intelligat.*'

[1] Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* i. 1. 21.

[2] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 138, &c., §§ 163, &c.

[3] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 170, § 195. Cf. Elyot, *Gov.* I. x. &c., and for the state of Greek scholarship in England in the sixteenth century cf. Elyot, *Gov.* I. xiv, Croft's edition, vol. i, p. 145, note C.

admirable practice, customary among us, together with his letters to instil into a boy the elements or simplest characters of the Christian Religion, for, as we have said, there can be neither goodness, nor learning, nor any hope of an honourable life, unless virtue attends and accompanies. And at the same time there should be put before him pregnant maxims of authors of high authority bearing upon holiness of life and the example of virtue to be copied and evils to be shunned, maxims [1] that the impressionable mind may well receive and carry with it through the rest of life.

Pregnant maxims of high authority.

The practice once formed of reading and writing with ease, grammar [2] next follows—its name of

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 155, ll. 25–9: 'And therefore I think it may do well, to give them something every Day to remember, but something still, that is in itself worth the remembring, and what you would never have out of Mind, whenever you call, or they themselves search for it.' Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* i. 1. 35–6: 'Et quoniam circa res adhuc tenues moramur, ii quoque versus, qui ad imitationem scribendi proponentur, non otiosas velim sententias habeant, sed honestum aliquid monentes. Prosequitur haec memoria in senectutem, et impressa animo rudi usque ad mores proficiet.'

[2] On Grammar, cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 145, &c., §§ 168, &c. Elyot, *Gov.* I. x: 'Grammer beinge but an introduction to the understanding of autors, if it be made to longe or exquisite to the lerner, hit in a maner mortifieth his corage: And by that time he cometh to the most swete and pleasant redinge of olde autours, the sparkes of feruent desire of lernynge is extincte with the burdone of grammer, lyke as a lyttel fyre is sone quenched with a great heape of small stickes: so that it can neuer come to the principall logges where it shuld longe bourne in a great pleasaunt fire.'

Cf. also for a different estimate of the value of learning: Arnobius, *adversus Gentes*, Book II. 19 (*Ante-Nicene Christian*

Grammar follows next—its scope—sometimes improperly extended by grammarians.

course derived from letters [γράμματα] seems to indicate a narrow sphere, but, in fact, its range is ampler: for it includes not 'letters' only, not only nouns and verbs, and the other parts of speech, but embraces and deals with the learning of poets and prose authors in such a fashion that it seems to leave little in those subjects to be dealt with by other arts. This usurpation, indeed, should not in my judgement be charged against grammar, but rather against those who have deliberately made an improper use of the name grammar in order to display their own ability and learning in other provinces. Many scholars, some Greek, some Latin, have written upon grammar, some in a compressed and chastened style, many more copiously—though we need hardly credit the legend that 3,000 books on grammar were written by Didymus. Among the Greek scholars, Apollonius and Herodianus are the most approved in grammar; among our own Donatus

Apollonius and Herodianus.

Library, vol. xix): 'But if men either knew themselves thoroughly, or had the slightest knowledge of God . . . never, carried away by pride and arrogance, would they believe themselves to be deities of the first rank, and fellows of the Highest in his exaltation, because they had devised the arts of *grammar*, *music*, *oratory*, and *geometry*. For we do not see what is so wonderful in these arts, that because of their discovery the soul should be believed to be above the sun as well as all the stars, to surpass both in grandeur and essence the whole universe, of which these are parts. For what else do these assert that they can either declare or teach, than that we may learn to know the rules and differences of nouns, the intervals in the sounds of tones, that we may speak persuasively in lawsuits, that we may measure the confines of the earth?'

has deserved high honour, and also Servius who imitated him; after them came a crowd of others. But it is not our purpose to draw out a list of authors, but rather to consider by what means and in what measure grammar is to be taught to a boy; and we must look not to the extent of the subject, but rather to the capacity of the pupil; difficult and troublesome matters in grammar which are involved in arguments rather attractive to a subtle intellect than strictly necessary, may be set aside till a later time, when, equipped and strengthened by the discipline of other studies, the youth will be able to pass his leisure hours on questions of this kind. To the young man these questions will suggest themselves, and they will be all the more shrewdly discussed from the standpoint of some other subject; but to load the mind of a young boy with burdens of this nature would be folly. For what advantage can it be to him to be familiar with the controversy whether the participle is a real part of speech or should be included under the verb, or whether the use of a common or a proper noun is to be preferred, and many similar problems, which even to those who understand them are of very little service.

Donatus and Servius.

We must look rather to the capacity of the pupil than to the extent of the subject.

Elaborate grammatical discussions unsuitable for a boy.

I would rather have the pupil led to a clear plain understanding of matters which are both necessary and useful: let him learn to distinguish the various letters, recognizing that some are vowels,[1] those namely which of their own virtue make a pure sound; and others consonants,

The teaching of grammar.

[1] Cf. Vives, *Plan of Studies for Girls* (Foster Watson), on 'Pronunciation' and 'Parts of Speech'.

Sounds.

those, namely, which are sounded in alliance and union with the vowels; and further, among the consonants the semi-vowels, the sound of which begins with a vowel, and the others, the mutes (explosives), in which the vowel sound merely ceases. Let him learn, moreover, these double sounds, which the Greeks call diphthongs, produced by the union of two vowels; and then let him give to all these sounds their appropriate pronunciation. He must be led forward into the great wealth of language by such stages as will enable him to learn quite accurately what are commonly called the eight parts of speech, with the properties and, so to speak, the badges of each of which he must so make himself acquainted as to be able to distinguish one from another; as, for example, he must know that a *noun* is that which marks the nature and quality of a thing, fixed and stable; that nouns are declined in cases; may be divided into several kinds, admit changes in number, or vary in gender, and are distinguished in regard to form.

Parts of speech.

That a *verb* is that which indicates a thing in a condition of acting, or being acted upon, and is marked by variations of *tense* as a noun is by cases. That a *participle* is akin both to a noun and to a verb, taking its tense and movement from the verb, and in the rest following the noun. That a *pronoun* is that which stands in place of a noun—of a noun, that is to say, which is proper and indicates a certain person. Or again that *adverbs* have no value except when attached to another word, and that *prepositions* may either be used merely with nouns, usually taking a place or position (hence

their names) immediately before them, or else in relationship with nouns and verbs, and thus either emphasize or lessen or change the meaning of the words in connexion with which they are employed. Once more, that *conjunctions* are words which connect the five principal parts of speech by joining together two or three: while *interjections*, breaking the flow and sense of a clause, are thrown in with a tone of voice which betrays some emotion, hope, joy, fear, grief, eagerness, wonder, and so forth. But all these matters, which are more suitably dealt with in the actual teaching of boys, it is only for us rapidly to review them, for we are offering an outline, not elaborating a system.

Declension and conjugation.

The next matter is the inflection of the four principal parts of speech; three of them (noun, adjective, pronoun) are declined in *cases*, the other, the verb, is conjugated in *tenses*; and these must be quite perfectly committed to memory. The pupil must learn to distinguish their several forms with the complete ease which comes of familiar practice; and not less, what case should follow, and what precede each *verb*; for in my judgement, competence in grammar is best exhibited in the ability so to design and weave the texture of speech—with cases, gender, number, and tenses—that there shall be no confusion, no want of harmony, nothing that is not perfectly fitting and appropriate. And all this must be kept in mind by the teacher of grammar both in verse and in prose-writing, for we include in grammar a just[1] perception

Grammar best taught by the practical application of rules.

The reading of good authors not only in prose,

[1] Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* i. 4. 6–7: 'Ne quis igitur tanquam

but in verse. The quantity of syllables, and the laws of scansion are to be appreciated with nice sensibility.

of the quantity of syllables, and of the proper scansion for every kind of poem. As for an intelligent mastery of verbs and nouns which have betrayed themselves to some common resemblance, and adopted irregular and inconsistent forms under the influence of other similar words—I say, such mastery is to be got not so much from nice and curious rules as from frequent reading of good authors ; and we can but say the same thing in regard to correct writing, which the Greeks call orthography. Writing is most difficult and burdensome for boys to acquire, if we attempt to teach it by means of rules and counsels, whereas the regular practice of reading and writing establishes their skill. And in fact we may say without reservation that the whole art of grammar is built up on two foundations—the common practice of speech, and the authority[1] of learned writers in the past: and the goal and end of the art consists in the ability to plan and develop a speech in such sort, that there be nothing discordant or ill-arranged in it, and to achieve this equally in prose and in verse where moreover the quantity of the syllables

Grammar built upon two foundations—the common practice of speech, and the authority of learned writers in the past.

parva fastidiat grammatices elementa, non quia magnae sit operae consonantes a vocalibus discernere ipsasque eas in semivocalium numerum mutarumque partiri, sed quia interiora velut sacri huius adeuntibus apparebit multa rerum subtilitas, quae non modo acuere ingenia puerilia sed exercere altissimam quoque eruditionem ac scientiam possit. An cuiuslibet auris est exigere litterarum sonos ? non mehercle magis quam nervorum.'

[1] Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* i. 6. 45 : 'Consuetudinem sermonis vocabo consensum eruditorum, sicut vivendi consensum bonorum.'

has to be taken into account. A boy should be able to do this smartly and readily, without hesitation in the process. Since the art of grammar [1] is the foundation, and, as it were, the very soil on which all the other arts are built up, so that if there be anything weak and faulty in the knowledge of grammar the whole superstructure must needs be unstable, the more attentive care must be devoted to securing a firm grasp of grammar. But, when a boy has learned and mastered all this, one need not fear to put any task upon him: and indeed he himself, no longer hampered by all these puzzling and intricate problems, which are the cause of no little trouble, and of no great pleasure in the mind of a child, will be like a horse lately broken in, delighted to run at large in the wide and open fields, and to essay his own strength and mettle. So the studies which follow grammar will not be burdensome to him, but welcome and pleasant.

Once well grounded in grammar the boy can move freely and fearlessly in any field.

And thus he must be led on forthwith to the exercises and rules of rhetoric, the subject-matter of which is the same [2] as that of grammar, viz. the treatment of nouns and verbs and the whole process of shaping and arranging speech, but in a different way. For, as we have said, the grammarian's art

The student approaches rhetoric.

[1] Writing at almost exactly the same time as Sadoleto, Elyot says (*Gov.* I. v): 'And as touchynge grammere, there is at this day better introductions, and more facile, than ever before were made, concernynge as wel greke as latine, if they be wisely chosen.'

[2] Cf. Wilkins, *Roman Education* (Cambridge Press), pp. 78 seq.; Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 162, &c., §§ 188–9; Elyot, *Gov.* I. xi, p. 41.

is content to construct a speech which is consistent and fitly arranged in person and tense and the rest, or to turn a verse[1] correct in scansion and measure, and with that achievement comes to a stop, having no reason to go further. But rhetoric takes over the achievement of grammar, as something necessary to herself; though there is nothing distinguished in what is merely necessary. And so it cultivates and improves what it has inherited in such sort that nothing can provoke more fervent admiration than the embellishment which it provides. I should have more to say about this art, since it is so wonderful an ornament of human life, had not everything been said in a supreme and final form by Cicero, an author whom, in obedience both to my advice and to your own inclination, you have constantly in your hands. Cicero you must read now and ever, and not only read; you must absorb him and make him your own by every intimate sense and method; for there is no crown of learning, no brilliance of oratory, no magnificence of sentiment, no charm of word and phrase, no quickness of wit, no vigour of mind, which does not clearly, nay, with unrivalled lustre, exhibit itself in him, and exercise so swift and irresistible an influence, that the ear, and indeed the heart, of the reader is overwhelmed as though by a torrent of delights. But though all the gifts which seem to be needed for an art of this distinguished kind are to be found in him, and united moreover with the greatest learning and the

Cicero has said all that can be said about rhetoric.

Cicero is not only to be read; he is to be absorbed.

[1] Contrast the views of Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 152, § 174.

deepest wisdom; yet even when you have fashioned yourself upon his model, and taken not merely the colour, but the very sap and life of his style, even so you must not neglect to read the other authors, Latin and Greek, both prose writers and poets. For to your years, Paullus, and even to a later age, it is at once a great distinction and a great advantage to become acquainted with the genius of many authors, because from many minds you may learn many things which may come usefully to your hand in the affairs of daily life; and a wide and varied reading establishes a man's judgement and good sense; whereas if he keeps within the confines of a single kind, and has nothing with which to compare it, he appears to have devoted himself to it, even though it should be excellent, not from any preference, but by chance or good luck. But we wish to produce in the youth, of whom we have so long been speaking, a nature strong to choose and to judge. True, to judge is hardly the task of a youth;[1] yet it is proper for youth to exhibit fresh vigour of mind, and it is the proof of vigour quickly to grasp what is offered to it, and when it has seized from a teacher some principle, to press forward a little in advance, and from a few data quickly to gather many new points; and this splendid endowment is in us a gift of Heaven, most fervently coveted. But the

But other authors, both Greek and Latin, are also to be studied.

Wide and varied reading establishes the judgement.

[1] Cf. Whewell, *Cambridge Education* (Part I, Principles and Recent History. Second edition, 1850, Parker), on the difference between Permanent and Progressive Studies; especially the section (pp. 117 seq.) 'Of Mr. Lyell's Remarks on the English Universities'.

To judge is to select, and the student's reading must be large enough to provide him with materials for selection.

power of judgement is characterized less by rapidity than by weight; it consists not so much in foresight as in circumspection; it should be able to select from among many things which present themselves on all sides, from every quarter, that which is most suitable; and this of course cannot be done without a comparison of many things, and this power of testing and seizing the best out of a multitude of possibilities is given by long commerce[1] with the counsels of men, and the dealings of fortune, and most of all by learned and various readings, though of course it depends upon the bounty of Nature, which endows us with a good intellect at our birth; if that be wanting, nothing avails. The decisive and dominant influence is that of Nature. Yet, though judgement is not proper to youth, youth should be provided with these instruments, this cultivation and mental equipment, that when maturity arrives, it shall be able to judge shrewdly and truly; and a very great contribution will be made to this end by an acquaintance with literature, a knowledge of history, and a wide reading of the chief and most approved authors; and of those of this quality which the havoc of time has left to us, not one is to be despised. And not only conspicuous advantage, but the greatest pleasure also, will be gained from wide reading. It will be a pleasure to know and marvel over the amazing, impetuous power of

Experience of men and of the world, together with knowledge of books, needed for developing judgement.

Pleasure as well as advantage to be got from reading.

[1] Cf. Jowett, *College Sermons* (Murray, 1896), p. 259: 'A common cause of failure is ignorance of the world.' Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 199, § 140, on Wisdom; Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.*, Book VI, ch. v and foll.; Elyot, *Gov.* I. xiii.

Demosthenes;[1] whose speech is, I think, so closely knit in a chain of thought, that if you take away

Demosthenes—his style.

[1] Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* x. 1. 105, on Demosthenes and Cicero; and x. 1. 76–9, on Demosthenes, Aeschines, Lysias, and Isocrates: '. . . princeps Demosthenes ac paene lex orandi fuit; tanta vis in eo, tam densa omnia, ita quibusdam nervis intenta sunt, tam nihil otiosum, is dicendi modus, ut nec quod desit in eo nec quod redundet invenias. Plenior Aeschines et magis fusus et grandiori similis, quo minus strictus est; carnis tamen plus habet, minus lacertorum. . . . Lysias subtilis atque elegans . . . puro tamen fonti quam magno flumini propior. Isocrates in diverso genere dicendi nitidus et comptus et palaestrae quam pugnae magis accommodatus omnes dicendi veneres sectatus est.' Cf. also Vives, *Plan for Boys' Studies* (trans. Foster Watson): 'To begin with, I think the orators should be read—Isocrates, Demosthenes, Lysias, Aeschines, and part of Lucian. Then the philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Theophrastus. Next those iron-like writers—Thucydides and Plutarch.' Vives' advice with regard to the poets may be conveniently quoted here: 'Before you attack the poets read Apollonius and Johannes Grammaticus on the Greek Dialects; then chiefly translate; to begin with, the Attic writers are easiest, such as Aristophanes, and afterwards Homer, the fountain of the rest. Then, Euripides and Sophocles. Have a lexicon by you—say Suidas or Hesychius.' Vives draws up a somewhat different list for girls; he says: 'The authors in whom she should be versed are those who at the same time cultivate right language and right living; those who help to inculcate not only knowledge, but living well. Of this kind are Cicero, Seneca, the works of Plutarch . . . some dialogues of Plato, especially those which concern the government of the state. Then the epistles of Jerome, and some works of Ambrosius and Augustine should be read. Further the Institutiones Principis, the Enchiridion, the Paraphrases (of Erasmus) and many of the works useful to piety, and the Utopia of Thomas More . . . History from Justinus, Florus, and Valerius Maximus . . . something (morning and night) from the New Testament . . .

a single letter the whole breaks in pieces; so alert for contest that it cannot but be victorious; so full and crowded that it overwhelms the listener; so musical that it avails to beguile an opponent. How constantly he sings the praise of antiquity; how well he chooses word and phrase, how often he is inspired by the occasion and the subject to encourage men to deeds of honour and glory! Not without reason might the claim of the Greeks for eloquence be based upon the fame of this one prince of orators. His personal enemy and his public foe, Aeschines, though altogether less intense, has something melodious and fluent in his style. Lysias is fine and most apt in his selection of words.[1] The eloquence of Isocrates, though once much admired, has too many graces and artificial harmonies to give the effect of virility. The frequent reading of these authors and the rest, not only affords the delight which comes from acquaintance with the genius of great men and their differences, but exercises and increases the power of judging between

Aeschines.

Lysias.

Isocrates.

and also the Christian poets such as Prudentius, Sidonius, Paulinus, Aratus, Prosper, Juvencus. . . . Nor are the heathen poets to be entirely omitted, particularly Lucan, Seneca the tragedian, and a good part of Horace.'

[1] Cf. Cicero, *Orat.* 226: 'Lysiam . . . alterum paene Demosthenem.' 'Egregie subtilis scriptor atque elegans quem prope audeas oratorem perfectum dicere' (*Brutus*, 9. 35): 'in Lysia saepe sunt etiam lacerti, sicut fieri nihil possit valentius' (ibid. 16. 64): 'ita fit ut Demosthenes certe possit summisse dicere, elate Lysias fortasse non possit' (*de Opt. Gen. Orat.* 4. 10) (quoted by Wilkins, *De Oratore*, i, p. 35). Cf. also *πέφυκεν ἡ Λυσίου λέξις ἔχειν τὸ χαρίεν, ἡ δ' Ἰσοκράτους βούλεται*, Dion. Hal. *de Isoc.* 3.

different and various styles. And the same observation must be made in regard to the historians, among whom our Latin writers are masters of a refinement and wealth not surpassed by the Greeks. In these writers whatever makes for the strengthening of human judgement is seen far more clearly (than in the orators); for carefully to study the plans and achievements of leaders of the past,[1] men who have risen to eminence in the direction of national affairs, is to learn from the results of their work what in life is to be avoided, and what eagerly pursued. But what am I to say about the poets? You know what a multitude of them there are in Latin and in Greek, you know how potent is their art, not only to soothe but to rouse our spirits. The race of poets has ever been held sacred, and dear to the gods: for it is not so much by the effort of human thought as by the breath of some inspiration from Heaven that they pour forth those strains which, fashioned with sound and measure, take our senses, and, streaming in upon our minds, deeply stir them in such sort that no resistance seems possible to their compelling influence. It was for this reason, of course, that the poets were bidden to leave[2] that ideal state which Plato established and perfected in his *Republic*: it was feared that if the poets, obeying only their own fancy, were to write and spread abroad whatever they choose (a freedom which was generally granted in Greece), they might most

Historians not less than orators to be read.

Uses of historical study.

The poets —a sacred race.

Their power over the mind of man.

Plato and the poets.

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 159–60, §§ 182–4; and Appendix B, p. 192.

[2] Plato, *Rep.* iii. 398 A; x. 595 A; and *Laws*, vii. 817.

easily corrupt the character of the citizens. And indeed there is more power in the poet's craft than one might perhaps suppose, for breaking and weakening the character by the appeal of pleasure or the other violent emotions, or, on the other hand, tempering it to steadfast virtue.

Poetry the principal element in music, of which we must speak.

But since this seems to be the function of music generally, of which poetry is the principal element, and even the foundation upon which the whole art is built up, we must say something about music, if we desire to profit by this cursory account of the liberal arts, and if we explain in advance the object towards which we are pressing.

Paul. Yes. I am debating in my mind what place you give to the poets, and I begin to be very much afraid of that judgement of Plato's. And yet when I remember that it is at your bidding that I have learnt to live in intimacy with the poets,[1] and to hold their works constantly in my

[1] Cf. Vives, *Plan for Boys' Studies* (trans. Foster Watson), 'Poets are also to be studied for the sake of the mind; for they often relieve the tedium of business, and of the reading of unfettered speech [i.e. prose]. This alternation of verse and prose keeps the mind intent on studies for a longer time. Moreover the poets abound in unusual words and figures of every kind which common speech at one time or another requires.' Vergil, Horace, Silius Italicus, Seneca, and Lucan are here named. Vives says that 'Vergil holds the first place, and rightly so, on account of his seriousness and his ideas', but goes on presently to say that, in his opinion, 'Lucan holds the victory over all, in the majesty of his word, and the force of his subjects, in the value and number of his thoughts.' He adds a list of 'poets of our religion' who should be read—Prudentius, Prosper, Paulinus, Servilius, Juvencus and Aratus—and then characterizes these last-named pleasantly,

hands, I console myself, and cannot entertain the fear that you will deprive me either of the delicious rest which they afford me from my more exacting studies, or of their signal aid (which I am beginning to realize in my own experience) in the cultivation of language, and indeed of life. For so far as my mind has any capacity for estimating the value of the studies in which I am daily engaged, I do not know what I could read more fertile or more glorious than Homer, or what more sublime than Vergil. As I reflect on the way in which these two poets have been brought into comparison and rivalry with each other by the zeal, not merely of individual admirers, but of two whole nations, disputing which of them ought to be awarded the chief title in this kind of excellence, I often make use of your judgement. You have always declared that while there are a thousand things in Homer which may be praised to the skies, there is nothing in our national poet which one could wish bettered; though indeed you hold that all other poets have been derived like streams from Homer as from the fount and creative source of all wisdom.[1]

Paullus acknowledges his debt to the poets, as teachers both of style and conduct.

Homer, Vergil.

Homer and Vergil compared.

And as you maintain that the province of comedy is private life and social usage, I imagine that neither are you at all inclined to disown the

'whilst they discuss matters of the highest kind, for the salvation of the human race, [they] are neither crude nor contemptible in speech.'

[1] Cf. Milton, *Par. Lost*, Book VII. Of the Sun:

> Hither, as to their fountain, other stars
> Repairing in their golden urns draw light.

Terence.

comic poets. Terence[1] is an example; granted that his verse flows like a quiet stream, who could fail to marvel and rejoice in contemplating the purity and tranquillity of its waters, bearing no dregs, tainted by no stain, or in remarking his perfect adjustment to every sort of incident, in apt, clever, and polished speech and dialogue? In him, I think, the genius of good taste[2] is enshrined; for indeed he so carefully guards against the base and the sordid that sometimes he seems to give too little heed to the proper characteristics of his several personages. Plautus perhaps allows himself a greater freedom; and yet for enriching one's style in Latin, for acquiring ease of diction and wealth of vocabulary, what could be of greater service than his comedies? Of the other poets, of whom there is a delightful abundance, both in Greek and in Latin, I shall not speak, for there is supposed to be a variety of kinds in poetry: which perhaps is not the case with the orators. But I will say this much in general about them all, that as in

The genius of good taste.

Plautus—increase of of diction and wealth of style.

[1] Cf. Ascham, *Scholemaster* (Arber's *English Reprints*, pp. 143–4): 'For word and speech, Plautus is more plentifull, and Terence more pure and proper: And for one respect, Terence is to be embraced above all that ever wrote in his kind of argument: Because it is well-known, by good record of learning, and that byCiceroes own witnes that some Comedies bearyng Terence name, were written by worthy Scipio, and wise Laelius, and namely Heauton: and Adelphi. And therefore as oft as I read these comedies, so oft doth sound in myne eare the pure fine talk of Rome, which was used by the floure of the worthiest nobilitie that ever Rome bred.' Cf. also Vives on Terence and Plautus.

[2] Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* x. 1. 99: 'Terentii scripta . . . quae . . . sunt in hoc genere elegantissima.'

each one of them there is some special excellence in some part of his genius, and in most of them many admirable qualities, this class of writer is by no means to be excluded from our system for the training of the character or from the studies leading to that cultivation which we are seeking to acquire. But if the caprice of fortune and the lapse of time had, in its preservation of our own ancient authors, left us tragedy, or not deprived Greece of comedy, I think we might derive a singular pleasure from a comparative study of the writers of both nations. But since this boon has been denied us, whether through the fault of man or of time itself, by reading the authors in one kind, and then those in the other, we may still try to discover what is the special quality of each order, though perhaps tragedy is more violent and certainly more potent to stir us by various emotions.

Tragedy and comedy —the influence and quality of each.

Jac. You have put the matter neatly and with much justice. Indeed, I am delighted with the penetration and the care with which you make your estimate of the Greek and Latin writers —you afford me here an excellent illustration of your temper and your powers. You have relieved me of no small part of the task of criticizing and appraising the poets. Those whom you have just mentioned, and others like them, are, I think, not merely to be read by you, but to be regarded as familiar friends. And if I recoil from Plato's banishment of the poets, it is not because I do not believe that custom and propriety will rather lay down the law for the poets than the poets for

propriety. But we must admit that Plato, in his enactment, strove after a very real advantage; and I should not wish you to include in the number of poets those ribald and lawless verse-writers, who go all lengths of wantonness, and pack every subject with infamy.

Lawless and ribald verse-writers not to be included among the poets.

Paul. Certainly not, father (for I know whom you mean), unless sometimes they are to be read that the purity and wisdom of great and serious poets may be more clearly illustrated. But I am most eager to hear now what you promised to tell me about music.[1]

Jac. Naturally, since from your earliest childhood you have by your father's direction been instructed in that art.

False music, not to be admitted.

But I shall have nothing to say of the devices of the common and debased art of sound, whose sole office consists in a pandering gratification of the ear, devices which consist of hardly anything but variation and modulation of note—for this, as a thing most injurious to good character, Plato most properly banished from his Republic; the Egyptians indeed never permitted it to enter their cities. But about true music I must speak; about that music the whole function of which it is to bring the mind from a boorish stiffness to easy grace, and yet (lest it should be enervated and unduly relaxed) hold it firmly in the bonds of a steadfast goodness. Now, we said that there was something which seemed to have a prior claim on our attention, so pray take the matter thus—if (to take an image from the Stadium) we lead

The function of true music.

[1] On the subject of music, cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 174, § 197.

youth from the starting-point into the course of the arts and of learning, so as to put him at the point where the prize of the race is set up, you must believe that the supreme and crowning reward, the object of our effort, that of which we have so often spoken already, that study which brings human nature and human reason to perfect development and gives us the boon of a happy life, is philosophy. When we reach philosophy, in her we must make our resting-place, the home of all our thoughts; for we can lack nothing there which makes for our welfare and our peace, or aids us in achieving in richest abundance the proper delights of a healthy mind. Now the very starting-point of our course is the art of grammar; when you have stayed upon it as much as is needful, you must leave it in order to adorn and cultivate your style by the aid of another art or discipline of the first importance and the greatest distinction, the pursuit of which claims all the remainder of our lives, for without it no man can well attain greatness or eminence among his fellows either at home in peace or abroad in time of war.

We must not forget that philosophy is our final object.

Grammar the starting-point in early years.

Rhetoric claims the rest of life.

This training in dignified, clear, and polished speech upon any subject which may be proposed, should, in my view, accompany a youth throughout every stage of his development, so that it may be carried along with him as he advances towards philosophy, as a river is borne towards the sea and at last becomes merged and identified with the element into which it passes. At the same time I would have his rhetoric flow onward in

Rhetoric at last is merged in philosophy, as a river is merged in the sea.

Other arts are like tributaries.

a stream ever enriched by the tributary[1] gifts of the other arts and disciplines. There is not one of those arts which we call liberal, and consider worthy of the noble nature, which should not be attempted by a youth so far as is appropriate—I mean that as much time as may prove necessary must be spent upon each. This will be no difficult matter, and indeed they are so interwoven and bound together by relationship and by a sort of sympathy that a student who has entered at all deeply into one of them makes for himself an easy approach into the others. The ancient Greeks dealt with this question more elaborately and at greater leisure than our own countrymen; they perceived that the road to that complete and supreme wisdom which they believed exhibited itself in statesmanship and in supremacy and pre-eminence of judgement and eloquence lay through arts of this kind. They appointed men as teachers at once of oratory and of philosophy, whom they called Sophists, masters, as we may say, of civic wisdom, and engaged their services at a recognized fee for their children. These men were always to be attached to them, and never leave their side; but they provided that their sons should be taken as though for exercise to other teachers—mathematicians, musicians, astronomers, at whose hands

Sophists—masters of civic wisdom.

[1] Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.*, *Prooemium*, § 5: 'Ego, cum existimem nihil arti oratoriae alienum, sine quo fieri non posse oratorem fatendum est, nec ad ullius rei summam nisi praecedentibus initiis perveniri, ad minora illa, sed quae si negligas, non sit maioribus locus, demittere me non recusabo'; cf. also § 9 and i. 10. 2–8.

they might get something which it was worth while to learn in addition. But they knew that boyhood, and still more adolescence, is impetuous and aflame, incapable of repose, always restless, and in movement unable to set bounds to its appetite for talking, running, shouting, and accordingly prescribed first of all those arts which they thought the most suitable for controlling that age, and fashioning it to a certain mould of habit—the arts, I mean, of gymnastic and music, of which the one should bring beneath the sway of certain laws the impulses of the body, the other the impulses of the mind, both alike by nature, unbridled and unrestrained. So that in giving free expression to natural instincts and impulses, art and training should nevertheless be employed to invest those movements with grace, and make the body healthy, while they secured the balance of the mind. So far as concerns the body and its training, we have changed and omitted items in the ancient method. We do not, for example, indulge in the frequent baths and daily ablutions, to which they were so devoted: we have long abandoned the habit of oiling the body and the art of wrestling. Most of those exercises[1] which accord with the spirit of our Roman training have been preserved in our customs, such as riding, running, ball-playing, javelin-hurling, fencing, and others which promote endurance and bodily health, matters of choice rather than of teaching; excellence in which is attained not by the commands of a master, but by a youth's own temper and self-discipline. There

Gymnastic and music bring the natural impulses of the body and of the mind under the sway of law—securing grace and health of the body and balance of the mind.

Gymnastic exercises, past and present.

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 175–6, §§ 198–9.

Dancing, common to gymnastic and music.

remains alone that accomplishment in bodily movement [1] common to gymnastic and music; the art of dancing [2]—the art, that is, of springing to the sound of stringed or wind instruments. Here, however, music is of the greater importance, and so (since we have said enough about gymnastic) let us now turn to the task of painting it upon the minds of the young in the colours which antiquity has approved.

Paul. I am afraid that all I have learnt of music is of a kind which may not win your approval; though I have for some time almost wholly given up this study, and, as you may see, take less and less pleasure in it every day, devoting myself more readily to the nobler and more serious music which I find in poetry, a music which lifts my soul almost to heaven on the rhythmical and harmonious current of its majestic thoughts.

Jac. I will not deny, Paullus, that it has been quite proper and necessary for you to learn all you have acquired about raising and again lowering sounds and tones (as you call them), about true and false notes, the value of a full tone and of a semi-tone, what is meant by an octave and a fifth, the scale, the changes of key, the laws of harmony, and such subjects of the music school. But to learn these things is not difficult: what we have to see to is that an art such as this, without doubt singularly

[1] Plato, *Rep.* iii. 412: 'He who mingles music with Gymnastic in the fairest proportions, and best attempers them to the soul, may be rightly called the true musician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings.'

[2] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 174, § 196.

sympathetic to our nature, is not allowed, by a wrong use, to become itself a corrupting influence upon our mind and character. For nothing has a more controlling and arresting effect on the mind than rhythm,[1] nothing is more penetrating, more potent to prescribe the rule and law by which it is to be moved and governed. This is often shown in our silent reading of the poets and orators, in both of whom rhythm and cadence, measure and pause, are to be found, though in the poets all this is much more explicit. But as we read them we are conscious that we are deeply moved, we feel ourselves swayed and borne along in the sweep of that rhythmic movement. And if these words are set to appropriate and fitting music for the voice, scarce any mind can resist their influence, but must surrender and suffer itself to be led away in captivity. What follows? The more force and vigour this art of music has, the more carefully ought we to take precaution (though we never do) that no one be permitted at his own whim to introduce change and variations in musical method, but that all should be strictly compelled to abide by the established and recognized tradition. At Sparta of old, indeed, they observed this rule so stringently that when Timotheus, the famous lutist, who was giving a public performance before a large audience at Sparta, added a single chord on his lute, he was condemned to death on the charge of damaging the authority

The effect of rhythm on the mind.

Music and poetry combined.

Tradition in music to be respected. Innovations to be closely scrutinized.

[1] Plato, *Rep.* iii. 400: 'There is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is an effect of good or bad rhythm' (Jowett).

of the laws and undermining the discipline of youth.[1] And if we are to inquire what system is to be maintained in music, I am of opinion that we should bear all the following principles in mind: since a chorus consists of three elements, words, rhythm (by this I mean time), and tune, it is evident that the words are far the most important[2] of the three, as being the very basis and foundation of the rest; they have no mean influence upon the mind, whether to persuade or to restrain: when disposed in conformity with time and rhythm they have a much more penetrating force; while if arranged also in a musical setting they take possession of the inner man and all his feelings.

Words, rhythm, and tune—the pre-eminent importance of the words.

Any community, then, which undertakes the general supervision of these matters, and any private citizen who is concerned about bringing up a son properly and decently, must needs see to it that this art be learnt in such fashion as that its groundwork and subject-matter (I mean the words and ideas expressed) should be of a kind which will tend most surely to the maintenance and nurture of good character. This will be fitly

Words and ideas—the groundwork of music.

[1] Cic. *Leg.* ii. 15. 39; Quint. *Inst. Or.* ii. 3. 3; Macr. *S.* v. 32.

[2] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* iii. 399–400: 'Next in order to harmonies, rhythm will naturally follow, and this should be subject to the same rules, for we ought not to seek out complex systems of metre, or metres of every kind, but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of a courageous and harmonious life; and when we have found them, *we shall adapt the foot and the melody* to words having a like spirit, *not the words to the foot and melody*;' and, a little further on, 'Our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words, and not the words by them'.

done, if the theme be either the praise of eminent men and their words and sayings regarding virtue, or sacred matters, and all utterances concerning God Himself which unite the commemoration of His goodness, kindness, and mercy with our own greatest advantage and profit.

Cato, in his *Origines*, tells us that after banquets themes of the first kind were adopted by the ancient Romans: the praise of their brave men and their eminent services to the state were chanted to the music of the pipe. The poets sometimes take the other subject: for instance, in Virgil Iopas [1] sings of sun and moon and heavenly bodies. In our day they have chosen more high and holy themes, celebrating in sacred song the mysteries of divine power and grace towards us. This indeed has but lately been done, with the applause of all the Muses, by Actius Sincerus, a man distinguished in his poetic powers by the union of genius and eloquence with Christian piety.

Melody to be considered after the theme has been chosen.

With this foundation, firmly laid and cemented, we must next attempt melody which must by no means be loose, languid, or feeble, if it is to provide a meet accompaniment to the gravity of the subject-matter. Its sweetness must not lack restraint and virility, its measure must be dignified. Human nature itself and our own expectations are outraged if, when a man takes upon himself the recital of Mutius Scaeva's noble deed, he feels constrained to roll it out in the quick iambic measure. For that measure is proper to haste and eagerness, excitement and anger, not to steadfast and unconquered

The measure must be appropriate to the subject-matter.

[1] 'Crinitus Iopas', *Aen.* i. 740.

valour. Nor again must the self-sacrifice of the Decii, their advance into the midst of their foes, when to save their country they hurled themselves upon certain death, be fettered by the form of soft elegiacs or flowing dithyrambics. It demands a heroic strain, that the metre may match the greatness of the theme. Furthermore, if the matter and metre are in harmony, and both maintain a firm and manly character, the voice must not be broken and womanish. So we shall have a concord not only useful for the training of mind and character, but, in my judgement, far more pleasant and agreeable. For it will not, like some over-refined[1] essence, quickly cloy the appetite and alienate the senses by disgust; but seasoning sweetness with severity will hold them longer; and gently penetrating the youthful mind will be apt to establish and maintain there that noble compact between virtue and pleasure which I have called the mainspring of character. Such is the music,[2] Paullus, which I urge you and all young people who love virtue, eagerly to follow and firmly to embrace—though you indeed forestall my advice by your own choice. What correctness or beauty can the music which is now in vogue possess? It has scarcely any real and stable foundation in word or thought. If it should have for its subject a maxim or proverb, it would obscure and hamper the sense and meaning[3]

The voice of the singer or reciter.

The noble compact between virtue and pleasure.

The music of our own time has scarcely any foundation in word or thought.

[1] Cf. Cicero, *de Orat.* iii. 26. 103: 'Suavitatem habeat orator austeram et solidam, non dulcem et decoctam.'

[2] Cf. Elyot, *Gov.* I. vii. *passim*, and Note *a* on p. 214 of Croft's edition.

[3] Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* xi. 3. 20 (on the care which the orator must give to his voice): 'Praeterea ut sint fauces

by abruptly cutting and jerking the sounds in the throat—as though music[1] were designed not to soothe and control the spirit, but merely to afford a base pleasure to the ears, mimicking the cries of birds and beasts, which we should be sorry to resemble. This is to turn soul into body, and weaken self-control. From this Plato most properly shrank in horror, and refused a place in his ideal state for such music as this. For when flaccid,[2] feeble, sensual ideas are rendered in similar music, in kindred modulations of the voice, weakly yielding to lust, languishing in grief, or rushing in frenzied agitation towards the sudden passions of a disordered mind, what ruin to virtue, what wreckage of character, do you suppose, must ensue?

Degeneracy in letters and music wrought the general ruin of Greece.

It was thus, of course, that Greece wrought the ruin of her ancient and honourable tradition, by the constant visiting of theatres and theatrical displays, and specially by introducing into them choruses which appealed to the ear by their charm and to the mind by a variety of influences. From Greece this bane was carried across to Rome, and

The evil spread from Greece to Rome.

integrae, id est molles ac leves, quarum vitio frangitur et obscuratur et exasperatur et scinditur vox.'

[1] Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* ii. 3. 20.

[2] Cf. Quintilian, i. 10. 31: 'Apertius tamen profitendum puto, non hanc [musicam] a me praecipi, quae nunc in scaenis effeminata et impudicis modis fracta non ex parte minima, si quid in nobis virilis roboris manebat, excidit, sed qua laudes fortium canebantur, quaque ipsi fortes canebant.' Cf. Plato, *Rep.* Book III, pp. 398–9, where he rejects the Lydian and Ionian modes as being enervating and degrading, and prefers the Dorian and Phrygian modes as being consonant with an attitude of mind both tranquil and courageous in time of adversity and prosperity alike.

unstrung and snapped the sinews of her pristine dignity. In our own day, what good is to be expected from music of this kind it is easy to guess when we observe the character of those who teach and profess it. Such music is not worthy of a free man, but that rather which we displayed earlier, the music which by its noble feeling, its stately measure, its manly tone, kindles the mind to a passion for virtue. If to this be added steps [1] and movements of the body adapted to the melody and the rhythm, we have the origin of dance [2] and even of the ballet, the enjoyment of which we do not absolutely forbid to the young, though it should be sparingly and discreetly permitted. For they will be of use in refreshing the mind and restoring it after the toil and intense application of study. But the ballets must be quickly dismissed and dance abandoned—for it quickly becomes absurd, and cannot be reconciled in any way or in time or place with manly dignity or grave movements—and gradually we must abandon singing and the modulation of the voice, for ourselves I mean, not that we may not listen to others. For the pleasure of listening is naturally granted

Ancient compared with modern music.

Dance and ballet may be allowed as recreation and relaxation for youth after toil.

But they must soon be given up, and so must singing, though the mature may listen

[1] Cf. Vives, *Instruction of a Christian Woman* (trans. Richard Hyrde; see Foster Watson, *Vives*). Vives condemns dancing for girls, but says: 'I will make no mention here of the old use of dancing which both Plato and many of the Stoic philosophers said was wholesome for honest men's sons, and Cicero and Quintilian called necessary for an Orator, which was nothing but a certain informing of gesture, and moving of the body, to set and move all in comely order, which craft now, as many others be, is clean out of use.'

[2] On Dancing, cf. Elyot, *Gov.* I. xix, &c., pp. 85 seq.

to every period of life—to advanced and even to extreme age, provided it be indulged with moderation, and sought without undue eagerness. to the performances of musicians.

Rhythmic passages, thoughts set in numbers of that kind which we have approved, whether in reading the poets or sometimes in rendering songs, we desire as the accompaniment of all our life, for they afford at once a pleasant and an appropriate relaxation from studies often too exacting, and from the burden of public responsibility. To hear music is a relief from the cares of public responsibility as well as from the labour of study.

Paul. I have quite clearly understood, my father, both what you adopt and approve in music, and what you reject: I shall take pains, therefore, to obey both you and Truth herself in both respects.

Jac. Surely we must not forget to summon to the company of the other disciplines, Arithmetic,[1] which is indeed the art and science of number, the use of which is so necessary to us that without her we could not know how many fingers we have on our hands, or reckon the objects upon which we gaze with our eyes—the ridiculous position in which the ancients must have found themselves before the time of Palamedes, who is credited with the invention of counting at Troy. For at that Arithmetic joins the other disciplines.

[1] Cf. Plato, *Laws*, vii. 818–22, on arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy; and *Rep.* vii. 522: 'Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares that he had invented number, and had numbered the ships and set in array the ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had never been numbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been incapable of counting his own feet—how could he if he was ignorant of number?'

time neither Agamemnon, the leader of that vast host, nor Nestor, who (so Homer tells us) excelled in wisdom, nor even Ulysses, the shrewdest of mortals, could have told the number of the ships with which they put in at Troy. But putting aside these legends, the knowledge and practice of this art must be given to our youths, so far as is advisable; the elements at any rate must be acquired, and we must make some little way in the subject, so as to understand the diverse properties of numbers,[1] the nature of the even and the odd, their manifold and various interconnexions, their quite startling correspondences, subsequent numbers reproducing after fixed intervals the characteristic features of those that preceded them. And other matters of the same order, which afford the noble pleasure attending the acquisition of a generous art, and are in high degree suitable for sharpening and quickening the mind. Moreover, they withdraw the mind from external and tangible things, and set it upon a better use of itself, so that, relying on its own strength and not distracted by the force of sensible objects, it may hold more consistently to the contemplation of external and unchanging truth. For this art possesses this gift in a pre-eminent degree; since the nature or quality of numbers is of such a sort that it is never involved in any, the slightest, traffic with transient and unstable things; it is pure and simple, like a cloistered maiden, touched not by the eyes and hands, but only by the minds of her courtiers. It is a service of a lower kind for themselves and

The elements of arithmetic must be acquired for practical use, and some attempt must be made to get the theory of number.

Arithmetic a generous art—disengaging the mind from external things, and setting it upon the contemplation of eternal truth.

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 157–8, §§ 179–80.

for their lives which they derive from this art, who turn to profit that part of it which is concerned with subtracting and adding sums, and which we call the reasoning part; they seek from it an advantage not to their character but to their coffers and strong boxes.[1] Even if it is applied to such ends, its aid is not properly sought for any other purpose than that both in war and peace, at home and abroad, the interests of the state may be well managed, and the private affairs of citizens may be handled in orderly fashion—and none of these objects can be properly secured without this study. And money-making is always even a sordid thing to generous minds; whereas the straight steering of public and private affairs is proper to a wise man.

Commercial arithmetic.

But we may go further: all those other arts which we call 'mathematical' derive their principles from this, and could not do their work without it. What would music be without the idea of number? or geometry?[2] Or what can astrology, that searches the heavens and their constellations, do without it? All these arts receive

The other 'mathematical' arts, music, geometry, astrology.

[1] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* vii. 525: 'We must endeavour to persuade those who are to be the principal men of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only; nor again, like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul herself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being.'

[2] Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* i. 2. 5: 'In summo apud illos (Graecos) honore geometria fuit, itaque nihil mathematicis inlustrius: at nos metiendi ratiocinandique utilitate huius artis terminavimus modum.'

from arithmetic number, as it were a spirit, and then clothe it themselves, adding to it something, like a body of their own. Thus, for instance, to unity, than which there is nothing in Nature more simple, more limited, or more independent of everything else, geometry adds place and position, music sound, astrology, even visibility and movement.

The praise of geometry.

As for geometry,[1] in what words shall we praise it? It is a discipline, the influence of which spreads even more widely, and makes itself deeply felt in all the arts and enterprises of man. It is

Its scope

the science of the point, the line, the surface, the figure, both in the plane and in the solid; it rests upon a foundation of the most trustworthy reasons; nowhere is it uncertain; it never slips; while it affords wonderful pleasure to the mind in the contemplation of truth; and for every kind of circumstance it is not only apt and appropriate, but, above all others, necessary. For that one science which embraces all things that are achieved by the

and its manifold uses.

wit and labour of men, balance and arrangements and the proportionate adjustment of one thing with another—that science is geometry. The roofs and walls of our houses, the noble and imposing monuments of human craft which we still see in the ancient temples, theatres, and vaults of Rome, would not stand, and could not move us to the great admiration which we feel for them, had they not been wrought out by the measurement of geometry. Think of our columns and porticoes! Think

[1] Cf. Plato, *Laws*, vii. 819 seq.; Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 158, § 181.

of the instruments and engines of warfare! Think of the arts of moulding and painting, of striking forms out of bronze or marble, arts ennobled of old by men of great genius and granted, indeed, only to honourable minds! Think of the whole art of navigation itself, the knowledge which we derive from geography[1] of locality, of coastlines, of territories, of shores! or again the measurement of estates, the tracing the courses of rivers! Finally, not to attempt a complete catalogue, everything which appeals to the eye by its beauty and splendour, everything which comes home to the use of life by its convenience or its necessity, belongs to this art, and is, indeed, the discovery of this faculty. But why detail the works of human hands? The heavenly[2] bodies above our heads revolving in their courses, whose nature and function no human words can express or explain—or again in our lower and changing world, the connected harmony of light and heavy, the poise achieved by finely adjusted forces, by which diverse bodies, opposed in nature to each other, and yet so linked and bound together, that though they strive mightily to avoid each other, are yet held in a single system[3]—why, I say,

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 159, § 181.

[2] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, pp. 157–8, § 180: 'Which when he can readily do, he may then be entered in the Celestial; and there going over all the Circles again, with a more particular Observation of the Ecliptick or Zodiack, to fix them all very clearly and distinctly in his Mind, he may be taught the Figure and Position of the several Constellations, which may be showed him first upon the Globe, and then in the Heavens.'

[3] Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* i. 10. 46 seq.: 'Quid? quod se eadem

The divine art of geometry.

should we speak of the works of man, when all these things are wrought out by the art—the divine art—of geometry? The force and range of this art were understood by Archimedes, who has the reputation of excelling all others in his mastery of it. He was wont to declare that, in his belief, if a second universe were discovered, he could connect and attach it to this: and certainly he seemed to be speaking not rashly or vainly nor making any idle boast. For his skill in geometry gave him a profound understanding of the principles of weight and measurement by which all bodies are governed and directed, and he knew that these principles were applicable not merely to the convenience and service of our daily life, but also to the movement and propulsion of the vastest bodies. When his native city was besieged, this great man stood forth as its saviour, by bringing his knowledge of geometry and of weight to her aid against the strength of a Roman army and the courage of a very great general. And yet he was blamed for drawing into the arena of common affairs, and so violently dishonouring, an art which owes its dignity mainly to its remoteness from the world of sense and sight and its dependence upon mind and intelligence. For among those learned men who still frequented the ruins of the Academy, where of old such themes were more liberally treated, the quality of this

geometria tollit ad rationem usque mundi? in qua, cum siderum certos constitutosque cursus numeris docet, discimus nihil esse inordinatum atque fortuitum: quod ipsum non nunquam pertinere ad oratorem potest.'

art was esteemed finer and more subtle, and a result in the cultivation and equipment of natural gifts of intellect was sought from it, all the more fruitful because not exposed to the admiration of vulgar eyes; it consisted in the contemplation[1] of truth itself, and in those high speculations which the Greeks call 'theorems', visions springing and drawn from each other in an endless series and revealing themselves so subtly and so clearly, that the mind, content with the sweetness of learning, seeks for nothing more, and is loath to suffer this serene delight to be interrupted by the rough clamour of popular applause.

Mystical absorption in geometrical truth.

Paul. Great heavens, do you bid me learn so many great subjects, especially as I am pressing on towards philosophy—subjects any one of which might well fill the lifetime of one man? Yet I agree with you, and admit that all these matters ought to be learnt (if indeed that be possible)—and I am of course eager for the task; but I constantly hear many lamenting the shortness of human life and making much in their speech of the difficulty and the number of arts of this kind, as if to say that the goal can never be reached. Thus they have on their lips that saying of Theophrastus, who when dying is said to have found fault with Nature for granting to some of the beasts and birds, to which such a gift could count for nothing, long spaces of life, while she

Paullus is alarmed at the number of subjects which he is to learn.

[1] Plato, *Rep.* vii. 527: 'The knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and not of aught perishing and transient . . . Geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and create the spirit of philosophy.'

chooses to put out the light of man, born for knowledge and contemplation, when he has scarcely begun to make good use of his mind and reason. Now I should very much like, if you please, to hear what you think about the opinion of these men, and to learn what aid to the understanding of philosophy (and that is our main quest) you find in these arts which you have named.

What aid to the understanding of philosophy is to be got from all these arts ?

Jac. The very greatest aid, Paullus, if I may reply to your second question first—manifold and various aid, useful and suited to many purposes. All knowledge or learning is liberal, but those arts of which we have so long been speaking are, as it were, members of that one great body,[1] the object of our quest, philosophy itself; for every process of handling and learning facts of nature—of whatever kind they may be—and all that is involved and implied in the contemplation of nature—all this falls within the province of philosophy, and is illuminated by its light, as by a ray of truth. Moreover, there are in philosophy certain problems which are held to excel all others in importance and dignity—such, for instance, as the knowledge of the highest good, and of the ultimate cause which makes all other things to be what they are, and other questions kindred and related to that supreme and master problem: to the understanding of which, since they have their

All the arts are members of one body—which is philosophy herself.

[1] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* vii. 531: 'Now when all these studies reach the point of intercommunion and connection with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them have a value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit in them.'

place in the highest region of the mind's activity, we climb, as it were, by grades and stages through studies and disciplines of this kind. And from these contributory studies themselves much is gained that supports and uplifts the mind. Without this aid the mind must almost of necessity move with tottering and uncertain steps to discover the noble and useful service of these arts in that very realm (of pure philosophy); nay, a supreme service, for these summon the mind from the senses, and teach it to consider and investigate, in abstract meditation free from the disturbance of the bodily senses, those things which in themselves deserve such consideration. And this is indeed the most distinctive and proper business of the philosopher. The essential qualities of things—what they truly are in themselves—Nature has either hidden from our gaze, or when she has thrust them upon us in the commerce of our daily life, she has yet woven about them so tangled a web of mystery that, though they affect our hearing, our sight, and our other senses, they cast a cloud of obscurity over the mind in its efforts to apprehend what each really is, and so it were no light task, no trifling labour, for the mind to make its way unaided through the throng and press of sensible objects and to discover what each thing is in itself—I mean, its essence, always the same, and subject to no variation by time or any other cause of change.[1] And this

We climb step by step through many disciplines to the highest plane of the mind's activity.

[1] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* x. 602: 'And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding—there is the beauty of them—and the apparent

The several arts contribute to free the mind from the dominion of sensible things, and lift it to the region of truth.

could by no means be achieved, unless we were able to control and indeed to banish the senses, and to enforce silence upon those creatures of imagination which, springing from our sense-impressions of external things, make their way into the mind and rudely disturb its contemplation. And, indeed, in so far as each art teaches the mind to manage itself in this way, to escape as far as possible from the dominion of the senses, and to retire into itself, it is specially useful and suitable as an introduction to philosophy; as may be seen most clearly in the disciplines of numbering and measuring; for they set before the mind for its treatment and consideration those things which are untouched by movement or sense or time or change or inconsistency or conflicting impulses, and stand independent and maintain within themselves their own unmistakable eternal constancy and truth. And as this is a quality natural to philosophy, these arts and sciences of mathematics (whether because they train the mind to the habit of independent and solitary speculation, trusting to and established upon its native strength, or because they are themselves in a certain sense parts and members of philosophy) must be acquired, at any rate in some measure, by those who aim at philosophy, and are not to be passed by without due tribute paid. For if the vastness of these subjects alarms some students and makes them ready to despair of themselves,

Some mathematics must be acquired by students of philosophy.

greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight'.

the fault is not to be attributed to the art, or the difficulty of learning, but rather to weakness and slackness of mind. Not that you should maintain that in the arts themselves there is no difficulty, no burdensomeness (if I may so speak, for the facts cannot be reconciled with the word), but rather that in the things of the mind there is a certain subtlety, a certain abstract quality which it is idle to put before the vulgar and cannot be made clear to dull and sluggish minds, but which does not escape the keen search of acute and vigorous intellects, a quality into which, with the aid of a little guidance, a slight indication, these make their way so easily and so rapidly, that they would appear not to be wandering through strange and unfamiliar territory, but exercising their proper sway in their own country. For when the mind is well established and firmly set by nature in men, its power is very great—so great that it is neither overcome by the number of things which it perceives and grasps, nor burdened by the vast magnitude of some, nor bewildered by the infinitesimal minuteness of others. Just as our eyes (if nature has given us strong and clear eyes) with smooth and easy movement towards whatever quarter they turn, quickly and without effort embrace whatever they will; so the mind, if it is by nature well-planted and equipped for grasping every kind of subject towards which it directs itself, is clear of vision. For consider, if it were difficult to equip oneself so completely with the knowledge and resources of many arts, how could so many learned men have

Vulgar, dull, and sluggish minds are baffled by the subtlety of things of the mind.

But an acute and well-trained mind is overcome neither by the magnitude nor by the number of the subjects with which it is confronted.

Learned men of old time.

come forth long ago from the schools of Greece, and made the claim (splendid and proud as it was thought at the time) that they were prepared to give an instant reply to every inquirer who should consult them on any subject whatsoever? Gorgias[1] of Leontini was the first, we learn, to do this; and for this so rich a meed of praise was offered from the whole of Greece, that to him alone

Gorgias of Leontini.

[1] Cf. Cicero, *de Orat.* i. 102–3: 'Quid? mihi vos nunc' inquit Crassus 'tanquam alicui Graeculo otioso et loquaci et fortasse docto atque erudito quaestiunculam, de qua meo arbitratu loquar, ponitis? Quando enim me ista curasse aut cogitasse arbitramini et non semper inrisisse potius eorum hominum impudentiam, qui cum in schola adsedissent, ex magna hominum frequentia, dicere iuberent, si quis quid quaereret? Quod primum ferunt Leontinum fecisse Gorgiam, qui permagnum quiddam suscipere ac profiteri videbatur, cum se ad omnia, de quibus quisque audire vellet, esse paratum denuntiaret; postea vero volgo hoc facere coeperunt hodieque faciunt, ut nulla sit res neque tanta neque tam improvisa, neque tam nova, de qua se non omnia, quae dici possunt, profiteantur esse dicturos.'

See also Sandys, *Orator*, Introd., p. vii, note: ἐλθόντος δὲ Γοργίου εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἐπεδείξατο ἐκεῖ λόγον καὶ εὐδοκίμησε πάνυ, ὥστε ἡνίκα ἐπεδείκνυτο λόγον ὁ Γ. ἑορτὴν ἄπρακτον ἐποίουν Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ λαμπάδας τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ ὠνόμασαν. *Proleg. ad Hermog.* iv. 15, Walz.

Cicero, *de Inven.* i. 5, § 7: 'Materiam artis eam dicimus, in qua omnis ars, et ea facultas, quae conficitur ex arte, versatur. Ut medicinae materiam morbos ac volnera, quod in his omnis medicina versatur, item quibus in rebus versatur ars et facultas oratoria, eas res materiam artis rhetoricae nominamus. Has autem res alii plures, alii pauciores existimarunt: nam *Gorgias* Leontinus, antiquissimus fere rhetor, omnibus de rebus oratorem optime posse dicere existimavit . . .'

Cf. also *de Finibus*, ii. 1: 'Primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quaestionem, id est iubere dicere,

of all others, not a gilded, but a golden[1] statue was set up at Delphi. Yet this claim, with its novel pretensions, admired at first, was afterwards cheapened by an undistinguished crowd of followers and imitators: while others, by a display of their ability and their interests, secured their position within the province of what we call liberal arts and of pure letters.

Hippias.

But when Hippias[2] at the Olympic games, which attracted the greatest concourse of folk from every part of Greece, not content with declar-

qua de re quis vellet audire: audax negotium, dicerem impudens, nisi hoc institutum postea translatum ad philosophos nostros esset; sed et illum, quem nominavi, et ceteros sophistas, ut e Platone intelligi potest, lusos videmus a Socrate.'

Cf. also Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* i. 4. 7: 'Ponere iubebam de quo quis audire vellet; ad id aut sedens aut ambulans disputabam.'

[1] Cic. *de Orat.* iii. 129: 'Hic [Gorgias] in illo ipso Platonis libro de omni re, quaecunque in disceptationem quaestionemque vocetur, se copiosissime dicturum esse profitetur; isque princeps ex omnibus ausus est in conventu poscere qua de re quisque vellet audire; cui tantus honos habitus est a Graecia, soli ut ex omnibus Delphis non inaurata statua, sed aurea statueretur.'

[2] See Sandys, op. cit., p. ix; and Cic. *de Orat.* iii. 126: 'Illos veteres doctores auctoresque dicendi nullum genus disputationis a se alienum putasse accepimus, semperque esse in omni orationis ratione versatos; ex quibus Elius Hippias, cum Olympiam venisset maxima illa quinquennali celebritate ludorum, gloriatus est cuncta paene audiente Graecia nihil esse ulla in arte rerum omnium quod ipse nesciret; nec solum has artes, quibus liberales doctrinae atque ingenuae continerentur, geometriam, musicam, litterarum cognitionem et poetarum atque illa, quae de naturis rerum, quae de hominum moribus, quae de rebus publicis dicerentur, sed anulum quem haberet, pallium quo amictus, soccos quibus indutus esset, [se] sua manu confecisse.'

ing that he had skill in all the generous disciplines, undertook to be a guide and master to any one, and vaunted that he had himself fashioned and made the ring which he had on his finger, the shoes he wore, and the cloak with which he was covered, did he not prove that there is no art or skill which can escape the quick wit of man? Granted that he was an idle boaster, and that the others who made the same pretence are not to be suffered—I call you back to those who without any ostentation have yet attained the highest power, the glory of complete wisdom. Is there anything, do you suppose, in the realm of nature or in the sphere of any art which escaped the vast range and penetrating insight of Plato, or Aristotle's keen mind, or the fertile intelligence of Theophrastus, or the grasp and patience of Polemon, Arcesilaus, Chrysippus, and Carneades?

Examples of complete wisdom and knowledge—Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Polemon, Arcesilaus, Chrysippus, Carneades.

Ancient Greece was rich with a glorious company of such men as these; and there is no need to name them severally. Among our own countrymen philosophers of that kind have been more rare—a deficiency for which fortune is to blame. The road to philosophy was no sooner open than first Varro, by far the most learned of all the ancients, and after him Cicero, that golden stream of eloquence, threw themselves into it, and were drawing the intellect of Rome in their train when the revolution came, and barbarism in morals and in letters imposed silence on the noble arts. But let us come down from those distant periods of antiquity to our times. I do not suppose you imagine that the writer whom you most admire,

Varro and Cicero.

Examples from our own time—

whom you constantly have in your hands and are diligently reading—that Bembo has been able to reach the splendid eminence which he holds both as an orator and a man of learning, without knowledge and mastery of many arts. In Bembo our age finds its chief ornament, and for myself I derive a special delight from him, for from our very boyhood we have been closely bound to one another by a tie of the most intimate affection, and in our love for each other yield nothing to brothers of one family. What shall I say of Hieronymus Aleander, or, once more, of Desiderius Erasmus, both of them men very learned, and widely famed for their knowledge, their command, their retentive grasp of every kind of art and of science? Or what of our friend Andreas Alciatus, or again, not to go further, think, Paullus, of your friend Gregorius Lilius, with whose example of scholarly labour and achievement you were early impressed, while you were still with your father. Are we to say that he attained his deep and varied knowledge without labour bestowed? As his constant companion Joannes Franciscus Picus, a man of distinguished gifts and noble lineage, whom we too have always admired, in what field of knowledge or learning can any one think him unpractised? He had, indeed, in his own family the example to copy, of a man great both in character and in learning, his uncle Joannes Picus; but by his own gifts of mind and his own industry he has brought it about, that though Joannes is dead we do not lament his loss, being able to recognize him in the person of his kins-

Bembo.

Aleando.

Erasmus.

Alciato.

Gregorio Lilio.

Pico.

man by his learning and his temper. But since it were an endless task to enumerate all those who by natural endowments, reinforced by strenuous effort, have achieved distinction in many fields of literary and scientific work, let us sum up the matter thus. The subjects embraced in the various liberal and generous arts, though no doubt in different kinds, have similar methods of inquiry and investigation by which they are held together as if by one common spirit: and so they are easily revealed to sound, alert, observant minds; and to these they lie open and plain to understand. But to sluggish and dull intelligences, damaged by disuse and sloth, they appear very difficult; insomuch that it seems indeed a true saying that they must needs be quickly seized or never: for the whole difference lies not in the diversity nor the difficulty of the arts, but in ability and determination. Nor need we marvel if there have been, and are every day, men who, having set before themselves the task of treating and learning some single art, have spent their whole life upon it. Such men are like navigators, who, having resolved to shape their course for some particular port, are during their voyage taken by the charm of another place, and, abandoning their original route, settle and establish their fortunes there. So, as you said just now, we who pursue philosophy—in which our destiny has fixed our harbour—must take certain ports of call, and stay in them as long as befits, and long enough to know them; that must be till you have examined the position of the places and the character

Different subjects pursued by a common method of investigation.

Some men, indeed, spend their whole life upon a single art.

and manners of the people, not as a native or resident would, but as an interested traveller, so that if you should, by chance, have to return thither, you would need no guide, but would be revisiting a known and familiar resting-place. So in all the other disciplines and arts through which we make our way to philosophy, we must master the elements and fundamental principles; and those main points from which for the treatment and consolidation of each special subject the whole process of argument is drawn must be thoroughly grasped and firmly fixed in the memory. Some lines of investigation have to be followed, but not all that may be comprised and included within the subject, for that is an endless task, and one on which not a few good men, attracted by the charm of some idle gratification, have spent the whole of their life or their leisure. For continuous application to any single subject always engenders and produces something which you may contemplate with delight, if the student is willing minutely to traverse all the matters which come within its scope. The student will make no end to his researches, save by disentangling and freeing himself like Ulysses, whose efforts to wrench himself away were too vigorous for him to be held captive by the Sirens' song. This at all events I can confidently promise and affirm, that if a man strive by these aids and disciplines to attain philosophy, and tinctured rather than saturated with a reasonable knowledge and command of these subjects, give himself up wholly to this queen of all the sciences, he will

We must pursue each several art far enough for our main purpose, which lies beyond it.

Absorption in a single subject natural and delightful.

But we should be content with a reasonable knowledge

and command of the subordinate arts, and press on towards philosophy. We may return to our special subject, enriched and quickened by the resources of philosophy.

afterwards, as need may arise, in returning to any special branch of inquiry and seeking to master and apply any part of it, do it with greater ease and success than if, unversed in philosophy, he had consumed all his time in the study of that one particular subject. For he will return to the special object with character and mind greatly enriched and quickened by the resources of philosophy.

Paullus longs for philosophy.

Paul. Now at length I understand, father, the gift of which you speak and the method and system to be adopted, and I am completely persuaded that this is the proper procedure. It has more often been my lot, as you talked, to find myself impelled by a certain passion towards philosophy, and now I feel myself more hotly aflame than ever, for I see that there is nothing good or worth seeking that does not come from her or lead to her. Shall I ever see the day when, by the supreme favour of Heaven and by your help, I shall know myself to be in possession of this great good?

He has not far to travel.

Jac. You have but a little of the way yet to travel, and to a spirit such as yours all that is to come will be very easy. You have, indeed, already reached the beginnings of moral philosophy, and the path leads surely to the loftiest heights and ranges of philosophy. By this path I will lead you when you have completed the course of study which you have now almost covered. For when you have achieved the other parts of a liberal training you must devote a little more time and study to geometry and also to astronomy;

a single summer will, however, be enough for that, provided you draw your information from Greek writers : for the Latin treatises are rather confused. And as I have so far said nothing about astronomy, I think we ought not to pass it over in silence. Astronomy [1] is the science, not of the natures and forms of celestial bodies (for that is the business of philosophy), but the movements of those vast and multitudinous bodies, the daily and nightly courses and orbits alike of the vast globes that make up all our system and of the stars and constellations. A man need not learn all the parts of this subject, nor each of them in detail, unless he proposes to be a professor of it : but for such as make philosophy their aim, to know enough and to learn the elements of this science is part of a liberal education. For who is so boorish, so deaf to the voice of nature, that the spectacle of the great luminaries does not stir him to some reflection about them ? Surely every one must wish to know whether the world in which we live occupies a place at the summit, or centre, or base of the cosmic system : to have some knowledge of the risings and settings of the stars, the movements of the sun, the moon, and other planets, differing as they do from one another, and yet regular and constant in their own times and spaces : how one star approaches another and often passes it, or again from time to time suddenly returns : the divers eclipses [2] of the sun (as the poet says) and the toilings of the moon, why the suns of

Astronomy.

[1] Cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 158, § 180.

[2] Virg. *Georg.* ii. 477–82.

winter haste to plunge in the ocean, or what delay besets the tarrying nights and other like matters. Those who disdain to give their minds to such things will find that they have much ado, not so much to grasp the truths of philosophy as to justify their very title to the name of men.

The desire of knowledge springs from wonder, and the spectacle of the starry heavens prompts wonder.

Paul. That is true: for if from wonder [1] springs the desire for knowledge and comprehension, as I have often heard you say, there is surely nothing more marvellous than the contemplation of the heavenly bodies.

The open plains of philosophy reached at last.

Jac. This course being completed, Paullus (for we have now reached your present age, and there remains for you little or nothing of all the studies I have mentioned), we must at length enter the broad and open plains of philosophy, so fruitful and fertile in all, the use and enjoyment of which can serve to render life most happy! I have already made a beginning for you in directing you to Aristotle's *Ethics*. If you read that treatise you will learn that anything right and noble in your life which is the outcome of practice and training is not virtue itself, but the image and the semblance of virtue. But, as I have said elsewhere, philosophy will breathe a spirit and a soul into this dumb and lifeless image, and will give it life

Aristotle's *Ethics*—an introduction.

Philosophy breathes a soul into formal and habitual rectitude of conduct.

[1] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* v. 475 C: 'He who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher;' and *Theaet.* 155 D: 'I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder.'

and expression. But to this study of philosophy we should add dialectic, to which we also give the name of logic. I have long since instructed you in that part of the art which deals with forms and methods of proof, and many circumstances have combined to teach you for yourself the use and value of such processes. But there are many difficulties yet which it is necessary to appreciate and overcome, unless the mind is to fail in the investigation of the highest matters of all. For in every kind of inquiry we undertake there is a certain way, or subtle method, of discovering what is most essential and proper to that special quest, from which materials and arguments are to be drawn for sound conclusions and demonstrations. And there is the more need of grasping and understanding this with perfect clearness, since there are almost innumerable fallacies,[1] in themselves fundamentally opposed to truth, though bearing a specious resemblance to it, which mislead not only those who have but a tincture of knowledge but often the most learned and well-informed, dislodging the stable from their position and tricking the vigilant. And unless the weapons of dialectic are handled with trained skill, no resistance can be made. But since you will soon learn, under my guidance, from the actual treatises of Aristotle all that I have just said about dialectic and its force and power, there is no need to say more now, save only to warn and counsel you that, standing as you do on the very threshold of philosophy, you should set yourself for constant

Dialectic is needed too (with logic).

A method of science.

The weapon of dialectic must be used by trained skill.

[1] On Logic, cf. Locke, *Thoughts*, p. 162, § 189.

The best authors to be constantly read; especially Plato and Aristotle.

reading and reflection the best authors of that incomparable science, above all Plato and Aristotle, in virtue of whose divine genius and amazing knowledge, Greece justly claims superiority over all other nations. But then you must read the commentators, the Greek for choice, for I think you

Do not use Latin versions of Greek philosophers.

ought carefully to avoid those writers who, offering a Latin version, have produced a corrupt and barbarous jargon, and by their debased style and preposterous questions have spread great clouds over philosophy. They bring nothing generous nor correct: but in their ignorance of the true force of philosophy pursue bastard reasonings, or sophisms as the Greeks call them, instead of true and legitimate reasons, and, for all the violence of their declamation and contention, are utterly weak in true wisdom. Led on by their

False philosophers.

natural vanity and ignorance, they court a reputation with the mob for achievements which ought to make them blush with shame. Have nothing to do with this crew nor their follies, Paullus, but

The art of life, the gift of philosophy.

embrace Philosophy[1] in the knowledge that she gives the art of living happily and well, that she teaches us not only how to think, but how to act and do. She will bring you steadfastness and strength in good conduct; she will supply your speech with abundance and wealth of fairest subjects and thoughts; she will establish you in

[1] Cf. Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* i. 1. 1: 'Cum omnium artium, quae ad rectam vivendi viam pertinerent, ratio et disciplina studio sapientiae, quae philosophia dicitur, contineretur, hoc mihi Latinis litteris inlustrandum putavi . . .' Cf. *de Fin.* iii. 2. 4: 'Ars est enim philosophia vitae.'

the soundest counsels and desires, she will ever keep you in the way of faith and duty and integrity; she will see to it that what is high and upright and generous in your spirit (and in these true dignity consists) shall never yield to fortune or be moved by prosperity or adversity.

Those who, having come so far and having long found a nursing mother in philosophy, turn afterwards to other interests in life, whether the civil law be their pursuit or the service of the state in peace or war, or any other art or mode of life that leads to honour and renown, may be sure that, to whatever they devote themselves, they will take with them greatly increased store both of facility in entering and of wisdom and determination in fulfilling their task. But those who make their abiding habitation in philosophy are to be deemed godlike rather than of the common way and nature of men. It is of their number, Paullus, that I most desire you to be, that your own disposition towards virtue and my hope for you may win the noblest and best of goals. I shrink from no pains to train and teach you; but I would fain be upheld by this supreme hope and consolation—the promise of a life continued in your own.

Those who, after philosophic training, turn to any other pursuit will have gained efficiency and determination.

Those who make philosophy their habitation are to be deemed godlike.

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